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New Policing, New Segregation: 
From Ferguson to New York
JEFFREY FAGAN * AND ELLIOTT ASH§
INTRODUCTION
In popular and political culture, many observers credit nearly twenty-
five years of declining crime rates to the “New Policing.”1 Breaking with 
a past tradition of “reactive policing,” the New Policing emphasizes 
advanced statistical metrics, new forms of organizational accountability, 
and aggressive tactical enforcement of minor crimes. 2 The existing 
research and scholarship on these developments have focused mostly on 
the nation’s major cities, where concentrated populations and elevated 
crime rates provide pressurized laboratories for police experimentation, 
often in the spotlight of political scrutiny. An additional line of scholarship 
has looked more closely at how the tactics of the New Policing have 
become institutionalized in police–citizen interactions in the everyday 
lives of residents of poorer, often minority, and higher-crime areas of the 
nation’s cities.3
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1. See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 
413–14 (2000); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW 
YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL, at x–xi (2011). For a review, see 
Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain 
the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 172–73 (2004).
2. See WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S
TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 239 (1998); CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, SECURING 
THE CITY: INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST COUNTERTERROR FORCE—THE NYPD 106 (2010);
GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 188–91 (1996).
3. See, e.g., VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO 
BOYS 3–5 (2011); David A. Harris, The Dangers of Racialized Perceptions and Thinking 
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These efforts have often overlooked how this New Policing has been 
woven into the social, political, and legal fabrics of smaller, less densely 
populated areas. These areas are characterized by more intimate and 
individualized relationships among citizens, courts, and police, as well as 
closely spaced local boundaries with a considerable flow of persons 
through administrative entities such as villages and towns. The New 
Policing models have had extensive reach into the everyday lives of 
citizens living in these areas, yet little research has been done on their 
effect. In popular discourse, small-town policing seems like a different 
world from urban policing; police–citizen interactions are both 
quantitatively less common and qualitatively distinct. It is an open 
question whether the processes of policing and the experiences of citizens 
in these more intimate spaces can be understood through the same 
framework as urban policing. 
The New Policing provides a paradigm for understanding and 
comparing the practices of policing and the experiences of citizens in large 
and small areas. In cities, residents have frequent contact with police, 
often in the context of investigative stops or field interrogations based on 
low levels of suspicion.4 High rates of misdemeanor arrests draw people 
into systems of legal sanctions and control, often for low-level, nonviolent 
offenses. 5 Whereas stops have consequences for socio-legal behaviors, 6
the consequences of the misdemeanor arrest prong of the New Policing go 
well beyond the dignitarian concerns of street stops.7 Arrests for low-level 
by Law Enforcement, in DEADLY INJUSTICE: TRAYVON MARTIN, RACE, AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 146, 155–56 (Devon Johnson et al. eds., 2015). 
4. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of 
Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168–69, 175–76
(2015).
5 . See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 611, 639, 668 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1313, 1358–59 (2012).
6. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 143 (2014); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 43, 68–69 (2009); Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the 
Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323–25 (2014);
K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 306–07 (2009); 
William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 1216–17 (1998); 
Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: 
Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 751, 757–60 (2014).
7 . Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1218; see also Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, 
Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,”
66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1035–39 (2014); Rod K. Brunson & Ronald Weitzer, Police 
Relations with Black and White Youths in Different Urban Neighborhoods, 44 URB. AFF.
REV. 858, 865–68 (2009); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and 
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misdemeanors, as well as noncustodial citations or summonses, are a 
staple of this policing model. 8 The use of administrative codes and 
ordinances in these police practices often results in either custody arrests
or summonses requiring court appearances. Few of these contacts result in 
jail time, but many result in monetary costs for fees as well as fines and 
other financial sanctions.9 As discussed in Part I below, these regimes of 
misdemeanor arrests and summonses are influenced by, and draw 
justifying ideology from, practices common to “Broken Windows” models 
of policing that are now common in cities across the United States.10
The 2014 investigation into the events in Ferguson, Missouri, by the 
Department of Justice, raised social, legal, and political awareness of how 
the New Policing unfolds in less urban areas.11 The Ferguson episode and 
related incidents have driven a painful national conversation about the
New Policing: racially uneven enforcement of petty offenses, the use of 
lethal force, constraints on police accountability, indigent defense after 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 12 the political economy of policing and 
punishment, and the role of criminal justice in an era of declining crime 
both in cities and in many less urban areas. In particular, it revealed how 
monetary sanctions are deeply woven into local institutions and 
illuminated the path from noncriminal legal matters to deeper criminal 
liability and punishment. Still, even after the revelations in the Ferguson 
report, legal and social science scholarship about the New Policing in less 
populated areas has remained separate from research about the New 
Policing in urban settings. 
This Article questions this separation. We observe surprising and 
troubling similarities in the conduct of the New Policing in two vastly 
different areas: the suburb of Ferguson and the metropolis of New York 
City. We compare the processes of investigative stops, intensive 
enforcement of municipal codes, arrest practices in high-discretion 
offenses, and—most importantly—how these cases are adjudicated and 
Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perception of Police 
Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 256–57 (2010).
8. JACK MAPLE WITH CHRIS MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD 
GUYS OUT OF BUSINESS 214 (2000).
9. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1175, 1186–89 (2014). See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH:
MONETARY SANCTIONS AS A PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 26–46 (2016).
10. Heymann, supra note 1, at 449–50; George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Why 
We Need Broken Windows Policing, CITY JOURNAL (Winter 2015), 
https://perma.cc/HPJ4-VP8X. But see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE 
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 46–51 (2005); RALPH B. TAYLOR, 
BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS 93–94 (2000).
11 . See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 2–6 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT].
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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punished. We show that these low-level offenses—whether “public order” 
crimes, such as open container violations, or traffic violations for vehicle 
defects 13 —are the starting point for legal proceedings that over time 
evolve into tougher penalties that leave criminal records with lasting 
consequences. In particular, warrants provide the entry point for processes 
that move from civil fines to criminal punishment.
This Article also shows that the use of monetary sanctions, whether in 
pretrial stages or as punishments, has become a widespread practice that 
flies well below Eighth Amendment scrutiny. We show that in both large 
cities and small municipalities, there is a racial skew in the financial 
burdens of the New Policing. And, in particular, those least able to meet 
the financial obligations imposed by the New Policing are those with the 
most frequent contact with police and courts. These financial burdens can 
metastasize from simple fines to warrants, from warrants to arrests, and 
further to more severe penalties. In turn, exposure to criminal punishment 
imposes social and economic burdens with both near- and long-term 
impacts on employment, housing, and other social assets.
This Article unfolds in four Parts. We begin in Part I with a review of 
New Policing practices leading to court sanctions, as well as the evolution 
of fines from punishment alternatives to a practice deeply ingrained both 
in law and in the political culture of legal institutions. Parts II and III 
develop respective case studies of Ferguson and New York City. We 
conclude in Part IV with a discussion of how New Policing has been 
translated into a web of legal and financial controls that can only be 
appreciated as the new segregation.
I. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE NEW POLICING
A. THE NEW POLICING
The literature in support of the New Policing is exemplified by a 2000 
Fordham Urban Law Journal essay, in which Professor Philip Heymann 
credits the New Policing methods for the sharp crime decline of the 
preceding decade.14 This supporting literature can be traced to the well-
known theoretical essay on “Broken Windows” theory by Professors 
George Kelling and James Wilson.15 In that essay, Professors Kelling and 
Wilson suggested that merely the appearance of disorder signaled 
vulnerability to would-be criminal offenders and thereby increased crime 
rates. Some empirical support for this theory came several years later from 
13. Such as broken taillights or expired registrations.
14. Heymann, supra note 1, at 413–16.
15 . George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://perma.cc/QL3S-RHDR.
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research on disorder and crime, 16 though later reanalysis of those data 
undermined Broken Windows claims.17 The initial research showed that 
aggressive enforcement of minor crimes—usually through arrest—
deterred crime by signaling the risks of detection and punishment to 
criminal offenders.18 The New Policing combined these tactics with the 
use of statistical metrics of geospatial crime patterns to allocate police 
personnel optimally and to strengthen organizational accountability by 
linking police actions with crime rates. 
Professor Debra Livingston described this vector of New Policing 
tactics in a 1997 essay but stopped short of crediting them for producing 
the crime decline. 19 Professor Heymann’s essay took a broader view, 
endorsing both community engagement to solve the problems that 
generated persistent crime and prospective solutions that anticipated crime 
problems and took preventative measures. 20 Both Professors Livingston 
and Heymann highlighted aggressive street stops as an integral component 
of the new approach.21
A large strand of the criminology literature has followed that of 
Professor Heymann in crediting New Policing for the dramatic reduction 
in crime in the 1990s. Professors George Kelling and Catherine Coles 
cited the place-based policing tactics built on Broken Windows theory of 
disorder and crime22 as the engine driving local crime declines in three 
case studies.23 One study showed a sharp decline in gun violence in New 
York City in the early 1990s and gave partial credit to new police 
tactics. 24 Professors Hope Corman and Naci Mocan credited aggressive 
policing in the form of drug-related misdemeanor arrests for the reduction 
16. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL 
OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 73–75 (1992).
17. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social 
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 312–27 (1998).
18. See Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in EVALUATING 
GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 217, 238–39 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. 
Cook eds., 2003); Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police 
on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 183–85 
(1988).
19. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997).
20. Heymann, supra note 1, at 424.
21. Id. at 429; Livingston, supra note 19, at 589–90.
22. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 15.
23. KELLING & COLES, supra note 2, at 194–235.
24. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two 
Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1297–98, 1313–16 (1998) [hereinafter 
Fagan et al., Declining Homicide].
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in murder and other violence in New York City in the 1990s. 25 Others 
found small but measurable effects of misdemeanor arrests on crime, 26
while some studies simply rejected the causal claims of the New Policing 
advocates.27 Other research challenged the core notions of the disorder–
crime relationship, showing that the connections between crime and 
disorder are uncertain.28
Despite these doubts, “proactivity” became a core element of the New 
Policing. 29 Terry stops 30 and misdemeanor arrests were central to the 
notion of proactivity from the start. 31 Over time, proactivity became a 
25. Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 235, 261–63 (2005).
26 . See, e.g., Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Economic 
Conditions on Robbery and Property Crime: The Role of Consumer Sentiment, 45 
CRIMINOLOGY 735, 750 (2007).
27. HARCOURT, supra note 10, at 8–11; ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER 
MYSTERY 117–21 (2000); Jeffrey Fagan, Policing Guns and Youth Violence, 12 FUTURE 
OF CHILD. 133, 142 (1995); Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police 
Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 177–78 (1999);
Harcourt, supra 17, at 342; Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New 
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 
317–20 (2006) [hereinafter Harcourt & Ludwig, New Evidence]; Ana Joanes, Does the 
New York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in New York City’s
Homicide Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 
33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 302–03 (1999); Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Impact 
of Order-Maintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: 1988-
2001, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 355, 377 (2007). But see ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 149; 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 155–56 (2006).
28. Compare TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 18 (finding no evidence that crime is related 
to disorder), Harcourt, supra note 17, at 309 (same), Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, 
Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New 
York City, 1989-2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 165, 176 (2007) (same) 
[hereinafter Harcourt & Ludwig, Reefer Madness], and Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. 
Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in 
Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 637–38 (1999) (finding no direct link 
between disorder and crime), with GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., CTR.
FOR CIVIC INNOVATION, DO POLICE MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW 
YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 18 (2001) (finding evidence that crime is related to 
disorder), SKOGAN, supra note 16, at 10 (same), Corman & Mocan, supra note 25, at 262 
(same), and Rosenfeld et al., supra note 27, at 366–67 (same).
29. The term was first used without fanfare by Professors Jerome Skolnick and 
David Bayley in their description of policing innovations in the 1980s. JEROME H.
SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION IN SIX 
AMERICAN CITIES 178 (1986) (discussing a shift in police tactics from reacting to crime 
complaints to acting in response to chronic criminal problems in specific neighborhoods).
30. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry permitted temporary stops and 
detentions based on reasonable suspicion that crime was “afoot,” supplanting the more 
demanding probable cause standard and memorializing police discretion as the gateway 
to street stops. Id. at 30.
31. The original Broken Windows essay, whose ideas informed the New Policing 
and its proactive prong, argued that arrest should be a last resort when other efforts failed 
to ameliorate the disorderly conditions that invite crime. See Kelling & Wilson, supra 
note 15. By 2000, Kelling had embraced the notion of using arrest authority 
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broad umbrella for a wide range of police tactics. One study defines 
“proactive policing” as the “vigorous enforcement of laws against 
relatively minor [misdemeanor] offenses.”32 Other studies mention the use 
of stop and frisk, or investigative stops, as central to a proactive policing 
policy. 33 Still others portray a mixture of drug enforcement and 
community policing as proactive.34
B. POLICING RACE AND CRIME
In cities, the social and spatial demographics of crime made it 
inevitable that the New Policing would be concentrated in poor, and often 
minority, neighborhoods. Allocating police to places with higher crime 
rates is hardly an irrational response to public safety concerns and also to 
the politics of crime. But that rationality is potentially mediated by several 
factors. First, as practiced in New York, police presence and activity in 
minority neighborhoods seemed to have more to do with race than simply 
with crime. 35 After controlling for local crime rates, a neighborhood’s 
racial composition predicted the police response in terms of proactivity.36
In other words, proactivity was about more than crime; it was also about 
race. 
Second, the allocation is rational only to the extent that it can be 
connected to crime declines. As we show later on, proactivity resulted in 
very high rates of street stops, misdemeanor arrests, and court summonses, 
all of which potentially swept up neighborhood residents into legal 
controls, disproportionately to both racial composition and local crime 
systematically and aggressively to stop minor crime from growing into more serious 
crime patterns and problems. See KELLING & COLES, supra note 2, at 108–56.
32. Charis E. Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 
48 CRIMINOLOGY 57, 57 (2010).
33. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: 
The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 309, 309–10 (Stephen K. 
Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010) [hereinafter Fagan et al., Broken Windows 
Revisited]. 
34. See, e.g., Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing 
Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 318 
(2004).
35. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, 
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 462 (2000); see also
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (claiming that 
police in New York City engaged in “indirect racial profiling” that focused policing in 
minority neighborhoods at rates higher than what the local crime rates would predict); 
Fagan et al., Broken Windows Revisited, supra note 33, at 310.
36. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 32, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034); see also Fagan et al., Broken Windows 
Revisited, supra note 33, at 310.
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rates, and with little to show for it. 37 Stops rarely resulted in arrests or 
seizures of contraband. 38 The few stops that did result in arrests rarely 
involved serious crimes, and few resulted in convictions or punishment.39
These inconsistencies raise questions of fairness, efficiency, and 
constitutionality.40
Third, there is a big difference between the number of police sent to a 
neighborhood and their actions when they get there. Under the New 
Policing methods, involuntary police–citizen contacts rarely were gentle 
or neutral, nor were they intended to be that way. 41 They were neither 
pleasant nor without emotional consequences.42 The harsh tone and style 
of investigative stops raised fear and anger, as well as cynicism, toward 
police and law. 43 Policing framed this way, and carried out 
disproportionately in black and Latino neighborhoods, raised 
constitutional questions of disparate treatment.44 This was not just a story 
about New York: civil rights litigation and federal court oversight spread 
37. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
38. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; Meares, supra note 4, at 164; Jeffrey 
Fagan, Greg Conyers & Ian Ayres, No Runs, Few Hits and Many Errors: Street Stops, 
Bias and Proactive Policing 22 (Nov. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors). 
39. See ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., A
REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-
AND-FRISK PRACTICES 8–9, app. G (2013).
40. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
41 . See MAPLE WITH MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 151–52; Roger Matthews, 
Replacing ‘Broken Windows’: Crime, Incivilities, and Urban Change, in ISSUES IN 
REALIST CRIMINOLOGY 19, 38, 45 (Roger Matthews & Jock Young eds., 1992); see also
PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN 
DISTRICT 114–15 (2008); Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and 
Collective Responsibility, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 363, 366–67 (2004) (describing 
how community police officers invoked a drug-enforcement rationale to stop a suspect 
without any indicia of drug use or possession and proceeded to conduct a fruitless cavity 
search); The Nation, The Hunted and the Hated: An Inside Look at the NYPD’s Stop-and-
Frisk Policy, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2012), https://perma.cc/BFW8-NN8L (presenting audio 
tape recorded by Alvin Cruz during one of his multiple stops. After a physical struggle 
instigated by the police officer and his sergeant, Cruz asked for the reason why the 
officers were arresting him. One replied: “For being a fucking mutt!”).
42. Tyler, Fagan & Geller, supra note 6, at 751; see also Geller et al., supra note 6, 
at 2321.
43. EPP ET AL., supra note 6, at 1–2, 75–84 (describing racial degradation and 
racially selective enforcement in stops and searches in vehicle highway stops); see also
RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND 
REFORM 74 (2006) (showing racial differences in evaluations of police based on 
perceptions and experiences with police misconduct); Tyler, Fagan & Geller, supra note
6, at 771; Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of Racial Profiling: Race, 
Class, and Personal Experience, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 449 (2002). 
44. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 660–64; see also Fagan, Conyers & Ayres, supra 
note 38, at 8, 24. 
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across cities along with the proliferation of the New Policing model. 45
Consent decrees in Maryland, New Jersey, and Los Angeles, and a 
stipulated settlement in New York City, all were based on foundations of 
empirical evidence of racially selective police enforcement fraught with 
Fourth Amendment irregularities. 46 Racial profiling became a 
fundamental component of, and a social fissure in, both legal and popular 
culture.47
The New Policing remained a constant feature of urban policing in the 
United States throughout the broad, nearly twenty-five year crime decline 
that began nationally in 1993 and even earlier in some cities.48 The New 
Policing regimes became entrenched in police practice and policy during 
this time, especially in poor, often minority neighborhoods. 49 Indigence 
characterizes the population that is most affected by the New Policing, 
making it difficult to provide even minimal criminal defenses for minor 
misdemeanors and violations.50
With less serious crime to manage, the excess bureaucratic capacity of 
proactive policing defaulted to an administrative regime. At the same time, 
the New Policing intersected with race and broadened the reach of 
policing and criminal justice, while its transformation to social regulation 
threatened to dilute the significance of the criminal sanction. The 
connection of these regimes to race and crime became more tenuous, as 
45. See David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate 
Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 853, 855–56 (2013).
46. See id. at 871; see generally IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF 
RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (2008); 
EPP ET AL., supra note 6; BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007); R. Richard Banks, Beyond 
Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003); Fagan & 
Davies, supra note 35; Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43
(2016) [hereinafter Fagan, Original Sin]; David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and 
the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); Joanna C. 
Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law 
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010).
47. See Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants 
of Citizen Perceptions, 83 SOC. FORCES 1009, 1017 (2003) (finding that black 
respondents in their survey were six times more likely than whites to believe that police 
prejudice is “very common in their own city”); See also EPP ET AL., supra note 6, at 152–
55.
48. See Fagan et al., Declining Homicide, supra note 24, at 1319–20; Harcourt & 
Ludwig, New Evidence, supra note 27, at 317–20; Richard Rosenfeld, Robert Fornango 
& Eric Baumer, Did Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 419, 420 (2005).
49 . See Issa Koehler-Hausmann, Detecting Discrimination in Policing, 
BALKINIZATION (Aug. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/RNA4-KHKP.
50. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 
122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2181 (2013) (showing that even after Gideon v. Wainwright
confirmed the right to counsel, the New Policing has compounded the very problems that 
Gideon was meant to solve). 
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did their connection to constitutional regulation. But the connection of 
these regimes to cash flow through the courts and correctional agencies 
became more visible and common throughout this era, signaling a new set 
of profit interests to push criminal justice from policing to corrections and 
even deeper into administrative law. We begin to connect the New 
Policing with these profit interests in the next section.
C. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS: A LATENT TAX ON ARRESTEES
1. Punishment and the Undeserving Poor
The connection between money, crime, and punishment has a long 
history in common law countries. 51 In their famous treatise on 
punishment, historians Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer showed how 
fines were integral to punishment regimes beginning in the Middle Ages.52
Debtor prisons were a regular feature of American and European justice 
until their eradication from multiple countries in the nineteenth century.53
But even today there are pathways to prison for debtors, in particular 
through civil contempt for failure to surrender assets or pay court-ordered 
fines. 54 In Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court severely limited the 
practice of revoking probation for a defendant’s failure to pay a fine or 
make restitution. 55 Yet in modern punishment practice, prisoners often 
accrue debt that creates barriers to re-entry upon release.56 Prisoners are 
already likely to be poor entering prison, but once there they accumulate 
further debts administered by courts and correctional authorities as part of 
cost recovery. 57 In many instances, child support obligations also 
compound accruing debt to prisoners.58
In the United States, there is a long history connecting these regimes to 
race. David Oshinsky describes how free black men in the 1800s in 
51. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 19–23; see also Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1179–
81.
52. GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
8–11 (1939).
53 . Gustav Peebles, Washing Away the Sins of Debt: The Nineteenth-Century 
Eradication of the Debtors’ Prison, 55 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 701, 702 n.5 (2013).
54. Richard E. James, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: 
Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 149 (2002). 
55. 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (holding that “sentencing court[s] must inquire into the 
reasons for the failure to pay”).
56 . Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison: Prisoners’ 
Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 187, 192–95 (2007); see also BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN 
AMERICA 87–89 (2007).
57. Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 56, at 187; Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 
1190–96. 
58. Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 56, at 187.
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Mississippi were subject to fines for vagrancy and “being a tramp.” 59
Convict leasing, which targeted mainly black prisoners in the South, was 
an economic boon both for private corporations and for the government 
from Reconstruction through the early 1950s. 60 In the modern era, the 
expansion of the use of monetary penalties has coincided with the 
expansion of the carceral state, 61 which in turn has disproportionately 
affected black and Latino young men and women.62
Monetary penalties have proven to be quite popular in state 
legislatures and in criminal legal institutions. Fines are seen both as a 
legitimate deterrent to wrongdoing and a means of internalizing the costs 
of criminal justice administration (courts, police, prisons, etc.) to the 
prisoner, which would otherwise fall on ostensibly law-abiding taxpayers. 
Further, administrative fees allow state and local legislators to get around 
tough rules on raising local taxes. Fines and administrative fees therefore 
provide a path to budgetary relief without court oversight. Professor 
Alexes Harris shows the penetration of the fine and fee regimes not only 
in (non-tax) statutes but also in the political culture of the courts in 
Washington State, as expressed in interviews with court officers and 
clerical staff about the purpose and justification of the fee regimes.63 It is 
not simply fiscal interests in recuperating costs from poor defendants that 
seemed to animate the institutional postures; rather, Professor Harris 
shows how these fines are shaped by perceptions of criminal defendants—
regardless of crime severity—as deserving of this extra burden beyond 
formal punishments. In effect, this view of defendants reflects a justifying 
ideology about the undeserving offender that links money to crime and 
punishment.64
The concentration of these measures and the animating views of legal 
actors suggest a certain exceptionalism of criminal matters, if not an 
enmity toward criminal offenders. Filing fees for wills and trusts, for 
marriage or incorporation papers, or any other civil action carries none of 
59. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE 
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 42 (1996); see also DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY 
BY ANOTHER NAME 1 (2008).
60. BLACKMON, supra note 59, at 54–57.
61. See Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social 
Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1755 (2010).
62. WESTERN, supra note 56, at 15–18; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 56–58 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). 
63. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 14–15.
64. See John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-
Justifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 260, 260 (2005). For an 
example where moral status is ascribed to a less powerful group to justify legal treatment, 
see Maykel Verkuyten, Justifying Discrimination Against Muslim Immigrants: Out
Group Ideology and the Five Step Social Identity Model, 52 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 
(2013).
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the association of wrongdoing that the language of the fee-authorizing 
criminal statutes connotes. Professor Harris and her colleagues point to the 
language of “accountability” as a linguistic bait-and-switch for 
punishment that is used to justify the imposition of fees for everything 
from an application for indigent defense to a motion to expunge a criminal 
record upon dismissal of a case.65
2. Taxing Criminals
Much of the regime of taxing criminals has developed with the rise in 
incarceration. But until recently, there was little research or scholarship on 
the rise of fee-based criminal justice.66 Recent work by Professor Rachel 
Barkow shows how criminal procedure, from charging through 
adjudication and sentencing, has devolved to—and also, perhaps,
defaulted to—administrative law,67 granting broad discretion to agencies 
with little constitutional interest or oversight. The courts may regard the 
fee regimes as extrinsic to punishment and more accurately classified as 
civil requirements or civil penalties in the case of fines. 68 However, 
defaulting to agency autonomy is an equally compelling explanation, 
removing it from constitutional oversight. In general, the rise of 
administrative criminal justice seems consistent with the general drift 
toward actuarialism in criminal justice.69
65. Harris et al., supra note 61, at 1757.
66. For an exception, see NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON 
AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM
(1990). See also Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: 
Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52 (1982). It is possible that 
as part of the justifying ideology of the court staff and officers, they may view it as fairer 
that offenders pay for the costs of their criminal case rather than the general tax rolls that 
include their victims. But having offenders pay for pre-adjudication costs, including 
filing fees, and vetting their eligibility for indigent defense presumes that they are in fact 
guilty of a criminal offense or a civil violation. Given the high rates of plea bargaining in 
the lower criminal courts in misdemeanor cases, as well as the high rates of prosecutorial 
declination and court dismissal, this is an assumption fraught with risk and potentially 
error. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1211–12.
67. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of 
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1334–35 (2008) (arguing that the transformation of 
criminal law and procedure to an administrative design has reduced sentencing discretion 
and given unfettered power to agencies); see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy 
at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841 (2014); David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and 
Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 510 (2016)
(claiming that “[a]d hoc instrumentalism and boundary organizations, in turn, are parts of 
a still larger movement toward greater flexibility and fluidity in governance, a movement 
that includes the broad categories of negotiated rulemaking”).
68. Harris et al., supra note 61, at 1757.
69. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 6 (2009).
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New research in these fee-generating regimes followed from research 
and political interest in the growth of incarceration. After four decades of 
rising incarceration rates, legal scholars and empirical researchers focused 
attention on the consequences of incarceration, including features of 
incarceration that affected both jail and prison populations. 70 While the
accrual of debt is an indirect consequence of incarceration in prison, the 
debt burdens of jail spells are only now gaining research and advocacy 
attention.71
The expansion of misdemeanor justice, driven in part by the New 
Policing, has imposed heavy fines and fees on jail populations.72 As much 
as prison itself creates stigma and lingering collateral damage once 
released from confinement, the fines and fees of misdemeanor regimes 
also create disadvantages for the poor individuals who comprise the 
majority of the jail population. Failing to post bond leads to pretrial time 
in jail, risking loss of work and family disruption. The pressure to avoid 
jail leads to plea bargains and misdemeanor convictions that can adversely 
affect later applications for employment, housing, and education.73 Again, 
while this burden falls on all those who plead out, the racial skew in 
policing and arrests can add further costs in the labor market.74 It is not 
only fines as punishment that characterize the turn to monetary sanctions, 
but also the administrative regimes that require defendants—assuming 
they can afford them—to pay fees and costs for the very court processes 
that lead to their punishment.75 The expansion of both incarceration and 
the financial costs of court processing contribute to the persistence of 
intergenerational poverty and economic inequality.76
70. For a summary, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 157–201.
71 . See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION 34 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/SJ2W-TVZR.
72. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1185; see also HARRIS, supra note 9, at 18, 42. 
Although there are monetary burdens associated with felony case processing, such as 
taxing offenders to pay for probation or drug treatment or electronic monitoring in lieu of 
jail, these measures affect a smaller population facing prison. See E. ANN CARSON,
BUREAU OF JUD. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2014, at 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/QX6K-EC2F 
(showing that 1,561,500 persons were held in state and federal correctional facilities, a 
fraction of the total population under correctional supervision including probation and 
parole); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 40–42, 50–51 (showing 
that only a fraction of all sentenced offenders each year are sent to prison compared to 
sentences to probation).
73. See, e.g., William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive 
Trials, N.Y. TIMES (April 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/4GS8-BNEU. 
74. See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 
959–60 (2003).
75. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1190–92.
76. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial 
Dynamics, Social Processes, and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, 
in POVERTY TRAPS 176 (Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2006).
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The legal status of these sanctions as pre-adjudication processing fees 
technically exempts them from constitutional scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment. They may, however, interfere with a defendant’s due process 
rights under the Sixth Amendment.77 Poor defendants may be unable to 
pay for filing fees to determine their eligibility for indigent defense. 
Exercising the right to obtain a lawyer at the state’s expense cannot 
constitutionally be conditioned on ability to pay.78 In arguing their case, 
poor defendants may be unable to pay fees to obtain documents such as 
medical, employment, or housing records. If these imposed processing 
fees—taxes, in effect—are skewed racially by selective enforcement 
targeting black or Latino persons—or neighborhoods with high 
concentrations of black and Latino residents—the Sixth Amendment 
concerns multiply, raising both due process and equal protection claims 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.79
The inability to post bail raises issues both before and after 
adjudication. Defendants charged with minor misdemeanors may have 
difficulty retaining counsel if required to pay a fee to establish indigency, 
or the assignment of counsel may be delayed during the scramble to post 
bond in the interim between their arrest and first appearance. The risk of 
fee default at that stage leading to pretrial delay or—worse—pretrial 
detention in turn leads to the risk of an adverse court outcome in terms of 
charging and sentencing. Empirical studies confirm that defendants who 
are detained pre-trial are more likely to be convicted by plea or trial, and 
also receive harsher sentences.80 Failure to pay the latent taxes of fees, in 
effect, prejudices court outcomes and all the burdens that come with either 
a monetary fine or a criminal conviction.
3. The Menu of Defendant Taxes
Recent work has shown the extent of this structure of fees and fines, 
and recent litigation has shown how deeply integrated these structures are 
with the political and fiscal structure of the institutions of criminal 
77. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1224.
78. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963).
79. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 9; Butler, supra note 50, at 2192.
80 . Paul Heaton, Sandra G. Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream 
Consequences of Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 717 (showing evidence that 
detained defendants are 25% more likely than similarly situated releasees to plead guilty, 
43% more likely to be sentenced to jail, and receive jail sentences that are more than 
twice the average); see also Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to 
Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Working Paper, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/F69J-E7WM (showing that that pretrial detention leads to a 13% 
increase in the likelihood of being convicted compared to similarly situated persons who 
were released before adjudication).
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justice. 81 Accordingly, we adopt the term Legal Financial Obligations 
(LFOs) to describe the array of fees and monetary costs now associated 
with each step in the criminal justice process, from securing an attorney to 
having one’s record expunged or sealed following completion of 
correctional sentences. 82 The similarity in the statutes authorizing these 
fees across the states strongly hints that these features of LFOs have 
spread somewhat contagiously across the states in a relatively short time. 
We draw on several recent works simply to array the types of monetary 
fees and fines that have developed over the past two decades. 83 This 
development corresponds with the rise of misdemeanor justice and the
New Policing that disproportionately affects the poor, in turn both raising 
profits for agencies while deepening and criminalizing poverty for those 
swept up in the dragnet. 
a. Usage Fees or Pre-Judgment Fees.
Arrestees face several types of fees, including those associated with 
processing the arrest and obtaining indigent defense. Local governments 
charge fees for police investigation, booking fees for any pretrial detention 
(however brief), prosecution costs to compile case folios, trial costs 
including the production of transcripts and other document costs, daily 
fees associated with the operation of the courtroom, and a variety of filing 
fees. Booking fees often apply even if charges are eventually dropped or 
dismissed.84 Until recently, when a conviction is overturned, defendants 
in Colorado were required to file a lawsuit to recover fines and restitution 
that were levied in the original sentence.85 The standard in the lawsuit to 
recover funds was clear and convincing evidence, a formidable procedural 
81. See, e.g., FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 9–15, 52–54; Julia Laurie & 
Katie Rose Quandt, How Many Ways Can the City of Ferguson Slap You with Court 
Fees? We Counted, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://perma.cc/23J7-5WHC. 
82. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 8–9; Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1176–77.
83. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 28–41; Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1185–96; 
Developments in the Law–Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1727–33. 
Harris’s compendium of statutes is the most exhaustive of these reviews. 
84. See, e.g., Mickelson v. Cty. of Ramsey, 823 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2016). Corey 
Statham was arrested on a charge of disorderly conduct with $46 on his person. Id. at 
922. He was released two days later when all charges were dropped. Id. Ramsey County, 
the court district for the arrest, kept $25 of his money as a “booking fee.” Id.  The balance 
was returned on a debit card, subject to fees to maintain the debit card, to withdraw the 
funds using an automated teller, to transfer the funds to his checking account, and to 
check the balance remaining on the card at the time of issuance. Id. at 921–22. He never 
received the $25 booking fee. Id. The petition for certiorari in this case was denied on 
April 17, 2017. Mickelson v. Cty. of Ramsey, 137 S. Ct. 1578 (2017) (mem).
85 . COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-102 (2016) (describing the process by which a 
defendant may file a petition to recover fines and seek compensation). The U.S. Supreme 
Court found that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Nelson. v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1257–58 (2017).
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and evidentiary bar for a person who cannot afford civil representation.86
Despite Gideon’s promise that defendants would not be denied 
representation because they could not afford to pay counsel, 87 several 
jurisdictions charge fees either to file proof of indigency to obtain a public 
defender, or to pay for the services of a court-appointed lawyer.88
Additional fees include filing fees to offset clerk costs, fees to resolve 
a bench warrant in the case of a failure to appear for a scheduled court 
date, fees for deferred prosecution (in effect, to stall a case), crime 
analysis or DNA analysis fees, and jury service fees.89 Defendants who 
cannot post bail and are in jail awaiting trial might have to pay daily fees 
for their room at the jail. Some prosecutors attach conditions to a deferred 
prosecution, such as supervision, drug testing, or probation reporting, 
which can also be associated with additional fees. 90 If a defendant is 
diverted to drug court, fees are levied for monthly (or more frequent) drug 
testing to monitor compliance, as well as fees to cover the costs of third-
party drug treatment. Upon completion of drug court or drug diversion, 
fees may be collected to offset provider costs of court notification and 
clerical costs of entering the judgment in the drug court database.91
Despite the pre-judgment or pre-adjudication stage at which these fees 
are levied, they are binding and non-recoverable even for the innocent or 
for those whose cases are dismissed by the court for legal insufficiency.92
These are legally binding debts, subject to the defendant’s ability to pay, 
and failure to pay can prolong a case or lead to interest and late fees.93 In 
some cases, it can lead to incarceration: 18% of all commitments to the 
Rhode Island Department of Corrections in 2007 (2446 incidents) “were 
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-102(b) (2016); see also Adam Liptak, Charged a Fee 
for Getting Arrested, Whether Guilty or Not, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/7DGF-HJHF.  The State of Kentucky also “bills people held in its jails 
for the costs of incarcerating them, even if all charges are later dismissed.” Id.
87 . Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963); see also Henry P. 
Monaghan, Gideon’s Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U. L. REV. 445, 445–46 (1965).
88. Developments in the Law–Policing and Profit, supra note 83, at 1726–27.
89. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 77.
90. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1187.
91. See id. at 1204–05 & n.227.
92 . See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §151.505 (2015) (allowing a court to require the 
defendant to repay certain costs irrespective of the outcome of the criminal matter).
93. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1204 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 
670 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397–99 (1971); People v. Pacheco, 115 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 220, 223–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (as Logan and Wright explain, “applying 
California statute which expressly states that the imposition of fines and fees are subject 
to the defendant’s ability to pay”); Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1015 (Fla. 2011) 
(“[B]efore a probationer can be imprisoned for failure to pay a monetary obligation such 
as restitution, the trial court must inquire into a probationer's ability to pay and make an 
explicit finding of willfulness based on the greater weight of the evidence.”)).
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solely the result of the defendant missing an Ability to Pay hearing.”94
“Only after finding that a particular defendant has the financial ability to 
pay,” as in the case of the Rhode Island hearings, and if the defendant 
“willfully disobeys the judicial order to pay, is incarceration permitted.”95
Incarceration can also be prolonged by an inability to pay parole 
supervision fees.  Pennsylvania law makes inmates ineligible for parole 
release if they cannot pay the $60 court costs fee. 96 These measures 
compound the LFOs into a legal burden that attaches only to those too 
poor to pay the initial fees. The piling on of these fees compounds the 
regressivity of this revenue policy and exacerbates the economic 
disadvantage that already attaches to many misdemeanor arrestees, 
deepening the poverty traps where many already reside.97
In the event of a trial, there are a large set of fees associated with 
adjudication that arguably interfere with the right to an attorney and the 
right to a trial. There are often application fees for indigent defense—one 
may have to pay serious sums for a public defender.98 In addition, some 
jurisdictions require defendants to pay fees associated with the 
investigation of their case, 99 while others assess fees for preparation of 
transcripts necessary for a retrial or filing an appeal.100 In several states, 
court fees associated with trial—paying for the judge, bailiff, and jury—
may also be imposed, though some states have prohibited their 
imposition.101
94. R.I. FAMILY LIFE CTR., COURT DEBT AND RELATED INCARCERATION IN RHODE 
ISLAND FROM 2005 THROUGH 2007 11 (2008), https://perma.cc/4YNB-YD8Q.
95. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1200. However, some states have moved to 
restrict the use of incarceration to coerce payments of fines and fees. See, e.g., MO. REV.
STAT. § 479.360(3) (2016) (prohibiting incarceration of a defendant to coerce payments 
“unless found to be in contempt after strict compliance by the court with the due process 
procedures”).
96 . 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11.1101 (2016); see also ALICIA BANNON ET AL.,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 22 
(2010), https://perma.cc/UQD9-KAPT.
97 . COUNCIL ON ECON. ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 1–2 (2015) 
(showing that these fines and fees disproportionately affect poor defendants and often 
either prolong or increase the likelihood of incarceration based on a defendant’s ability to 
pay).
98. See, e.g., REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF 
FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 7 (2010); Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1211 
n.274.
99. Courts generally defer to legislatures whose statutes require payment of specific 
fees associated with juries, non-incarceration supervision, prosecution expert witnesses, 
or DNA evidence collection and analysis. See Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1207.
100. Id. at 1204 (citing Trinkle v. Hand, 337 P.2d 665 (Kan. 1959); State v. Gill, 342 
A.2d 256 (R.I. 1975); State v. New England, 363 S.E.2d 725 (W. Va. 1987)).
101. See, e.g., State v. Ayala, 623 P.2d 584, 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that 
jury and bailiff costs cannot be imposed); Arnold v. State, 306 P.2d 368, 376 (Wyo. 
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Finally, there is bail. Bail is paid either to the court or to a commercial 
bail bond dealer. Defendants who fail to appear at a court hearing after 
posting bail or a bond forfeit the cash or collateral they have put up, a 
windfall for bond dealers or courts. A few states impose fees for simply 
posting a bond, on top of whatever fee a private bond dealer might 
impose.102 And as in deferred prosecution, any supervision attached to bail
conditions can generate fees to offset the costs of that supervision. 
Defendants facing lengthy pretrial delays have little choice but to pay 
these costs or else remain in jail pending a court date and case 
resolution.103
b. Punishment Fees.
Fees for the court proceedings are assessed upon conviction, apart 
from the fines that are part of the sentence. These fees can depend on the 
offense: traffic cases are less expensive than felony offenses, for 
example. 104 Additional fees can mandate payments to crime victim 
restitution or compensation funds, crime prevention funds (for example, 
“Crimestoppers” programs), or other fees to reimburse crime labs for 
forensic analyses.105 Here, as with pretrial fees, late payment fees also can 
be levied.
The traditional form of the LFO is fines: direct monetary penalties for 
infractions. An individual might be fined $25 for parking without paying 
the meter, $50 for drinking at a public park, $100 for speeding, or $500 for 
drunk driving. These fines remain prevalent and have increased in value 
on average.106 Convicted sex offenders are required in some states to pay 
for enrollment in the state’s sex offender registry.107
Several states levy fees for post-adjudication incarceration. The rates 
vary depending on whether incarceration takes place at the state or local 
level. In a report to the New York State Bar Association, the Brennan 
Center for Justice in New York reported that New York recovered $22 
million from inmates serving in state prisons and county jails during the
1957) (stating that expenses paid for bailiff services are not a part of the costs of 
prosecution).
102. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 48; Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1189 & n.91.
103. See, e.g., Glaberson, supra note 73. 
104. Logan and Wright report a conviction fee of $60 for a traffic offense to $225 for 
a felony conviction in Florida. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1190. Harris reports a 
similar fee structure in Washington State. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 106–07.
105. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1190.
106. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 23–24.
107. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §311.171(B) (West 2016) (allowing the sheriff 
to charge a fee for each time a person either enrolls in the sex offender registry or makes 
changes to the registration).
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years 1995–2003.108 States also can levy fees for parole supervision, and 
for any drug testing that may be ordered as part of parole release.109
Probation is the most common sentence under the New Policing for 
misdemeanor cases.110 Until recently, probation officers were either court 
employees or agents of a local correctional service. Privatization of 
probation displaces these government agents with business staff whose 
purpose is profit maximization rather than offender rehabilitation or public 
safety. This is not to say that local government agencies should avoid fees 
to offset costs. However, it is quite different when local government 
retains private contractors to supervise probationers because the 
contractors’ motivations depart from the governmental interests of 
probation. One review of these practices suggests that the private entities 
charge nothing to government for their services, and rely on payments 
from probationers to generate revenue and profit.111
The fees are levied for the duration of supervision terms, with the fee 
varying by the conviction offense and the terms of supervision that the 
sentencing court imposes. 112 Costs of geospatial monitors for electronic 
surveillance also are shifted to the offender, which in effect becomes a
form of non-refundable post-trial bail.113 Community service terms may 
require that probationers post an insurance bond. Because private 
contractors increasingly run these supervision programs, there is no limit 
on the extent to which those private entities can tack on their own above-
cost fees for providing the service.
In these private regimes, the rules of supervision, including the fee and 
fine structures, are delegated to local government, creating a wide space 
for divergent rules that work outside court oversight. 114 In at least two 
locations, probationers are supervised by a private contractor and required 
to pay the firm for this supervision. The burdens of the financial 
obligations that accompany punishment also have been challenged in 
108. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NEW YORK BAR RE-ENTRY REPORT CHAPTER ON 
FEES AND FINES 178 (2006).
109. See, e.g., KY. DIV. OF PROBATION & PAROLE, OFFENDER HANDBOOK 3 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/5GDU-PK3B (“You may be required to pay fees and other money based 
upon your court order or parole certificate. These include supervision fee, restitution, 
Crime Victim’s Fund fee, and drug testing fee.”).
110. In 2014, there were 3,864,100 persons on probation supervision in the U.S., 
compared to 2,224,400 incarcerated in prisons or local jails. DANIELLE KAEBLE, ET AL.,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 2 & tbl.1 (2015) (revised 
2016), https://perma.cc/J7R8-GVS3. Most probationers and local jail populations were 
persons convicted of misdemeanors. 
111. Developments in the Law–Policing and Profit, supra note 83, at 1729–30.
112. Id.
113. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1189 & n.92.
114. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 71, at 56–57.
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litigation in states including Alabama115 and Georgia.116 The court filings 
allege systematic abuses of the fee-levying authority to the point where 
economically disadvantaged probationers accrue even deeper debts that 
transform probation into a mechanism for deepening impoverishment.
c. Civil Punishment through Forfeiture.
A more well-known and controversial example of an LFO is in the 
realm of civil asset forfeiture.117 If charged with a crime, police can seize 
assets—monetary or otherwise—and sell them to fund police department 
activities, or share them with prosecutors. Forfeiture can take place in 
conjunction with a criminal sentence, but it also can be disconnected from 
any criminal proceeding.118 The seizure depends on the plausibility of the 
claim that the seized assets were linked to a crime. Seizure can take place 
even if the person whose property is seized is not charged with a crime. 
Often, valuable assets or large sums of money are seized, and the loss or 
prolonged deprivation of those assets can become a hardship. Prosecutors 
have strong advantages in these cases, and can often extract an agreement 
from defendants to forgo an asset claim in return for dropping the 
prosecution.119 As with the revelations in the investigation of the Ferguson 
Police Department and the municipal court, 120 some jurisdictions 
anticipate revenue from seizures that they structure into agency 
budgets.121
D. THE NEW POLICING MEETS THE LATENT TAX
The onset of the New Policing and its broad reach into urban 
communities coincided with the expansion of latent taxation of criminal 
offenders and extension of monetary sanctions. This collision of two faces 
115. Burdette v. Town of Harpersville, No. CV 2010-900183, 2012 WL 2995326, at 
*1 (Ala. Cir. Ct. July 11, 2012) (order granting a motion for a preliminary injunction 
hearing); see also Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for 
Probation, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), https://perma.cc/U3AH-QDUE.
116 . Cash v. Sentinel Offender Servs., No. 2013-RCHM-001, slip op. at 10 
(Richmond Cty. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2013) (affirming in part Plaintiffs’ claims that 
Sentinel unlawfully collected probation supervision fees from plaintiffs and violated their 
due process rights); Sandy Hodson, Georgia High Court Grants Sentinel Request, 
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Oct. 24, 2013), https://perma.cc/UBS3-WTFZ.
117. See generally Catherine E. McCaw, Asset Forfeiture as a Form of Punishment: 
A Case for Integrating Asset Forfeiture into Criminal Sentencing, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 181 
(2011).
118. Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 1195 & n.151.
119. Id. at 1195 (citing Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013)), 
https://perma.cc/AJ8W-RLG2.
120. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 9.
121. Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture Laws, 
Policing Incentives, and Local Budgets, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2117 (2007). 
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of deregulated criminal law created a managerial regime with a deep reach 
into the lives and the pockets of mostly poor and predominantly minority 
citizens, 122 deepening any pre-existing impoverishment 123 while 
aggravating racial disparities in criminal justice. 124 The New Policing 
method produced extensive activity in the form of widespread 
investigative or Terry stops, high rates of misdemeanor arrests and 
convictions, and extensive use of the summons authority to bring non-
criminal offenders through the first gates of the criminal court. Because 
these developments coincided with a transformation of criminal procedure
to bureaucratic and administrative regimes, the prospects of constitutional 
regulation in all but the most extreme practices became remote. The net 
result has been a fundamental transformation of the adjudicative model of 
justice into a set of managerial processes with the goal of social 
management and regulation of populations who are the targets of these 
tactics.125
Who are the targets? Data show that these developments are 
consistently more likely to affect non-whites compared to whites. Data on 
the New Policing in New York, for example, showed that misdemeanor 
arrests from 1990–2012 rose more than twice as fast for blacks as 
compared to whites, and more than three times as fast for Hispanics as 
compared to whites.126 All of this took place in an era of declining crime 
rates. The same racial skew is evident in Terry stops, another cornerstone 
of the New Policing. Two investigations of the stop and frisk tactics in 
New York, one in 1999 127 and a second in conjunction with the Floyd
litigation, 128 showed that stops were racially concentrated in minority 
neighborhoods well above what local crime rates or other social conditions 
would predict. 
122. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 11–12; see also Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 
1177.
123. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S
NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 6–10 (2010), https://perma.cc/3TDS-4X27; see also Katherine 
Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as Misguided 
Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 516–17 (2011).
124. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 14–15, 156; see also Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 
1177.
125. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 692; Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1319, 1325–
27.
126. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 633, 634 fig.3. 
127. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT’S STOP & FRISK PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 101 (1999), 
https://perma.cc/L5QH-HB7R [hereinafter OAG REPORT].
128. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see 
generally Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).
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The racial component of arrest decisions generalizes well beyond New 
York. Professor Tammy Kochel and her colleagues showed that across 
twenty-seven independent datasets, non-whites were nearly one-third more 
likely (26% as compared to 20%) than whites to be arrested, controlling 
for a rich set of covariates. 129 Other empirical studies confirm racial or 
community influences on the decision to arrest.130
The expansion of misdemeanor justice collided with the new forms of 
taxation on criminal offenders to multiply the reach of the New Policing to 
penetrate minority communities significantly more often and more
intensively than in predominantly white communities. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor arrest or a summons now include financial obligations 
that weigh heavily on the population groups most affected by the New 
Policing. Failure to meet those obligations can raise the stakes of criminal 
liability in the form of warrants for missed court dates, and escalating 
fiscal penalties that reach deep into the economic lives of these groups. 
The economic consequences go beyond the criminal stigma and the weight 
of LFOs to include burdens on work, family, and housing that can 
multiply the disadvantage by spilling over to family members.
Until now, most of this discussion was based on theory and evidence 
from urban areas. In this Article, we compare two places that are symbolic 
of the regimes of managerial criminal and civil justice and the new 
taxation of criminal offenders: New York City, New York, and Ferguson, 
Missouri. Each has been extensively studied in terms of policing, 
community, and law. At first glance, we might assume that any 
comparison would be pointless. Ferguson is a small municipality, 
surrounded by dozens of other small municipalities, with relatively low 
crime rates and a small police force.131 New York City was the epicenter 
of the New Policing, and has influenced policing strategies and tactics for 
over two decades. 132 On the other hand, many of New York City's 
seventy-five police precincts are socially and spatially configured 
similarly to Ferguson: small in size and population, manageably low crime 
129. Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of 
Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 490–91 (2011).
130. See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008); Karen F. Parker, Brian J. Stults & 
Stephen K. Rice, Racial Threat, Concentrated Disadvantage and Social Control: 
Considering the Macro-Level Sources of Variation in Arrests, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 1111 
(2005); Douglas A. Smith, Christy A. Visher & Laura A. Davidson, Equity and 
Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1984).
131. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 6–7. 
132. See Heymann, supra note 1, at 429–32.
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rates, primarily residential, with busy through streets connecting precincts 
to adjacent and distant areas.133
Differences and similarities aside, this comparison shows the 
connections of these two new developments in policing across different 
social and political spaces. In the case studies that follow, we show that 
these two places can both be seen as full expressions of the New Policing. 
In cities large and small, we see tens of thousands of offenders brought 
into flourishing punishment and taxation systems. The connections across 
these two places illustrate what we might see across a spectrum of cities 
and suburbs in the modern era of managerial and administrative criminal 
justice.
II.  FERGUSON, MISSOURI
Long before the protests erupted in Ferguson over the shooting of 
unarmed black teenager Michael Brown by white officer Darren Wilson, 
the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) practiced its own version of the 
New Policing.134 At first glance, that version was quite different from the 
policing model that had spread across U.S. cities over the past two 
decades. The urban expression of the New Policing model developed in 
response to an historic epidemic of violent crime from the late 1980s 
through the early 1990s. 135 Officers in cities were assigned to
neighborhoods with elevated crime rates. Once there, they were 
encouraged to use their stop authority under Terry to search “suspicious 
persons” for weapons, guns, and drugs. 136 Deployments were closely 
monitored with analytics to redeploy officers as crime conditions changed. 
Officers working under the New Policing regime used arrest authority 
in minor crimes to justify searching offenders for weapons and conducting 
background checks with the goal of identifying—or deterring—those who 
might be engaged in violent crimes.137 The use of investigative stops had 
been a staple of American policing for decades.138 The racial skew in the 
use of those stops, and the harsh treatment of minorities during those 
stops, produced recurring tensions between police and black communities. 
133. Fagan et al., Broken Windows Revisited, supra note 33, at 321, tbl.13.1.
134. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 3–5.
135. Heymann, supra note 1, at 408; see also ZIMRING, supra note 27, at 175–77. 
136. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1224 n.23.
137. Heymann, supra note 1, at 429; see also Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1364.
138 . Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 891, 892–93 (1998) 
(noting that many states had authorized “stop and frisk” tactics during the 1960s, and the 
courts in those and other states recognized the police right of inquiry under the “common 
law and state constitutional rubrics”); see also David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: 
The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3–6, 23–40 (1994); Dasha Kabakova, 
The Lack of Accountability for the New York Police Department’s Investigative Stops, 10 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 539, 541 (2012).
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The Kerner Commission identified this skew as a spark for several of the 
urban riots in the United States in the 1960s. 139 Summonses and civil 
violations were not initially a central feature of the New Policing, but they 
gradually became more important as felony arrests and overall crime rates 
declined.140
Ferguson, like many small towns and communities, did not fit the 
urban prototype of a city under siege from violent crime. Ferguson was 
not plagued by high rates of violent crime; in fact, violent crime rates were 
declining in Ferguson for several years preceding the Michael Brown 
shooting and the protests.141 So, the crime-control motivation to adapt the 
New Policing in Ferguson seems to have been distinct from the 
motivations and justifying ideologies that animated the New Policing in 
the cities. Instead, the saturation of misdemeanor enforcement and 
enforcement of civil codes reflected a variation of the New Policing that 
more closely resembles the type of managerial justice that characterized 
misdemeanor enforcement in urban areas. 
The reliance on code enforcement, traffic enforcement, and 
misdemeanor arrests suggests a thread connecting the order-maintenance 
prong of the New Policing in cities with New Policing in less urban 
locales such as Ferguson. In addition, the racial dimension of policing in 
Ferguson also connects the Ferguson model to the urban version of the 
New Policing.142 What made Ferguson unique was the profit motive that 
had been injected into the policing regime. 143 The policing regime was 
designed to extract revenue not only from Ferguson residents, but also 
from people passing through Ferguson from nearby municipalities. Figure 
2 shows the proximity of Ferguson to these neighboring areas, a spatial 
concentration that broadens the reach of FPD policing to non-residents. 
FPD enforcement was tailored to this revenue-generating goal. The 
offenses cited by FPD officers in traffic stops and other citizen contacts 
generated a volume of fees and fines that were integrated into the 
municipal budget.144 When persons failed to pay these financial penalties, 
139. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, THE KERNER REPORT: THE 
1968 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 116–21 
(1988); see e.g., Anthony Daniel Perez, Kimberly M. Berg & Daniel J. Myers, Police and 
Riots, 1967-1969, 34 J. BLACK STUD. 153, 159, 168 (2003) (concluding that 
inflammatory police behavior was one of the primary causes of urban riots in Boston and 
San Francisco in the study period).
140. See Livingston, supra note 19, at 638–40 (characterizing order maintenance as a 
critical prong of the New Policing in the mid-1990s).
141. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 7 n.7 (indicating that the records of the 
FPD and the FBI “show[ed] a downward trend in serious crime” from 2004–2014).
142. See generally Fagan et al., Broken Windows Revisited, supra note 33.
143. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 2; see also Developments in the Law–
Policing and Profit, supra note 83, at 1734–35. 
144. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
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further fees and interest followed, compounding debt. These non-criminal 
court actions often grew into criminal matters when failures to pay led to 
criminal warrants. Once arrested for the outstanding warrants, the 
compounding of LFOs that we described earlier sank these individuals, 
already poor, deeper into poverty. 145 The racial component of these 
policing dynamics compounded the historical racial inequalities in 
Ferguson.146
A. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT
1. The Segregation of Ferguson
In the early 1960s, the first African-Americans bought homes in 
Ferguson, creating what at the time was a tiny section of the town that was 
physically separated from the more well-off, white sections.147 The other 
towns near Ferguson had either been integrated before that, or had become 
nearly all black earlier that decade.148 Parts of Ferguson were “sundown 
towns,” where blacks were only permitted to enter the segregated white 
areas during the daytime. 149 Nearby towns such as Kinloch either had 
been or became nearly all black, and the main road connecting the two 
towns was fenced off from Ferguson by a chain and construction 
barriers.150
Unlike many Northern and Midwestern cities, where white flight left 
behind segregated and often poor black neighborhoods,151 St. Louis was 
more an example of “black flight,” as public housing was demolished and 
the local public housing authority helped to relocate black families to 
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 76–78.
147. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON 3 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/2N27-CTHB.
148 . COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE 
AMERICAN CITY 24 map 1.7, 27 map 1.9, 28 map 1.10, 29 map 1.11, 30 map 1.12 (2009) 
(illustrating the process of white flight from several St. Louis neighborhoods that led to 
its concentrated poverty and segregation by the 1950s). 
149. JOHN A. WRIGHT SR., ST. LOUIS: DISAPPEARING BLACK COMMUNITIES 115–17 
(2005), cited in ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 3 n.2. Sundown towns are just that: places 
where blacks were not permitted after dark. They were sometimes called “sunset towns” 
or “gray towns.” Blacks caught by whites in those towns after dark were subject to 
beatings or arrests for trespassing. See JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN 
DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 3–4 (2005). 
150. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 3 n.2 (citing WRIGHT SR., supra note 149). The 
barrier was open during the day to allow black housekeepers and childcare workers to get 
to their places of work. See WRIGHT SR., supra note 149, at 281.
151. Allison Shertzer & Randall P. Walsh, Racial Sorting and the Emergence of 
Segregation in American Cities 32–33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 22077, 2016); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 42–57 (1993). 
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Ferguson and other suburbs.152 Starting in the 1930s, a major reason that 
small municipalities northwest of St. Louis began to incorporate was to 
maintain racial segregation in the schools and to avoid a redistribution of 
tax revenues from the better-off white areas, such as Berkeley, to the 
poorer black towns. 153 Several areas of St. Louis became more white 
during this time as blacks left the city in response to gentrification and 
increasing rents.154 This process increased the racial disparity among these 
communities.155
The rapid movement of black families from St. Louis to the nearby 
suburbs after the demolition of public housing, supported in part by 
subsidies in the form of “Section 8 vouchers,” created a backlash among 
white working-class families currently living in those suburbs. 156 They 
adopted exclusionary zoning ordinances in response. These ordinances 
went beyond the restrictive covenants that had promoted segregation in 
cities throughout the mid-twentieth century. 157 In particular, they 
prevented the construction of lower-cost multi-family buildings that would 
have been accessible to the largely black voucher holders. Case law in the 
1970s further reified those social and economic norms in constitutional 
law.158
152. GORDON, supra note 148, at 205 (“The St. Louis Chamber of Commerce agreed 
that the elimination of slums . . . would merely hasten the ‘natural’ movement of people 
to the suburbs.”); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 3. 
153. LOEWEN, supra note 149, at 370; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 3.
154. Rothstein’s analysis of census data shows that the downtown areas of St. Louis 
and neighborhoods west of it toward the city border became increasingly white over the 
past few decades. An analysis of several St. Louis zip codes show that these areas went 
from 36% white in 2000 to 44% white in 2010, and some are now a majority white. 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 3.
155 . See Otis Dudley Duncan & Beverly Duncan, Residential Distribution and 
Occupational Stratification, 60 AM. J. SOC. 493, 500 (1955) (using an index of racial 
dissimilarity to show how segregation increases socio-economic disadvantage).
156. Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012), authorizes the 
payment of rental housing assistance to private landlords on behalf of low-income 
households.  See About the Housing Choice Vouchers Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., https://perma.cc/5H65-AT48.
157 . Richard R.W. Brooks, Covenants Without Courts: Enforcing Residential 
Segregation with Legally Unenforceable Agreements, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 360, 361, 364 
(2011) (presenting a theory of racial residential segregation through enforcement of racial 
restrictive covenants and social conventions); see also RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL 
M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND 
SOCIAL NORMS 47–113 (2013) (showing the use of racially restrictive covenants in 
America to legitimate the push in white neighborhoods to exclude minorities). 
158. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 
(1977) (failing to find racially discriminatory intent by the village in denying the 
corporation approval for its application to construct low- and moderate-income housing). 
For a review, see Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1977).
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These processes, coupled with race-conscious housing segregation 
practices (including racial steering and government loan practices), served 
to push African-American families into newly segregated suburbs in the 
inner ring surrounding St. Louis. Even when families could afford better 
housing, local real estate agents adopted “ethical” codes. 159 Even when 
federal antidiscrimination laws disallow house sellers the right to choose 
their neighbors,160 the Federal Housing Act of 1969 created exceptions for 
“Mrs. Murphy” landlords that exempted some landlords from anti-
discrimination provisions.161 This exception practically allowed landlords 
to refuse to sell to black families and for real estate agents to do the same. 
The popular name for this exception reflects the political and racial 
dynamics driving the specter of an elderly widow having to take in 
boarders in order to make ends meet. 162 In effect, Mrs. Murphy can 
discriminate against non-white prospective renters “without fearing 
liability under the FHA as long as she does not tell the rejected tenant why 
she is rejecting him, but she can be liable if she is honest.”163
The housing discrimination processes were also structured into local 
regulations in and around St. Louis that escaped federal scrutiny and were 
designed to manage home-seeking heuristics.  For example, local real 
estate agents in the area claimed they could lose their license from county 
officials if they sold homes to black families in neighborhoods not 
“zoned” for those families.164 Ferguson’s current demography and housing 
landscape is the product of those historical forces of persistent racial 
discrimination in housing policy and practice. The lower economic status 
of the black residents of Ferguson and several of its surrounding 
municipalities reflect the economic fallout of those policies.
159. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 25–28 (showing that Federal Housing Authority 
policies, such as permitting whites-only developments in the 1950s, defeated the efforts 
of middle-class blacks to buy homes in the nearby suburbs).
160. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that racially 
restrictive covenants cannot be constitutionally enforced); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 
771, 779 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (observing that if a condo association were to post “a 
sign outside saying, ‘No observant Jews allowed’ . . . [it] would undoubtedly violate [42 
U.S.C.]  § 3604(a) . . . .”).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2012) (exempting from certain provisions of the Fair 
Housing Act “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended 
to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the 
owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.”).  A
similarly-structured exception exempts owners of single-family residences who meet 
certain criteria in selling or renting out their homes. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (2012).
162. Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349, 382
(2017).  The exception is part of a larger discrimination dialogue on discrimination in 
public accommodations.  See Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements 
On-line: Lessors from Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1135–38 (2010).
163. Fennell, supra note 162, at 383.
164. GORDON, supra note 148, at 84–87.
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2. The Neighborhood Ecologies of Ferguson
Table 1 shows social and economic characteristics of Ferguson in 
2013. Its population shift from a largely white to a majority black 
municipality took place about a decade after the demolition of St. Louis 
public housing in the 1970s. Ferguson’s black population grew from 
13.8% in 1980 to 25.1% in 1990, 52.4% in 2000, and 67.4% in 2010.165
Like the adjoining municipalities, it is a small city with a population of 
approximately 21,200 people spread over 6.2 square miles and five census 
tracts. More than two residents in three were black—more than twice the 
percentage of whites (29.3%). A small number of Hispanic and other race 
or ethnicity persons live in Ferguson. The density of 3,419.8 persons per 
square mile reflects a modest level of population concentration. Its 
housing stock, mostly single-family homes and low-income multi-family 
apartment blocks, keeps the population relatively low. 
Table 1.  Demographic and Socio-Economic Conditions in 
Ferguson, Missouri (2009–2013) 166
165 . American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/93HZ-5FQE
(search “Community Facts” field for “Ferguson, MO”; select “Race and Hispanic 
Origin”; select “Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin” under “2010 Census”); id. (same 
under “Census 2000”); Census 1990, SOCIAL EXPLORER, https://perma.cc/78QR-W877; 
Census 1980, SOCIAL EXPLORER, https://perma.cc/PPC5-MHE5.
166. Author calculations from the U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009–2013 AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR (2014), https://perma.cc/8FZ2-V5NJ. 
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The population could well be characterized as poor though not 
particularly young. About half the population is thirty-five years of age or 
older. Although more than half the population in Ferguson owns their 
home, more than one person in five lives below the federal poverty line 
and the average household survives on an annual income of $38,685. This 
suggests differences in the economic status of black and white residents of 
Ferguson, which is illustrated by the rates of poverty and black population 
concentration in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Ferguson Census Tracts, Population and Poverty, 2013167
Figure 1 shows the distribution of race and poverty in Ferguson’s 
census tracts. Some tracts have high rates of poverty but low 
concentrations of black residents. One tract has high concentrations of 
black population (less than 50%) but above-average poverty rates (26.3%). 
Another tract has high concentrations of black populations (76.4%) but 
below-average poverty rates (8.5%). The diverse patterns suggest that 
unlike urban areas, race and poverty are more weakly linked. Policing, in 
turn, seems to be less concentrated spatially. The Ferguson Report shows 
that policing is concentrated along major thoroughfares, rather than in 
residential areas or places with high pedestrian activity.168
While Ferguson itself presents a mixed picture of the nexus of race and 
poverty, the municipality is situated in a region characterized by 
concentrated poverty. Figure 2 shows that Ferguson sits in the middle of a 
167. Author calculations from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 166, and Ferguson 
Municipal Court data (on file with authors).
168. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 13–14.
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region of small towns and vicinages that all have elevated poverty rates. 
Due to its location, persons traveling in and out of Ferguson who fall 
under police gaze are more likely to be poor and non-white. Accordingly, 
this wider lens on poverty suggests Ferguson is part of a larger ecology of 
poverty, and that policing which touches broadly on the area population 
may be targeted, intentionally or not, in ways similar to the racialized face 
of the New Policing models elsewhere.
Figure 2. Concentrated Poverty, St. Louis County, 2008-2013169
Crime in Ferguson over the past few years presents a mixed picture. 
Violent crime declined from 619.9 crimes per 100,000 population in 2006 
to 376.7 in 2012—a precipitous drop in a relatively short time.170 To put 
that rate in context, New York City’s violent crime rate over the same 
period remained almost flat and far higher than in Ferguson—the violent 
crime rate in New York City in 2012 was 639.3 crimes per 100,000 
169. Elizabeth Kneebone, Ferguson, Mo. Emblematic of Growing Suburban Poverty, 
BROOKINGS (Aug. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/U49A-HFLT.
170 . UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://perma.cc/BXB8-7Z2R (select “Missouri” from “Choose a state” dropdown; select 
“All” from “Choose one or more groups” list; follow the “Next” link; select “Ferguson 
Police Dept” from “Choose one or more agencies” list; select “Violent crime rate” from 
“Choose one variable” dropdown; select “2006” and “2012” in the “Choose years to 
include” dropdown; follow the “Get Table” link).  
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population.171 The difference is notable for two reasons. First, the New 
Policing was organized and designed to combat mainly violent crime.172
The Ferguson rate suggests that there was less urgency there to adopt New 
Policing than there was in New York City, where the rates had climbed as 
high as 2383.6 crimes per 100,000 population in 1990.173 Second, New 
York City’s crime decline was widely celebrated,174 though the claim that 
it was uniquely steep was contested in several empirical analyses. 175
Though Ferguson has only a fraction of the population of the New York 
City, its violent crime rate is far lower. The conditions that gave rise to the 
New Policing were not present in Ferguson. The reasons for its adoption 
could not be justified in the same terms as in urban areas. Other motives 
for intensive policy were present, but its operational features were quite 
different.
3. Estimating the Racial Component of Policing for Profit in Ferguson
We traced the production of LFOs and criminal liabilities from arrests 
and summonses in Ferguson to understand this critical step in the 
production of cases that generate profits from policing. We use data from 
both the police and the courts to show that activities at all levels have 
discriminatory outcomes. We rely on two sources of data. First, we 
obtained data on nearly all Ferguson Municipal Court cases for the years 
1997–2014. Second, we obtained case processing data from Ferguson 
Police Department records for October 2012–July 2014.
In addition to showing the volume of violations and their outcomes, 
we show the racial imbalance in enforcement and adjudication of these 
cases. We estimate disparate racial treatment of drivers using methods that 
are standard both in law and in the econometrics literature.176 The baseline 
171. Id. (select “New York” from “Choose a state” dropdown; select “All” from 
“Choose one or more groups” list; follow the “Next” link; select “New York City Police 
Dept” from “Choose one or more agencies” list; select “Violent crime rate” from 
“Choose one variable” dropdown; select “2006” and “2012” in the “Choose years to 
include” dropdown; follow the “Get Table” link).
172. Heymann, supra note 1, at 413–19; Livingston, supra note 19, at 568–69.
173. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS, supra note 170 (select “New York” 
from “Choose a state” dropdown; select “All” from “Choose one or more groups” list; 
follow the “Next” link; select “New York City Police Dept” from “Choose one or more 
agencies” list; select “Violent crime rate” from “Choose one variable” dropdown; select 
“1990” and “1990” in the “Choose years to include” dropdown; follow the “Get Table” 
link).
174. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 3; BRATTON WITH KNOBLER, supra note 2, at 287–88, 
295–96.
175. KARMEN, supra note 27, at 23–27; Harcourt & Ludwig, New Evidence, supra
note 27, at 299–300.
176. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
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regression model features an outcome , representing, for example, the 
probability of receiving a citation conditional on a traffic stop, controlling 
for the race of the person. The regression takes the form of: 
In this equation, is an intercept, R is an indicator variable for a black 
driver, includes other covariates describing the driver and the traffic 
stop, and is an error term. The coefficient of interest, , gives the 
average effect of being black on the outcome , after the effects of the 
covariates in have been partialed out.177
Some factors that may bear on the decision to issue a citation or make 
an arrest may not be available in our data. The statistical problem for 
measuring is that X likely does not include some non-race factors that 
are correlated with both race R and the outcome . For example, drivers 
may have a driving manner that is not directly observed in the 
administrative data but that impacts the probability of getting a ticket or 
being arrested. Different races may observe different norms while driving, 
some of which may attract the attention of an officer or influence the 
officer’s decision to issue a citation or make an arrest. In that case, there is 
some bias in estimating the coefficient , and one would not be able to 
draw any conclusions about discrimination.
Our regression analysis is designed to mitigate these types of statistical 
problems. First, we include several covariates in the regressions, 
conditioning for example on the category of the offense, with seriousness 
ranging from violations to felony charges. By conditioning on the category 
of the offense, we control for any racial bias that is due only to some races 
engaging in more serious crimes than others.
Second, we undertake targeted analyses that may be less biased by 
these types of factors. For example, we compare the racial breakdown of 
speeding tickets justified by radar, an objective measure of driver velocity, 
performance, the practice is prohibited. On the record before us, neither the high school 
completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable 
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”). The goal of 
these models is to identify the effects of race on outcomes after simultaneously 
considering factors that may be relevant to race. Failure to do so raises the risk of 
“omitted variable bias,” which could lead to erroneous conclusions about the effects of 
variables that do appear in a regression test. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Three Tests for 
Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation: The Problem of 
“Included Variable” Bias, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S68, S69–70 (2005).
177. For a basic description of the regression procedure and the model form, see 
JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 25–
50 (2009); see also DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION 35–37 (3d ed. 2000).
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to those with an unspecified justification or those justified by vision or 
pacing, which are more subjective. These more subjective measures of 
speeding give greater discretion to the police officer, so if there are 
systematic differences between laser and non-laser stops, it is likely to 
reflect police racial preferences, rather than statistical discrimination or 
selection.
4. Race, Policing, and LFOs in Ferguson
In Ferguson, police can charge a motorist under any of several 
chapters that span local municipal codes or ordinances, traffic and other 
vehicle code violations, state criminal code violations, or procedural 
criminal violations such as “failure to appear” or “failure to comply.” The 
state criminal code violations are predominantly misdemeanors. 
Jurisdiction in Missouri over misdemeanors can overlap between local 
(municipal) courts and county courts of general jurisdiction.178 Local code 
violations are all heard in the municipal court.179
Table 2 reports the breakdown of offenses charged by the FPD 
separately by defendant race. In all instances, race notwithstanding, the 
emphasis on enforcement is for traffic violations, which results in court 
dispositions that generate revenue. For all four categories, blacks have 
more violations than whites. The disparity is smallest for state code 
violations—the most serious crimes—and largest for traffic violations—
the least serious crimes. The smallest disparity is about a 3:1 ratio, 
compared to the 17:2 ratio for the largest disparity. This table provides 
statistical evidence of a theme discussed at length in Section I.C.1: racially 
disparate policing is focused on less serious crimes for which fines would 
be imposed rather than jail time. 
The population distribution in Ferguson—about two-thirds black—
makes it unlikely that 17:2 disparities simply reflect differences by race in 
illegal behavior. One would struggle to identify plausible racial 
differences in driving behaviors large enough to produce these racial 
differences in traffic enforcement.
178. T. E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 MO. L.
REV. 69, 75–76 (1966) (“There is no doubt that Missouri municipalities may lawfully 
adopt ordinances which duplicate state criminal statutes. . . . [T]he existence of a general 
statute does not defeat the power of the municipality to enact a similar ordinance.” (citing 
Ex Parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395 (1881))).  “This doctrine is bolstered, perhaps, by the 
fact that where conduct constitutes an offense under both a statute and an ordinance, 
prosecution under one will not bar a subsequent prosecution under the other.” Id. at 76.
179. FERGUSON MUN. CODE § 13-2 (2016) (granting the municipal court primary 
jurisdiction over code violations).
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Table 2. Type of Violation by Defendant Race, Ferguson 
Municipal Court, October 2012 – July 2014180
To examine more closely the role of race in traffic enforcement, we 
looked next at a measure of discretionary police behavior in enforcing 
traffic codes. Table 3 shows the racial breakdown for speeding tickets 
separately by the method of detection and location of detection. Although 
most detection is done by radar or laser, which requires an objective 
metric of speed, some tickets have an unspecified detection, or specify 
something more discretionary such as pacing or even just “vision.” 
On local roads in Ferguson, the black/white disparity is quite large: 
over 80% of the total stops on local roads are of black drivers. For radar 
stops, the disparity closely approximates the overall rate because most 
violations result from radar stops. For non-radar detection methods, a 
small subset of local road stops, the disparity is even larger: 85% of non-
radar stops are black drivers. On state highways, the disparities for non-
radar stops are even more pronounced. Black drivers account for more 
than half the radar-based violations (57.3%) on state roads, but black 
drivers account for a larger share of the non-radar based stops on state 
roads (73.1%). 
180 . Ferguson Police Dep’t, Content Management System Data (on file with 
authors).
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Table 3. Speeding Violations by Driver Race, 
Road Type, & Method of Speed Detection,
Ferguson (2012–2014)181
Although race seems to influence the enforcement of traffic violations, 
namely, speeding, on both state and local roads, the racial disparities are 
greater on local roads, where officers can select the locations for detecting 
violations. Once positioned, FPD officers seem far more likely to use 
“other,” more subjective detection methods to issue traffic tickets to black 
drivers. Perhaps police are more likely to “see” violations among black 
drivers that go beyond what the objective radar metrics show.182 Overall, 
Table 3 shows two different forms of racial disparity in play, both to the 
disadvantage of black drivers who face greater risks of citation and fines. 
Again, the patterns of enforcement ensure that the flow of revenue to the 
Ferguson Municipal Court—in effect, a tax producing a revenue 
transfer—is skewed toward black and poorer citizens or passersby.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald & Roger G. Dunham, Police 
Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY
407, 413–14 (2005); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 320–21 (2004).
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Table 4. Logistic Regression of Race Effects on Stop Outcomes, 
Ferguson, 2010–2013
Next, we look at the outcomes of traffic stops using rich data collected 
from databases maintained by the Missouri State Attorney General. The 
implications of stops, tickets, arrests, and seizures are evident not only in 
the generation of revenue, but also in the creation of criminal liability. We 
calculated the probability of these outcomes occurring for each race by 
analyzing the rate of each outcome as a percentage of the number of stops, 
and then comparing the rates for each racial group. To this end, Table 4 
shows results from logit regressions for racial differences in police 
decisions during these stops.183 We also condition two further outcomes 
on a predicate event: whether contraband is seized depends on whether the 
driver or vehicle is searched, and whether a warrant arrest is the reason for 
the arrest compared to other reasons. These regressions, like those in 
previous tables, provide controls for several non-race factors—in 
particular, the stated reason for the stop—that may be correlated both with 
race and policing choices.
Controlling for the reason for the stop, the regression results in Model 
1 of Table 4 show that blacks are 1.35 times more likely than whites to be 
ticketed. Model 2 shows that blacks are 1.93 times more likely to be 
arrested. It is possible that drivers exhibit unreported behaviors that might 
183 . Logit regression is a form of regression that is well suited to test for 
combinations of predictors of binary outcomes: arrested or not, ticketed or not, searched 
or not. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 697–99 (7th ed. 2012); see also
ALAN AGRESTI, CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS 121–23 (2d ed. 2002); HOSMER & 
LEMESHOW, supra note 177, at 1–10. 
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lead to a decision to sanction them. If there are such differences in suspect 
behavior leading to tickets or arrests, those behaviors are not described by 
the officers in official reports. These results are statistically significant, 
suggesting that these patterns are unlikely to occur by chance alone.
Model 3 in Table 4 shows that blacks are 1.67 times more likely than 
whites to have their vehicle searched once stopped. These results are 
significant. But seizures of contraband are less likely for vehicles operated 
by blacks, conditional on being searched (Column 4). A lower “hit” rate 
for blacks (26% lower, though not statistically significant) suggests that 
stops and searches are a form of preference-based rather than statistical 
discrimination.184 Why bother to continue stopping and searching black 
motorists if there is no greater likelihood that those searches will pay off, 
other than a preference to stop blacks? 
This is the essence of preference-based discrimination. Statistical 
discrimination would reflect a tendency to stop one group at a higher rate 
than another group based on observable characteristics such as known 
crime rates. But preference-based discrimination would reflect a tendency 
to prefer one group for stops over others based on factors unrelated to 
observable differences in the targeted behavior, such as race. Preference-
based discrimination suggests that the purpose of stops is to select a 
particular group for criminal justice attention, independent of the 
likelihood of a positive result. If they are stopping blacks more often 
without finding more drugs, it is indicative of the use of punitive searches, 
and evidence of disparate racial treatment before the law.
Model 5 shows the reason for arrests of black defendants is 3.24 times 
more likely to be an outstanding warrant. Enforcement in Ferguson 
produced an astonishing volume of warrants: the municipal court in 
Ferguson issued 32,975 warrants in 2013,185 more than one per resident 
and most likely, more than one for every motorist passing through 
Ferguson, 186 and nearly all for non-violent offenses. 187 Recall that the 
median per capita income in Ferguson in 2013 was $38,685, and that 
nearly one in four persons lived below the poverty line. 188 That this is 
184. Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, Crime Minimisation and Racial Bias: What 
Can We Learn from Police Search Data?, 116 ECON. J. F368, F379 (2006). See generally 
Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the 
Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163 (2009); Sarath Sanga, 
Reconsidering Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 117 J. POL.
ECON. 1155 (2009). 
185. MO. SUPREME COURT, MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 
2013, at 303, https://perma.cc/YRN2-Q6YU.
186. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
187. MO. SUPREME COURT, supra note 185, at 173–93.
188 . American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/93HZ-5FQE
(search Community Facts field for “Ferguson, MO”; then select “Show All”).
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racially skewed suggests again a racial tax against those who can least 
afford it. 
This pattern of warrant arrests is consistent with the emphasis that 
FPD officers and municipal executives place on enforcement of warrants, 
and the motivating role of outstanding warrants in determining the 
outcomes of stops. Warrant arrests lead to criminal punishment, in turn 
leading to LFOs that add monetary costs to the liberty costs of warrant 
arrests. Here, if the goal of policing is to detect persons with outstanding 
warrants and continue the economic drain on those defendants, then the 
police are in fact maximizing on that goal—a form of statistical 
discrimination. But it is the predicate processes of stops, citations, and 
searches that lead to the issuance of a warrant that is infected with race-
based and preferential discrimination. In other words, if police are 
stopping black motorists with the hope of getting a warrant arrest, the 
ocean of outstanding warrants among black drivers makes this a good bet 
by the FPD.
5. Court Processing
An important mechanism for the proliferation of warrants and 
subsequent warrant arrests is the operation of the municipal court system 
in Ferguson and elsewhere in the northeastern corner of St. Louis 
County. 189 A sense of this process can be observed in Table 5, which 
reports the racial breakdown for a set of activities in the Ferguson 
Municipal Court over a seventeen-year period. 
Over this time, concluding in 2014—the year of the Michael Brown 
shooting—blacks were disproportionately present at each stage of 
municipal court processing. Although blacks are 67% of the Ferguson 
population, they are 74% of municipal court defendants. Within that court 
population, they are 81% of the population receiving summonses, 91% of 
those with warrants issued for their arrest, and 95% of the persons 
arrested. Black defendants in the municipal court average 3.5 citations per 
appearance, about 50% more than the rate of 2.3 summonses per white 
defendants. Black defendants average 4.7 warrants per person, compared 
to 1.4 warrants per white defendant. They have 2.25 arrests each (relative 
to just 0.3 for whites). Finally, blacks have more warrants and arrests 
when controlling for the number of summonses.
189. See THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCH CITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS 
WHITE PAPER 27–37 (2014), https://perma.cc/4PM6-JAUK.
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Ferguson Municipal Court Activity, 
1997–2014190
By itself, it is not too striking that 74% of defendants are black in a 
small municipality where two residents in three are black. But beyond this 
base rate, the disparate treatment of blacks at each stage of criminal 
adjudication is startling. And the much stronger per-defendant and per-
summons intensive margin treatments, when taken together, are indicative 
of racially discriminatory treatment in this judicial system. 
Figure 3. Effect Sizes of Black-White Differences in Case 
Outcomes, Ferguson Municipal Court (Mean, 95% CI)
190. Dep’t of Justice, Ferguson Municipal Court Data (on file with authors). 
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To illustrate further the role of race in the policing-for-profit regime in 
Ferguson, we look at more granular outcomes at the case level for each 
defendant. Table 6 and Figure 3 provide regression estimates of the racial 
effect on several case outcomes in the Ferguson Municipal Court. As with 
the traffic stops, the regressions include several covariates that measure 
non-race factors, both legal and demographic. We also include fixed 
effects for the range of offenses that bring people into the municipal court 
and that one would expect to affect penalties and other outcomes. The 
standard errors in the regressions are clustered by the defendant’s resident 
zip code, to adjust the significance estimates for local crime and social 
conditions. The coefficients reported in Table 6 and Figure 3 give the 
average difference in the stated outcome between black and white 
defendants in Ferguson, providing clean measures of racial disparities in 
misdemeanor justice. The coefficients in Figure 3 are all in percentage 
terms, in order that all outcomes are comparable on the same scale.
Race has a substantial impact on each outcome after controlling for 
potential non-racial influences on court outcomes. Conditional on the 
same offense, bail bond amounts imposed on black defendants are more 
than $400 higher, creating barriers for those defendants to make bail. As 
noted earlier, a spell of pretrial detention adversely affects the disposition 
and sentence in criminal cases, and creates personal hardships for 
defendants with work or school commitments or childcare duties.191 These 
hardships are skewed heavily toward blacks. Once adjudicated, usually via 
plea agreement, blacks are 2.5% more likely to have a fine imposed than 
whites for the same offense. In contrast, black defendants are 5.8% less 
likely to have their cases dismissed than white defendants, suggesting 
more formal adjudication and the likelihood of a LFO or a criminal record,
or both.
Conditional on receiving a fine, the fine for the same offense is 4% 
larger on average for blacks. These stricter penalties are further reflected 
in worse outcomes following the fine levy. Blacks are 2% more likely to 
have a positive financial obligation at the end of the case, meaning they 
have been unable—compared to whites—to pay the full fine amount by 
the time the court case nears its conclusion. Conditional on having any 
balance at all, that balance is 22% larger. These impacts are statistically 
significant. And remember once again that the Ferguson population is 
often poor and otherwise earns a median household income of less than 
$40,000.192
191. See supra Section I.C.2.
192. See supra Table 1.














































193. STATE OF MO., supra note 196, at tbl.94.
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Finally, blacks are significantly more likely to have a warrant issued 
and more likely to be arrested. Strikingly, blacks are 15% more likely to 
have a warrant issued than whites. This may reflect the stricter monetary 
penalties resulting in more delinquency, or it may again reflect an 
independent source of racially based treatment.
B. THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF POLICING AND MONEY IN ST. LOUIS COUNTY
The municipal court in Ferguson, and courts like it throughout the 
racially segregated municipalities of St. Louis County, serve as an 
important institution for generating warrants and revenue, which 
incentivizes police to enforce a wide range of municipal ordinances, low-
level misdemeanor enforcement, and most prevalent, traffic 
enforcement.194 This is an efficient revenue-generating machine on which 
the city of Ferguson grew to rely, not only to provide municipal services, 
but also to sustain its own police force.195 It seems that the municipality 
of Ferguson was cloaking its taxing power in the exercise of police power 
by functionally equating the power of taxation with the power to punish. 
Court fines and fees were Ferguson’s third-largest source of income in 
2014, generating over $1.964 million in revenue that sustained the court 
and also the police force. 196 Indeed, the FPD grew to depend on these 
revenue streams to sustain its size and to pay salaries and annual 
increments. 197 The cynicism and indifference of Ferguson leadership is 
breathtaking: they presided over a regime where black citizens were 
disproportionately taxed through the criminal justice system to generate 
revenue to pay for the policing that discriminated against them. All this 
took place in a context that was not driven by crime or public safety 
194. HARVEY ET AL., supra note 189, at 27–37. 
195. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 9–10; see also Memorandum from Mayor 
John Gwaltney to the Sergeants and Patrolmen of the Edmundson Police Dep’t (Apr. 18, 
2014) (on file with authors) (encouraging sergeants and patrolmen to write “good tickets” 
and informing them that “the tickets that you write do add to the revenue on which the 
[Police Department] budget is established and will directly affect pay adjustments at 
budget time”). 
Edmundson is a small town with a population of 836 persons in 2014. It is located 
approximately ten miles from Ferguson and sits along one of the major regional 
thoroughfares that connect the small town in the northeastern quadrant of the county near 
the border of the city of St. Louis. Edmundson, Missouri, CITY-DATA, 
https://perma.cc/N7FW-L8GT.
196. CITY OF FERGUSON, ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2016–2017, at 
11–12 (2016), https://perma.cc/2FCT-QKW7. Only sales tax and utility gross receipts tax 
generated more revenue than court fines and fees. Id.
197. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 9–10.
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concerns, but instead for the concerns of maintenance of a biased legal 
regime.
Ferguson was not alone among St. Louis municipalities in imposing 
this type of revenue-generating legal process, nor in depending on these 
revenues for a share of the municipal budget. Figure 4 shows that 
Ferguson ranked sixth in St. Louis County municipalities in the collection 
of revenue from traffic fines and other court fees in 2014, but it hardly 
generated the highest revenue in 2014. The St. Louis County Municipal 
Court generated the largest revenue from fees and fines. That court serves 
the unincorporated areas of St. Louis County (outside the City of St. 
Louis), with a large population and land area in its jurisdiction. 
Among the municipalities, Ferguson ranks fifth, behind nearby 
Florissant and other small areas. St. Ann, a small town near Ferguson, had 
a population of 12,971 (slightly more than half of Ferguson’s) in 2013 
with a median household income of $35,852.198 It had approximately the 
same per capita income as Ferguson.199 Yet St. Ann’s policing brought in 
nearly 50% more revenue than did the policing regime in Ferguson. The
revenue from fines and fees in other municipalities drops gradually 
thereafter. Those towns are increasingly distant from the band of 
municipalities that border the city of St. Louis, an area in which Ferguson 
sits at the heart. As the population thins in those areas, and the percentage 
of the black population in those areas becomes smaller, the dependency on 
fines and fees diminishes in turn. 
It is not unreasonable to consider, as we see in Ferguson, that policing 
in that sub-region has racial contours linked to the kinds of racial tax that 
led to the strife in Ferguson. The connection from race to revenue 
generation may run through the practice of racially selective enforcement: 
police may stop more black motorists not from any animus toward those 
drivers, but simply as a reliable means to identify unlicensed drivers or 
drivers with some other vehicular violation that is unrepaired due to 
poverty. This is simply preference-based discrimination, driven by an 
indifference among police to the economic consequences of piling up legal 
financial obligations that can put a poor motorist into poverty.
This regime of fines and fees revealed in Ferguson and in the 
surrounding municipalities shows the depth of the integration of these 
processes in the political, legal, and social ecologies of the region. This 
form of revenue-driven policing may be common, 200 “but it always is 
198. St. Ann, Missouri, CITY-DATA, https://perma.cc/CE35-6F2W.
199. Races in St. Ann, Missouri (MO) Detailed Stats, CITY-DATA,       ……… 
https://perma.cc/J3LN-ULYE.
200.  See Developments in the Law–Policing and Profit, supra note 83, at 1726. 
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troubling.” 201 The social and historical trajectory from the creation of 
racially segregated communities to the enforcement of traffic laws
disproportionately on blacks in Ferguson and its neighbors, displays, in 
turn, the synergy and integration of the New Policing and the regimes of 
policing for profit that are deeply implicated in these ecologies.
III. NEW YORK, NEW POLICING
In both popular and political culture, New York City epitomizes the 
New Policing. Professor Philip Heymann focused his 2000 essay on the 
policing model in New York City,202 as did Judge Debra Livingston in her 
widely read 1997 essay.203 Professor Franklin Zimring credited the post-
1994 policing regime in New York for the sharp decline in homicides and 
other violent crime through the 1990s and into the next decade. 204 The 
city’s policing regime in fact sustained much of the policy and empirical 
literature on the nationwide crime decline throughout the second half of 
the 1990s and for years after. This literature was sharply divided on the 
merits of the claims that the strategic and tactical shifts in policing in the 
New York model produced deep and sustained crime declines over time. 
A. FROM SAFE STREETS TO BROKEN WINDOWS
Although many accounts look to the 1994 reforms as the onset of the 
New Policing, (in particular with the appointment of William J. Bratton as 
Police Commissioner), the strategy in fact had precursors beginning more 
than a decade earlier. As far back as 1980, the New York City police had 
revised their strategies to target open-air drug markets and other locations 
of recurring crime. 205 By the late 1980s, as crack cocaine markets 
developed in the city’s poorer neighborhoods, intensive street-level drug 
enforcement by elite police units such as the Tactical Narcotics Teams 
(TNT) produced tens of thousands of felony drug arrests using undercover 
201. Henry Ordower, Onésimo Sandoval & Kenneth Warren, Out of Ferguson: 
Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution and Constitutional Limitations 11
(St. Louis Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-14, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/CEN6-TKQT. 
202. Heymann, supra note 1.
203. Livingston, supra note 19. 
204. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 131–32; see also Fagan et al., supra note 24, at 1289–
90 (showing that the decline in violent crime from 1994–1996 was almost totally 
attributable to a decline in gun crimes with little corresponding decline in non-gun violent 
crimes).
205 . ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 131–32; see also Fagan et al., Declining Homicide, 
supra note 24, at 1289–90 (showing that the decline in violent crime from 1994–1996 
was almost totally attributable to a decline in gun crimes with little corresponding decline 
in non-gun violent crimes).
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stings. 206 Several scholars had argued for similar strategies of policing 
“hot spots,” scaling policing strategy to places using allocation principles 
that matched police resources to the small areas that seemed to have 
recurring crime problems. 207 Others relied on research showing that 
aggressive enforcement of relatively minor crimes—usually through 
arrest—deterred crime by signaling the risks of detection and punishment 
to criminal offenders.208
In 1992–1993, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly 
used a “surge” model to increase street presence of officers in high crime 
neighborhoods. 209 Almost immediately, crime began to decline. The 
homicide rate fell by about 10% over these two years. 210 Robbery and 
assault rates fell during the same time, at similar rates.211 The focus under 
Kelly shifted from drug crimes to major violent crimes. Drug enforcement 
through mass felony arrests had done little to reduce murder and other 
violent crimes; those rates remained unchanged through the TNT years, 
with homicide rates peaking in New York in 1990. 212 The 1992 surge 
refocused policing on violence, with police deployment in the highest 
crime areas in the city. 
206 . MICHAEL E. SMITH ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
EFFECTS OF STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (1992); Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie 
West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City 
Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1561 (2003); Michael Z. Letwin, Report 
from The Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement In New York City 
and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 798–809 (1990) (showing the 
failure of arrest-based drug control policy to disrupt street drug markets and homicides in 
New York City during the crack cocaine epidemic of 1986–1992).
207. Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A 
Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 571 (1999); Lawrence W. 
Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of 
Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 49 (1989). See generally ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L.
WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES: CRIME HOT SPOTS AND EFFECTIVE PREVENTION
(2010).
208. Cohen & Ludwig, supra note 18, at 217, 218, 238–39; Sampson & Cohen, 
supra note 18, at 175–77. See generally BRAGA & WEISBURD, supra note 207.
209. The surge in police officers was the product of the Safe Streets, Safe City Act 
passed by the New York State Legislature in February 1991. The Act was sponsored by 
Mayor David Dinkins, who expended considerable political capital for a $1.8 billion tax 
increase over five years to pay for additional police officers that would raise patrol 
strength to over 19,500 officers in a 38,310-person police force. The Act also reduced the 
minimum hiring age to twenty. The first Police Academy class under this expansion was 
deployed on the street by summer 1991, although full implementation up to the mandated 
personnel levels took over five years. See Vincent E. Henry, CompStat: The Emerging 
Model of Police Management, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 117, 121 
(Albert R. Roberts ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
210. KARMEN, supra note 27, at 26; Fagan et al., Declining Homicide, supra note 24, 
at 1290, 1316; Ken Auletta, Fixing Broken Windows, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/X64W-JQRR.
211. Fagan et al., Declining Homicide, supra note 24, at 1298, 1302.
212. Murders in New York City, 1990–2014, NYPD, https://perma.cc/N5SL-9JZ8.
2017] THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 79
When Bratton began his term in 1994, he was quick to change policing 
models. His reforms, described in detail by Professor Heymann, had three
essential components: (1) the use of crime metrics to allocate police and 
deploy them where needed, (2) management reforms that held police 
supervisors accountable for crime control, and (3) proactive (or assertive, 
or aggressive) policing.213 According to Professor Heymann, proactivity 
was the animating theory of the New Policing, whether in the context of 
data-driven management metrics such as CompStat, a computerized crime 
accounting system, or in the aggressive use of arrests for minor crimes, or 
the conduct of street stops at the first signs of suspicious behavior.214
Strategically, there were two faces of action that animated these 
principles. The first focused on social and physical disorder: prostitution, 
graffiti, “squeegee men,” loud music (boom boxes) and other noise, illegal 
alcohol distribution, and nuisance abatement. The strategy was articulated 
in a blueprint for “order maintenance policing.” The strategy featured 
arrest authority to clean up disorderly places and reduction of discretion
for officers to use other tactics to nudge social norms. These methods were 
articulated in a policy memo titled Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the 
Public Spaces of New York, issued by the NYPD in July 1994.215
The strategy was rooted in Broken Windows theory, articulated by 
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, in a 1982 essay in the Atlantic 
Monthly.216 The theory, in its simplest form, said that signs of physical 
and social disorder were signals to criminals that there was no 
guardianship in the local area which in turn would lead to an invasion by 
criminals. 217 Policing took the form of aggressive enforcement of these 
violations and increased use of custody arrests in lieu of summonses or 
213. Heymann, supra note 1, at 429–31. 
214. Id.; see also Henry, supra note 209, at 119–20. See generally David Weisburd 
et al., Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in American 
Policing, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 421 (2003) (showing that many police 
departments adopted elements of the New Policing without incorporating the metrics-
driven management algorithms for targeting and assessment of police actions. In fact, the 
authors critique management metrics as a retarding organization reform and reinforcing 
the paramilitary model of police innovation).
215 . N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC 
SPACES OF NEW YORK 4, 6–7 (July 1994) [hereinafter POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5]. The 
memo cites Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s claim that high rates of crime and 
disorder had led to desensitization toward crime and tolerance of “conduct previously 
stigmatized.” Id. at 5.
216. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Wilson and Kelling urged that police 
use alternatives to arrest in restoring social order and removing visible signs of physical 
disorder. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 15. The prioritizing of confrontation through 
investigative stops and arrests for “quality of life” and order maintenance offenses was 
part of the new policing strategy adopted following the strategies articulated in Police 
Strategy No. 5. 
217. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 15.
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“desk appearance tickets” that allowed offenders to avoid custody and 
detention. 218 These measures produced higher numbers of misdemeanor 
arrests for non-violent crimes, the origins of the order maintenance 
practices that dominate policing in New York today.
The second, though, was closer to the heart of the New Policing. 
Policing Strategy No. 1, Getting Guns Off the Streets of New York,
explicated the Department’s plan to reduce, if not eliminate, gun violence 
by intensifying policing tactics to find and seize illegal guns.219 The policy 
memo presented several reforms in training, analysis, and investigation 
that were designed to increase the success rate in prosecution of gun 
crimes. The low success rate—just 43–55% from 1981 through 1993—in 
gun crime prosecutions was an explicit point of attack in the memo on 
prior policing regimes, despite the 10% decline in homicides in the prior 
two years.220
Although the policy memo avoided explicit mention of using Terry
stops to search for guns, the expansion and strengthening of specialized 
units to conduct investigative stops was the tactical realization of the 
strategy.221 The police department’s patrol bureaus had relied on “Street 
Crime Units” to conduct investigations, including gun crimes. The new 
strategy relied on expanded and intensified Street Crimes Units “to attack 
specific high gun-violence areas.”222 The details of the expansion were, 
for the time, quite specific:
The 86 police officers and 12 supervisors of the elite, 
citywide Street Crime Unit will be increased by 25% and 
deployed in a concentrated approach in one high-crime area 
at a time, on a 7-day, 24-hour a day basis, to determine to 
what extent they can increase firearms-related arrests, 
reduce violent crime in those communities, and address 
crime displacement into neighboring areas. Precinct
resources will then be used to maintain areas taken by the 
Street Crime Unit.223
Although there was little mention of Terry stops in either of these 
memoranda, the policy envisioned an intensified search for weapons 
218. POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 215, at 9.
219. N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 1: GETTING GUNS OFF THE 
STREETS OF NEW YORK (Mar. 1994) (on file with authors) [hereinafter POLICE STRATEGY 
NO. 1].
220. Id. at 9.
221. Id. at 10–11.
222. Id. at 10.
223. Id. at 14.
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beginning with the “initial encounter” on the street. 224 The acoustic 
separation of street stops and Broken Windows in the two policy memos 
was just that.225 In practice, it became clear that these two strategies were 
inextricably and formally linked.226 The aggressive use of stop and frisk 
drove proactive police interventions with criminal suspects, coupled with 
an aggressive approach to low-level disorder. The big gamble was that 
some of those disorderly persons were carrying guns.227
The inherent racial conflict in the New Policing in New York was 
evident in the first statistical analyses of the practice. A 1999 investigation 
by the New York State Attorney General presented evidence of racial 
disparities in the conduct of street stops, especially stops conducted by the 
Street Crime Units.228 Stops were made at a far higher rate for black and 
Hispanic persons relative to crime rates for those populations in the areas 
where those stops were concentrated.229 These stops often violated Fourth 
Amendment requirements that stops be based on individualized, 
articulable, and reasonable suspicion.230 Those same claims were litigated 
fourteen years later in Floyd v. City of New York and two companion 
cases, and were the focus of a court-ordered set of reforms to reduce racial 
disparities and return stops to constitutional standards. 231 When Eric 
Garner died, one year after the Floyd verdict, the frustration and anger 
with the new policing had already refocused from stops to misdemeanor 
arrests.232 But the underlying racial story remained.
224. Id. at 15 (“Uniformed and plainclothes members of the Patrol Services Bureau 
will receive precinct-based training . . . from the initial street encounter to courtroom 
testimony. This will enable police officers to find concealed weapons more effectively, 
safely effect arrests, and help obtain higher rates of conviction by making better 
presentations to prosecutors, grand juries, and judges.”).
225. POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 215, at 7 (“By working systematically and 
assertively to reduce the level of disorder in the city, the NYPD will act to undercut the 
ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible.”).
226 . See ROBERT C. DAVIS & PEDRO MATEU-GELABERT, RESPECTFUL AND 
EFFECTIVE POLICING: TWO EXAMPLES IN THE SOUTH BRONX 1 (1999) (“Stopping people 
on minor infractions also made it riskier for criminals to carry guns in public.”). If 
criminals, fearful of arrest for minor violations, stopped carrying guns (the argument 
went), fewer violent crimes, and fewer violent deaths, would occur.
227. Harcourt, supra note 17, at 341.
228. OAG REPORT, supra note 127.
229. Id. at 117–19; see also Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 477–78; Andrew 
Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police 
Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 479 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 821 (2007).
230. OAG REPORT, supra note 127, at 160–62.
231. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
232. See infra note 351.
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B. STREET STOPS, BROKEN WINDOWS, AND RACE
As in Ferguson, the policing story in New York is tied to race and 
place. Colonial New Yorkers formed militias in the 1700s to enforce 
criminal codes against slaves, fearing slave insurrections during a time of 
conflict with the French to the north. 233 Civil War era draft riots in New 
York exposed the depth of the animus between white and black New 
Yorkers, with the police siding with the largely white rioters who feared a 
Negro “invasion” following a Northern Union victory in the Civil War.234
Riots in Harlem in 1935, 1943, and 1964 followed incidents sparked by 
harsh police repression.235 These instances of open racial conflict in New 
York are not unsurprising in light of deep racial segregation in the city’s 
residential neighborhoods236 and schools.237
These historical patterns were exacerbated starting in the years after 
World War II as black populations began migrating to New York City as 
part of a larger migration from the rural South beginning in the 1940s.238
Puerto Rican families soon followed, as did Dominican and other Latino 
groups through the 1970s. 239 The creation of New York City’s vast 
network of public housing developments may have improved access to 
housing for the city’s minorities, but it also contributed to residential 
segregation and their isolation from housing equity, and invited intensive 
233 . EDGAR MCMANUS, A HISTORY OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN NEW YORK 90–91 
(2001) (showing the tensions between whites and negro slaves in New York that resulted 
in militia patrols and a bifurcated penal code that created harsher punishments for slaves). 
234 . See, e.g., IVER BERNSTEIN, THE NEW YORK CITY DRAFT RIOTS: THEIR 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR AMERICAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 17–
42 (1990); ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1860–1920 64, 78–80 
(1981) (showing the persistent influence of racial animosity on policing in the United 
States).
235. JANET L. ABU-LUGHOD, RACE, SPACE, AND RIOTS IN CHICAGO, NEW YORK,
AND LOS ANGELES 24–25 (2007).
236. See generally Andrew A. Beveridge et al., Residential Diversity and Division: 
Separation and Segregation among Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Affluent, and 
Poor, in NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE 310, 332–35 (David 
Halle & Andrew A. Beveridge, eds., 2013). 
237. JOHN KUCSERA WITH GARY ORFIELD, NEW YORK STATE’S EXTREME SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION: INEQUALITY, INACTION AND A DAMAGED FUTURE 35–36 (2014); see also
Elizabeth A. Harris, School Segregation Persists in Gentrifying Neighborhoods, Maps 
Suggest, N.Y. Times (Dec. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/TNJ4-34WM. For an historical 
account of racial tensions in public education in New York, see Lauri Johnson, “Making 
Democracy Real”: Teacher Union and Community Activism to Promote Diversity in the 
New York City Public Schools, 1935–1950, 37 URB. EDUC. 566 (2002).
238. See, e.g., Mary C. Waters, Ethnic and Racial Identities of Second-Generation 
Black Immigrants in New York City, 28 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 795 (1994).
239. VIRGINIA E. SÁNCHEZ KORROL, FROM COLONIA TO COMMUNITY: THE HISTORY 
OF PUERTO RICANS IN NEW YORK CITY 11–50 (1994) (documenting the history of Puerto 
Ricans in New York City).
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police interest.240 Accordingly, the historical continuity of race, place, and 
policing is an important context for examining the New Policing in New 
York in the current era.
Table 7 shows basic socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
of New York in 2010. The table includes data from the 2010 decennial 
census, combined with more granular measures from the 2009–2013 
American Community Survey data. Its 303 square miles illustrate the large 
land area. Population density, at 27,013 persons per square mile, may 
understate the extent of crowding in the city’s residential neighborhoods 
because there are several large land areas that include parks, airports, and 
commercial zones. New York is a city of immigrants, with more than one 
in three born outside the United States. The population is diverse, and the 
white population is barely a majority. The city is young, most households 
are renters, and the poverty rate is just above one household in five. 
Table 7. Demographics and Socio-Economic Conditions, 
New York City, 2010–2013241
240 . FRITZ UMBACH, THE LAST NEIGHBORHOOD COPS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
COMMUNITY POLICING IN NEW YORK PUBLIC HOUSING 1–9 (2011) (describing the 
challenges of policing in New York public housing contexts of extreme poverty and 
racial segregation); see generally Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race and 
Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697 (2012) 
(showing the intensity of New Policing in public housing relative to similarly-situated 
adjacent neighborhoods).
241. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 166.
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Readers should view these structural indicia of social and economic 
life as averages across distinct communities in the city, and the extent of 
racial segregation in the city suggests that the social and economic 
contexts of the distinct racial populations of the city are quite different 
from these aggregates. Figure 5 shows the patterns of racial residential 
segregation in the city today. The concentration of racial isolation in this 
decade, well into a two-decade period of crime decline, mirrors the 
concentrations of incarcerations in jails and prisons,242 street stops,243 and 
misdemeanor arrests throughout this era.244
The areas with the greatest racial segregation overlap with the areas 
that have the highest poverty rates in New York. Figure 6 shows poverty 
rates by census tract for the years 2009–2013. When juxtaposed, Figures 5 
and 6 show that poverty rates are highest in the areas where black and 
Hispanic population segregation rates are highest. When then juxtaposed 
with misdemeanor arrest rates by census tract in Figure 7, and stop rates in 
Figure 8, it becomes apparent that there is a spatial nexus of poverty, 
segregation, and the two essential prongs of the New Policing. 
Accordingly, the tension in the New Policing goes beyond simply the 
allocation of policing to places with high violent crime rates, places that 
tend to be largely non-white and isolated, and also poor neighborhoods 
whose residents risk social isolation and economic disadvantage, and 
where arrests exacerbate those conditions for individuals exposed to the 
New Policing.245
But it is one thing to assign police to particular places, and to do so in 
a way that is proportionate. It is quite another to ask what police do once 
assigned to patrol those places. As in Ferguson, this has become the 
flashpoint of tensions between citizens and police in New York, going 
back more than two decades. Those tensions boiled over in investigations 
following the police killings of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed citizen killed 
by the newly expanded Street Crime Unit in 1999, 246 and Patrick 
Dorismond, a man killed by police in a botched drug sting in 2000.247 Two 
eras of litigation, Daniels v. City of New York248 and Floyd v. City of New 
242. Fagan, West & Holland, supra note 206, at 1568.
243. OAG REPORT, supra note 127, at 117–19; Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 
477; Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and the New 
Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 595 (2010)
244. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 635.
245. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Have You Ever Been Arrested? Check Here, N.Y.
TIMES (May 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/TJ75-4CET.
246. OAG REPORT, supra note 127, at 5–7.
247. Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force: Why Patrick Dorismond Didn’t Have to Die, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 10, 2000), https://perma.cc/6D3K-UT6R.
248. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Figure 5. Racial Residential Segregation in New York, 2013249
Figure 6. New York City, Poverty Rates by Tract, 2009–2013250
249. Mireya Navarro, Segregation Issue Complicates de Blasio’s Housing Push, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/P9BK-CDFF.
250. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 166.
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Figure 7. Population-Adjusted Density of Misdemeanor 
Arrests by Police Precincts, 2010251
Figure 8. Stop and Frisk Activity, New York City, 2007–2012252
251.  Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 635 fig.5.
252 . N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, The Stop, Question and Frisk Report Database,    
https://perma.cc/3JYL-L5PD.
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York,253 followed, and each revealed the depth of racial disparities in the 
conduct of stop and frisk, the front edge of the New Policing in New York. 
These disparities may not have led to riots, as in past eras, but they led to a 
deep divide in how citizens in New York City view the police in the era of 
the New Policing.254 These disparities in treatment also have influenced
how citizens interact with police, 255 with evidence of social and 
psychological harms among the populations most affected.256
C. RACIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN THE NEW POLICING
This ection examines the racial dynamics of the New Policing in the 
city over the past decade. The durable links between race and place in 
New York reflect that the policing experiences of black and Latino 
citizens are deeply woven into the social ecologies of black and Latino 
neighborhoods. The racial disparities in policing tend to reinforce the 
structural disadvantages by limiting the economic and social fortunes in 
these communities.
Our analysis exploits data on crime and policing made available from 
the Floyd litigation, as well as research databases used in recent empirical 
analyses of misdemeanor arrests, summons activity, court processing, and 
case outcomes. Data on stops, crimes, and arrests indicate the suspected 
offense, which we code into seven distinct categories that mirror the 
evidence in the Floyd litigation257 and prior analyses of the New Policing 
in New York. Stop data are publicly available and show the age, race, and 
gender of the person stopped, as well as the precinct and other descriptors 
of the stop context.258 Stop data also show the reason(s) for the stop, based 
on a series of categories indicated on the UF-250 form that officers 
complete after each stop.259 The stop data also include measures of the use 
253. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
254. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People 
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 265 
(2008).
255. Tyler, Fagan & Geller, supra note 6, at 751, 773–74.
256. Geller et al., supra note 6, at 2324.
257. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 32 tbl. 5, 42 tbl. 7, 44 tbl. 8, Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034); see also 
SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 39, at 8–9, app. G; Gelman, Fagan & Kiss, supra note 229, 
at 817–19 (following a strategy of using crime rates as a benchmark to estimate disparate 
racial treatment in street stops).
258. The data are collected by police officers on the UF-250 form. See Report of 
Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at apps. B & C, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).
259 . See Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of 
Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 69–70, 88 (2015) 
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of force during the stop and the outcome of the stop: arrest, citation, frisk, 
search, weapons, or contraband seized. Arrest data show the arrest charge, 
as well as the race, age, and gender of the person stopped and the location 
and other descriptors of the stop event. 
1. Terry Stops as Police-Citizen Contacts
Since the outset of the New Policing in New York, most involuntary 
contacts between citizens and police take place in the context of stop and 
frisk encounters. We use publicly available data on each stop from 2004–
2014. During this time, the police recorded 4,811,769 stops.260 Figure 9 
shows the distribution of stops, averaged across police precincts by 
suspect race over that period. The race differences in the stop patterns 
show the elevated rate of stops, using a population benchmark, among 
black and Hispanic persons compared to other population groups in New 
York. Asians and other race persons are stopped least often, with whites 
stopped at a slightly higher rate over time than Asians and other race 
groups.
Figure 9. Number of Terry Stops per Police Precinct by Year261
(showing the UF-250 stop form and identifying the categories of suspicion under the 
Fourth Amendment that officers can indicate as the basis of the stop).
260. The Stop, Question and Frisk Report Database, supra note 252.
261. Id.
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Stops are regulated by case law, beginning with Terry v. Ohio and 
continuing through Adams v. Williams, Whren v. United States, Illinois v. 
Wardlow, several other Fourth Amendment cases, and now Utah v.
Strieff.262 One of the principles of the New Policing as practiced in New 
York is the allocation of officers and stop activity to places based on their 
crime rates to implement the stop and frisk strategy and other investigative 
tactics. 263 The concentration of crime in neighborhoods that are more 
likely to be black or Hispanic would suggest that relative to local crime 
and population, stop rates would be consistent across places once 
conditioned on crime. 
Table 8 shows the results of simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions to test this theory. We compare stop rates per person within 
racial groups relative to the local precinct racial population composition 
and crime rate, as well as population density to estimate the racial 
component of stop patterns. We include a control for crime to reflect the 
policy logic of allocating officers and directing investigative activity to the 
places where crime rates are high and require focused attention. Similar to 
the estimation methods in Section II.B, the regression takes the form of: 
where is the odds ratio for a given race, police precinct, and year. This 
odds ratio can be understood as the magnitude of the difference in the 
incidence of stops for that race and its proportion of the population. The 
vector of controls X includes fixed effects for year, a cubic polynomial in 
the crime rate, and the local population density.264
For each cell, the stop rate exceeds the population rate, after 
controlling for the local crime rate. These odds ratios would be equal to
one if there were equilibrium between stops and crime for each population 
group. The excess above one suggests disproportionate stops. Overall, 
blacks and black Hispanics are stopped nearly three times more than their 
population would predict (4:1) after adjusting at the precinct level for local 
crime rates. The excess stop rate is lower for white Hispanics, but still 
significantly above 1.0. The results for specific crimes also show 
262. See infra notes 335–42; see also Fagan, Original Sin, supra note 46, at 46–66 
(providing a summary of the case law).
263 . BRATTON WITH KNOBLER, supra note 2, at 233–39; Heymann, supra note 1, at 
424, 429; Livingston, supra note 19, at 650–51. 
264. We use a cubic polynomial to adjust for the extreme skew in crime rates by year 
across the city’s seventy-six police precincts. We omitted the 22nd Precinct (Central 
Park) because it has an extremely low population. Density is an additional measure that 
conveys information about the likelihood of a citizen to encounter a police officer given 
the territory that the officer is patrolling.
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uniformly higher rates relative to population after controlling for crime
with a similar racial distribution. 
At first glance, then, it seems that the logic of this prong of the New 
Policing exposes non-white persons to police contact at a significantly 
higher rate than one would expect knowing the local crime rate. This 
exposure is independent of the type of crime, a pattern that would not be 
predicted by the focus on violent crime and weapons seizures suggested in 
the policy blueprints that animated these policies more than two decades 
ago.
The interaction between persons stopped and the officers, and the 
outcomes of those encounters, are additional dimensions of the exposure 
of citizens to the New Policing. Table 9 shows the results of OLS 
regressions that estimate the effects of suspect race on stop outcomes, 
controlling for the reason for the stop under Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In this analysis, we compare the treatment of black, black 
Hispanic, and white Hispanic suspects to white suspects for each specific 
measure of stop interaction. We model five distinct outcomes of the stops. 
Frisks, which are permitted under Terry and subsequent cases as 
protective measures to ensure officer safety, are assessed. 265 We also 
examine “unproductive frisks”: frisks conducted where there was no 
indication of the presence of a weapon or violent behavior either in the
suspected crime or in the suspicion bases that animated the stop.266 We 
also examine whether any force was used, including “unnecessary force”: 
force used in the absence of either weapons or violent behavior in the 
reason for the stop.267 Whether the stop resulted in an arrest, indicative of 
probable cause and a higher standard for the contact than the Terry




265. Fagan, Original Sin, supra note 46, at 56–60.
266. Whether these frisks reflect either a “hunch” that exceeds the signals of danger 
in the indicia of suspicion, or a measure of a taste for intrusion or punitive interaction, is 
a reasonable question that these data cannot answer.
267. As with unproductive frisks, unnecessary force is counted in stops where there 
are no clear signals of danger, or when an arrest is not affected. Use of force in those 
instances could suggest a “hunch” of risk or violence threat that exceeds the signals of 
danger in the indicia of suspicion, or a measure of a taste for using force as a form of 
punitive interaction. This too is a reasonable question that these data cannot answer.
268. Fagan, Original Sin, supra note 46, at 54–56. 
269. The Stop, Question and Frisk Report Database, supra note 252; U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, DECENNIAL CENSUS: 2010 (2011), https://perma.cc/BSY5-NY9H (geocoded to 
NYPD Precincts at www.infoshare.org).
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Table 9. OLS Regression of Racial Differences in Stop Outcomes, 
2004-2014270
We find that blacks and black Hispanics are significantly more likely 
to be stopped and frisked relative to their white counterparts. Compared to 
their white counterparts, blacks are about 5%, white Hispanics nearly 7%, 
and black Hispanics are 7% more likely to be frisked. The same pattern of 
racial disparity is evident in the subset of frisks that we defined as 
unproductive frisks. The results for use of force mirror the frisk results.
There are significant racial and ethnic disparities for each group for both 
any force and for unnecessary force. 
Whatever the motive, whether a hunch of risk or danger that exceeds 
what the objective circumstances imply, or a taste for punitive interactions 
with non-white suspects, we observe a pattern of harsher treatment of 
minority persons by police. For non-whites, there is an increased risk of 
unwanted police contact, but no greater efficiency in crime detection that 
might benefit those same people. The harsher treatment of non-white 
suspects in what are common street interactions with police suggest that 
policing in minority neighborhoods is fraught with risks for the policed. A 
resident of—or visitor to—minority neighborhoods moves about in their 
everyday social interactions knowing that they may face a police contact 
270. The Stop, Question and Frisk Report Database, supra note 252.
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that is procedurally punitive even though there is weak to no evidence of 
criminal wrong-doing. 
Whether an effort to signal risk of contact in the interest of deterrence, 
or simply a taste for punishment of minorities, the results show the risks of 
unwanted and harsh police contacts in the course of everyday movements 
through neighborhoods. These are costs that are borne uniquely by 
minorities in largely minority neighborhoods, in turn reinforcing the 
isolation of those places and the costs of journeying not only outside them, 
but often simply moving about within them. 
2. Arrests and Summonses
Arrests and summonses are rare outcomes of street stops in New York 
from 2004 to the present, over this time, but, as we show below, they 
hardly are rare events across the city under the New Policing. Both are 
integral to the policing strategy that was launched in 1994 under Policing 
Strategy No. 5. And both continue to be instruments of social control and 
order maintenance when applied to low-seriousness misdemeanors or non-
criminal violations.
a. Summonses.
We first consider summonses, which at first glance are less 
stigmatizing and legally burdensome since they are civil actions that carry 
monetary penalties in lieu of jail sentences or probation. Summonses often 
are given in response to violations of city ordinances, traffic offenses, or 
low-level misdemeanors that the New York State criminal code classifies 
as “non-printable offenses.” These are offenses not defined by the Penal 
Law and for which fingerprints are not authorized. For non-fingerprintable 
misdemeanors, some persons are given summonses while others are 
subjected to summary arrest. 
Our concern here is with those who are issued summonses. 
Summonses in New York under the New Policing are a “high-volume 
enforcement activity . . . . [O]n average about a half million summonses 
were issued each year [from 2003–2013]. On a daily basis, the number of 
summonses issued ranged from a high of about 1,600 in 2006 to a low of 
about 1,200 in 2013.” 271 The five most frequent charges in 2013 were 
public consumption of alcohol, disorderly conduct, public urination, park 
offenses, and riding a bicycle on the sidewalk. 272 While these offenses
271. PREETI CHAUHAN ET AL., THE MISDEMEANOR JUSTICE PROJECT, THE SUMMONS 
REPORT: TRENDS IN ISSUANCE AND DISPOSITION OF SUMMONSES IN NEW YORK CITY,
2003–2013 8 (2015), https://perma.cc/9WH7-9YPU [hereinafter THE SUMMONS REPORT].
272. Id. at 39–40, fig.20.
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may fall under the capacious definition of social disorder, they hardly 
seem to be the precursors of criminal activity that animated the turn to 
order maintenance that was an essential prong of the New Policing.
Summonses, though, as we saw in Ferguson,273 can metastasize into 
burdensome legal entanglements that not only carry weighty monetary 
burdens, but also criminal legal liability for those who fail to either 
respond to the summons or who cannot meet the legal financial obligation. 
The extent to which these burdens fall disproportionately on non-white 
persons is not easily identified. Race and ethnicity data are not uniformly 
recorded on summons forms, 274 nor are data on the distribution of 
summons activity by race and ethnicity reported by the state Office of 
Court Administration. 
There are hints, though, that summons activity is racially skewed.275 In 
2012, Judge Noah Dear, a criminal court judge in Brooklyn, spoke 
publicly about the racial skew in summons cases in his courtroom. In a 
written opinion (itself an unusual step in a routine summons case) 
dismissing a summons issued to Jose Figueroa for public drinking, Judge 
Dear said, “As hard as I try, I cannot recall ever arraigning a White 
defendant for such a violation.” 276 Judge Dear had his staff examine a 
month of summons activity for public drinking issued in Brooklyn under 
the city’s open container law,277 and found that 85% of the summonses 
were issued to blacks and Latinos, while only 4% were issued to whites.278
According to census data, Brooklyn’s population was about 36% white.279
The entire summons regime was ruled unconstitutional in 2017 on both 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds in Stinson v. City of New 
York, and the city was ordered to pay $75 million to settle claims resulting 
from 900,000 summonses issued from 2007–2015 that were dismissed by 
the court for legal insufficiency.280
To test for racial disparities in summons activity, we re-analyzed data 
on summons activity that were obtained from the Misdemeanor Justice 
273. See supra Part II.
274. THE SUMMONS REPORT, supra note 271, at 13, 92–93.
275. EDITORIAL BD., New York’s Unfair Summons System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 
2015), https://perma.cc/U42J-686R.
276. People v. Figueroa, 948 N.Y.S.2d 539, 608 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012); see also
Joseph Goldstein, Sniff Test Does Not Prove Public Drinking, A Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 2012), https://perma.cc/AAL3-GUE3. 
277. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-125 (2013) (“No person shall drink or consume an 
alcoholic beverage, or possess, with intent to drink or consume, an open container 
containing an alcoholic beverage in any public place . . . .”).
278. Figueroa, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 608. 
279. Id.
280. 256 F. Supp. 3d 283 (2017); see also Rebecca Baker, Judge Approves $75M 
Settlement of NYPD Summonses Class Action Suit, N.Y. L.J. (June 12, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4NG5-PD8D.
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Project in its analysis of summons activity.281 We limited our analysis to 
2009–2013, the most recent five-year period for which data were 
available. Because data were not available on the race or ethnicity of 
persons who received summonses, we estimated OLS regressions to show 
summons rates as a function of precinct population, controlling for the 
local precinct crime rates. As before, we used a cubic trend for crime to 
control for differences in precinct-level crime trajectories. We also used 
fixed effects for months as well as precincts, consistent with the NYPD 
practices under the New Policing of frequent updating of patrol and 
enforcement activity reflecting “real-time” crime trends. 282 Table 10 
shows the results.
The table includes three models. In each model, the proportion white 
population is the reference for the regression,283 and controls are included 
for the crime rate. Model 1 shows the relationship between racial 
demographics and summonses per person. The coefficient of 0.19 means 
that doubling the proportion black in the precinct population (for example, 
20% black as compared to 10% black) is associated with 19% more 
summonses per person. Doubling the proportion Hispanic population also 
has a large effect: nearly 33%.
It is important to remember that these estimates are obtained 
controlling for local crime rates, suggesting a preference for summonses in 
black and Hispanic neighborhoods that cannot be explained by crime 
alone. It is possible that there is more outdoor activity in these 
neighborhoods, so that police can better observe law violations, or that 
once outdoors, young minority males are more likely to engage in 
disorderly behaviors including public drinking. After all, street corner 
socialization is an important part of city life in non-white neighborhoods, 
and has been for decades.284 Even if some covert drinking were part of 
that life, it would be hard to imagine the racial disparities that are observed 
in these data, or that were observed in Judge Dear’s analysis of summons 
activity. Whether summons activity is aimed at black or Hispanic persons, 
or their street corner life, is hard to disentangle. But Judge Dear’s 
281 . THE SUMMONS REPORT, supra note 271, at 18–19 (describing the data 
surveyed).
282. See BRATTON WITH KNOBLER, supra note 2, at 233–35 (discussing the logic of 
the use of real-time crime data to direct patrol resources and emphases to specific 
locations and crime problems).
283. Results for other racial and ethnic groups are not shown.
284. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, A PLACE ON THE CORNER: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A 
SHIFTING COLLECTION OF BLACK MEN (1978); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET:
DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (2000) (discussing 
streetcorner life for young black men as a “staging area” from which their behaviors then 
unfold in their neighborhoods and sometimes elsewhere in the city); ELLIOT LIEBOW,
TALLY’S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN (1967); Brunson & Weitzer, 
supra note 7.
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Table 10. OLS Regressions of Summons Outcomes from Precinct 
Demographics and Precinct-Level Summons Outcomes, 
New York City, 2009-2013285
experience with open container summonses, of which only 25% seem to 
be sustained in court, suggests that race may in fact trump law violation in 
police summons activity. 
The high dismissal rate that Judge Dear’s analysis noted raises difficult 
and sensitive questions. Are police simply adhering to “productivity 
goals” or quotas when issuing summonses, and diluting the bases of these 
summonses? A high rate of dismissals is not simply a matter of police not 
appearing in court.286 It could simply be a response to poorly composed 
summonses that were lacking legally sufficient bases. A similar question 
was raised in the Floyd case, where the high rate of unproductive stops 
that were severely racially imbalanced led the court to conclude that there 
was a policy of “indirect racial profiling” at work in the stop, question, 
and frisk (SQF) regime.287 The racial imbalance after controlling for crime 
could also suggest that summonses were used for punitive purposes, 
because they seemed to be detached from sound legal analysis by police as 
to whether there actually was a violation that was sustainable in court. 
285. Data provided by John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Misdemeanor Justice 
Project (on file with authors). 
286. Glaberson, supra note 73.
287. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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These concerns led to the analysis in Model 2 in Table 10, where we 
estimated the incidence of legally insufficient summonses by examining 
rates of acquittal and dismissal conditional on summonses. 
As with summons activity, the rates of “bad” or insufficient 
summonses were significantly higher as the proportion of black population 
in the precinct increased. Relative to other precincts, doubling the 
proportion black population is associated with a 3.3% increase in the rate 
of dismissals or acquittals. The acquittal or dismissal rate does not vary 
with the proportion of Hispanic population in a precinct. Dismissals or 
acquittals can result from a legally insufficient summons that provides 
vague or incomplete evidence, a failure of the complaining officer to 
appear in court, or a factual challenge to the summons by the defendant. 
Comparing the first two columns in Table 10, the summons rate 
increases as the proportion of black population increases, but so too does 
the dismissal rate. In other words, there are more bad summonses issued, 
taxing black residents to respond to the summonses in court in order to 
dispose of it. In Hispanic neighborhoods, the summons rate is higher but 
the rate of “bad” summonses remains unchanged across precincts as the 
proportion of Hispanic population increases. While the burden of 
summonses is greater on Hispanic residents in terms of volume, the 
burden on black residents is lower by volume but higher to challenge the 
summonses.
Model 3 shows that the summons process more often leads to warrants 
issued to black and Hispanic residents. The process mirrors what we 
observed in Ferguson. Warrant rates rise significantly as the proportion of 
black and Hispanic residents increases in a precinct. Doubling the black 
population is predicted to increase the warrant rate by nearly 20%. For 
Hispanic populations, the warrant rate increases by 34% for each doubling 
of the Hispanic proportion in the population. As we noted earlier in the 
Ferguson analysis, warrants multiply the burden of a summons beyond the 
monetary obligation. Warrants are gateways that can transform a civil 
violation into a criminal matter, with the corresponding costs attached to 
the warrant: criminal conviction, the risk of pretrial detention and a post-
conviction sentence, and further monetary costs in terms of bail, fines, and 
attorney costs. 
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b. Misdemeanor and Felony Arrests.
Misdemeanor arrests are a second prong of the New Policing and a
central feature of the New York model of social control. 288 Recent 
scholarship on misdemeanor arrests suggest that like street stops, they 
have grown over time across the United States. But unlike street stops, 
which rarely lead to arrests, or summonses, where the liabilities are 
monetary and only civil, arrests are criminal and carry great weight.289 We 
examined arrest patterns for the most recent five-year period where data 
were available. Unlike summonses, where data on the race of the 
defendant was not available, arrest data do have race and ethnicity 
available.
Accordingly, we examined arrests by race and ethnicity per precinct, 
comparing black, black Hispanic, and white Hispanic suspects to white 
suspects, controlling for social and crime conditions in the precinct. The 
data allow us to separate arrests by the most serious charge into felony, 
misdemeanor, and violation categories. The denominator in this model is 
the race-specific proportion of the population in the precinct. Using the 
proportions by race allows us to implicitly compare the two race and 
ethnicity groups to whites and others. The model form applied the same 
analytic strategy that we used to estimate the racial component of stops 
relative to crimes. Table 11 and Figure 10 show the results.
The odds ratios in Table 11 are startling. Each cell in the table is 
statistically significant, indicating that these are consistent patterns not 
attributable to chance. Relative to the local crime rates, the rate of felony 
arrests per population is more than two times greater for black persons,  
for white Hispanics. Similar disparities exist for
misdemeanor arrests and arrests for violations. According to police 
data, felony crime has been declining across all NYPD precincts in New 
York during this period. 290 The concentration of arrest activity in an 
era of steadily declining crime suggests increasing presence and 
police surveillance in those neighborhoods, further sustaining 
their social disadvantage as arrest records and convictions pile up 
among those residents.
288. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 631–32.
289. See generally HARCOURT, supra note 10; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5; 
Howell, supra note 6; Natapoff, supra note 5. 
290. Crime data for 2000–2015 for felony, misdemeanor, and violation crimes are 
available for public access. Historical New York City Crime Data, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T,
https://perma.cc/Z3DX-SVJ4.
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Table 11. OLS Regression for Race and Ethnicity Difference in 
Precinct-Level Arrests, 2009–2014291
Our particular interests here are misdemeanor arrests and arrests for 
violations, the essential components of the New Policing. The charges in 
these cases are less serious, as are the punishment tariffs. The charges 
often are quality of life and disorder offenses. Arrests for these lower 
seriousness crimes have been interpreted as a form of social control and 
order maintenance that is quite separate from the weightier project of 
public safety through felony arrests.292 Table 12, from Professor Kohler-
Hausmann’s research, shows the distribution of misdemeanor arrests by 
crime type. Misdemeanor possession of marijuana is the most frequent 
charge category, accounting for nearly one in five misdemeanor arrests in 
2012. Of the remaining charges, only misdemeanor assault (14.8%) and 
weapons offenses (3.6%) are crimes that threaten public safety. 
The heightened risk of misdemeanor arrest of black and Latino people 
in New York is not confined to their own neighborhoods. 293 A recent 
analysis of misdemeanor arrests showed that fewer than half (about 40%) 
of misdemeanor arrests were of persons in their precinct of residence. The 
291. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, Arrest and Complaint Database Data (on file with 
authors) (provided in Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
292. Howell, supra note 6, at 273–75; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 691–92; 
Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1368.
293. TODD C. WARNER ET AL., THE MISDEMEANOR JUSTICE PROJECT, MAPPING
MOBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED FOR MISDEMEANORS IN NEW YORK CITY, 2006–
2014 22–23 (2016). 
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risks of misdemeanor arrests seem to be as much associated with race as 
place. The implications for constrained mobility that we observed in 
Ferguson are mirrored here.
Figure 10. Odds Ratios of Nonwhite-White Ratio in Per Capita 
Arrest Rates Controlling for Precinct Crime Rate (Mean, 95% CI)294
Why marijuana? The relationship of marijuana use or possession to 
crime is a contentious debate in social science, with most analysts 
dismissing as spurious or narrow a hypothesized connection of marijuana 
use to violence.295 But marijuana enforcement is targeted in New York at 
black and Latino young males.296 Even if one were to accept the notion 
that there was some public safety threat associated with marijuana use that 
might justify intensive enforcement of marijuana arrests, there is no 
evidence that the marijuana-crime relationship is limited to black and 
Latino young males.
294. Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 269.
295. Geller & Fagan, supra note 243, at 623–24 (reviewing the behavioral science 
literature on the weak causal relationship between marijuana use and crime); see, e.g., 
Helene Raskin White, Rolf Loeber, Magda Stouthamer–Loeber & David P. Farrington, 
Developmental Associations Between Substance Use and Violence, 11 DEV. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 785 (1999) (showing weak associations between marijuana use and 
violence that were limited to early adolescence).
296 . ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 32 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/CF8R-NRPN; HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, 
MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY,
1997–2007, at 4 (2008); Geller & Fagan, supra note 243, at 593; Kohler-Hausmann, 
supra note 5, at 630, 633.
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Table 12. Misdemeanor Arrests by Penal Law Chapter, New York 
City, 2012297
Marijuana itself is also disconnected from dangerous behavior, 
particularly violent crime. The linkage of marijuana to crime is both 
contingent on contextual factors and spurious to underlying personal 
characteristics.298 In addition, contrary to “gateway” hypotheses, few users 
of marijuana progress to using harder drugs, and the causal paths are 
complex and mediated by both observed and unobserved personal 
characteristics. 299 Nor is there a connection through marijuana markets. 
Several studies show that marijuana markets are segmented from cocaine 
and heroin markets, reducing the likelihood that disrupting marijuana buys 
297. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 630 tbl.2.
298. See Geller & Fagan, supra note 243, at 624.
299. Professors Andrew Golub and Bruce Johnson examined several waves of the 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse from 1979–1997 and concluded that any 
“increase in youthful marijuana use [in the 1990s] has been offset by lower rates of 
progression to hard drug use among youths born in the 1970s.” See Andrew Golub & 
Bruce D. Johnson, Variation in Youthful Risks of Progression from Alcohol and Tobacco 
to Marijuana and to Hard Drugs Across Generations, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 225, 225 
(2001). Connections between marijuana use and progression to other drugs is more likely 
to be produced through a correlation with (unobserved) personal characteristics rather 
than a causal path. Jan C. van Ours, Is Cannabis a Stepping-Stone for Cocaine?, 22 J.
HEALTH ECON. 539, 551 (2003).
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will have any effect on the more violence-prone heroin and cocaine 
markets.300
In fact, the social science evidence suggests that not only is the 
relationship spurious, but that marijuana use is far more frequent among 
white youths. 301 Why, then, the targeting of marijuana enforcement at 
non-white youths? 302 Perhaps this is simply a form of surveillance or 
control of young black males, the majority of marijuana arrestees. Perhaps 
it is intended to deter more serious crimes, including carrying weapons. 
Perhaps it is borne of a misguided notion of a stronger link between 
marijuana and violence or marijuana and progression to more serious drug 
use. Whatever the rationale, the consequences are hardly minimal and 
reinforce the boundaries of residential and economic segregation.303
3. Court Outcomes
Court processing of misdemeanor arrests shows that sanctions are rare. 
While there may be legal financial obligations imposed in the form of bail 
and other court costs, the outcomes of these cases rarely result in 
substantive punishment. Instead, as we show here, the life of these cases is 
typically marked by repeated court appearances leading to dismissal or a 
simple pleading that closes the case (albeit with a criminal record). The 
coupling of extended court processing with dismissals and rare 
punishment suggests that these were likely not strong cases to begin with. 
We are hardly the first persons to identify this process as part of the New 
Policing, or even policing models from past decades. Professor Malcolm 
Feeley’s analysis of misdemeanor processing in the 1970s suggested that 
organizational interests among court actors contributed to a separation of 
processing from justice.304
Others see misdemeanor arrests as a form of management of largely 
poor and minority persons. Professor Eisha Jain suggested that the 
information generated by misdemeanor arrests serves the interests of 
300. See generally Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, What Price Data Tell Us 
About Drug Markets, 28 J. DRUG ISSUES 593 (1998).
301. See Geller & Fagan, supra note 243, at 593.
302. See Andrew Golub, Bruce D. Johnson & Eloise Dunlap, The Race/Ethnicity 
Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 131, 144–47 (2007); see also Andrew Golub, Bruce D. Johnson & Eloise Dunlap, 
Smoking Marijuana in Public: The Spatial and Policy Shift in New York City Arrests, 
1992–2003, 3 HARM REDUCTION J. 22, 23 (2006); Harcourt & Ludwig, Reefer Madness, 
supra note 28, at 165–66.  
303. Howell, supra note 6, at 274, 288. 
304 . See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (showing how the 
interdependencies, adaptations, institutional maintenance, and adversarial relationships 
among court actors shape the process as experienced by defendants, and its separation 
from the interests of adjudicating guilt or innocence). 
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noncriminal justice actors who can then exert regulatory control over those 
arrested. 305 Professor Kohler-Hausmann suggested that misdemeanor 
justice is separated from the adjudication of guilt or innocence, but instead 
reflects interest in the management of the classes of individuals—mostly 
black and Latino in New York—who are brought into the court in the New 
Policing. She showed that during 2012, only one in five (19.6%) of 
misdemeanor arrests resulted in misdemeanor convictions.306 About three 
in ten (28.7%) resulted in non-criminal convictions, which often carry 
financial obligations in the form of fines.307 Another 7.6% were declined 
for prosecution, a step often taken where there is insufficient evidence to 
sustain a prosecution. 308 The total conviction rate, then, was less than 
50%, well below what one might expect if the interest of misdemeanor 
justice was adjudication of guilt and assessment of proportionate 
punishment tariffs.
Yet, for those 50%, responding to their arrests, including posting bail 
or spending time in pretrial detention or making repeated court 
appearances as prosecutors and police stretched cases out over months and 
sometimes years, poses a different set of burdens and costs for 
defendants.309 This is a form of unregulated punishment for which there 
has been little constitutional interest as prosecutors manipulated speedy 
trial rules to delay final case dispositions. And unless the conviction is 
sealed, the criminal record is available to the court and the police, a stigma 
burden with consequences for future work and housing.310
Four in ten overall (42.1%) were not convicted, including 29.9% who 
were dismissed conditionally.311 Usually, these cases are adjourned after 
305. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 809 (2015). She 
identifies “immigration enforcement officials, public housing authorities, employers, 
licensing authorities, and child protective service providers, among others” as those who 
make use of the information generated by misdemeanor arrests to regulate the poor. Id.
“They do so not because arrests are the best regulatory tools but because they regard 
arrests as proxies for information they value, and because arrests are often easy and 
inexpensive to access.” Id.
306. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 647 fig.10.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Daniel Hamburg, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York's Speedy Trial Statute, 48 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 228–31 (2014) (showing manipulation of the New York 
state Speedy Trial Statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2015), by 
prosecutors with deceptive claims of trial readiness that stretches misdemeanor cases for 
months and sometimes years).
310. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of 
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 207–10 (2008) (discussing 
how federal law both permits and mandates certain criminal background checks); see also
Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 803, 816 (2010).
311. This is commonly known in New York as “Adjournment in Contemplation of 
Dismissal,” or ACD, which is authorized under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.55, 
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six months and the case is closed with no lasting criminal record. For 
marijuana offenses and family court matters, the period of conditional 
dismissal is one year.312 If the individual is not arrested again before the 
adjournment date, the case will be dismissed and sealed on the
adjournment date. 313 But the defendant’s record is open to the public—
employers, landlords, and neighbors—during the ACD period, negating 
the de-stigmatizing purpose of an acquittal and a sealed record. Professor 
Kohler-Hausmann summarizes effectively the importance of these various 
dismissal or delay procedures in the misdemeanor court: 
Defendants are marked—sometimes for a very short time 
and sometimes for a very long time—even if the eventual 
outcome of the case is a dismissal. That marking serves an
important function even if it is not used to trigger the 
capacity of the state to impose a formal sanction. It allows 
the court to record the fact of an encounter and use it as a 
data point in later encounters. The next prosecutor and 
judge who encounter the defendant will know if there was a 
prior allegation of criminal conduct, without demanding 
that the current prosecutor and judge expend all of the time 
and resources needed to secure a conviction.314
Our interest is the racial skew in these processes and how that skew in 
processing and outcomes of misdemeanor arrests may link to the New 
Policing. We exploited data from the Floyd litigation on stops that resulted 
in arrests from 2009–2012,315 and obtained additional data from the state 
Office of Court Administration on the processing of those cases from 
initial filing to sentencing. 316 Table 13 shows the percentage of cases 
surviving each stage of case processing. We then estimate OLS 
regressions to show the odds of cases reaching that stage for black, white 
Hispanic, and black Hispanic defendants compared to white defendants.
During the four years analyzed, 142,596 cases were identified as arrests 
resulting from stops. This represented 5.9% of all stops recorded during 
170.56. Under an ACD, cases are adjourned by motion of either party for a specific time 
period (usually six months). Assuming no further contact with the police or the court, the 
charges are dismissed and the arrest and prosecution is voided. The case disappears from 
the defendant’s record. 
312. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.55, 170.56.
313. Prosecutors do have the authority to move for a “do not seal” stipulation, which 
leaves the record open to public view. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50(1).
314. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 649.
315. Summonses were excluded from this analysis because data on the race or 
ethnicity of persons receiving summonses were not reliably available. See THE SUMMONS 
REPORT, supra note 271, at 13.
316. For details on data sources, see SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 39, at 7–8, app. A.
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the four-year period. Of those, 82.3% proceeded to arraignment. Details of 
the reasons for the attrition of nearly 18% of the arrests were not available. 
Generally, cases may drop out if quashed at the precinct by police 
supervisors, or if they were declined for prosecution due to legal 
insufficiency or other evidentiary concerns.317 The 18% rate is somewhat 
higher than rates reported by Professor Josh Bowers for New York for a 
four-year period from 2005–2008 immediately before the period that we 
observed. Bowers reported declination rates ranging from 2.25% for theft 
of services (generally, turnstile jumping or fare beating) to 16.5% for 
possession of stolen property.318 For marijuana possession, an important 
stop and arrest charge in our data, Bowers reported a declination rate of
8.93%.319
Figure 11. Odds Ratios of Nonwhite-White Differences 
in Case Outcomes, New York City (Mean, 95% CI)320
317. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision 
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1655–56 & n.1 (2010). Bowers suggests 
that prosecutors inherently have the power not to charge and do so for three possible 
reasons: legal reasons (such as insufficient evidence), administrative reasons (such as 
prioritizing case assignments, inability to produce complaining witnesses), and equitable 
reasons (such as moral-judgment-based assessments of the seriousness of the crime, the 
culpability of the suspect, or the character of actors). Id. at 1656–57.
318. Id. at 1720 tbl.4.
319. Id.
320. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 291; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 269.
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Convictions, whether by plea or trial, resulted in 61.1% of the total 
number of arrests resulting from stops. Most of those were misdemeanors 
(53.5%) or violations (37.2%). Perhaps these were more serious charges 
that were plea-bargained to a lesser offense. The Schneiderman report 
noted significant charge reductions from arraignment to conviction. 321
Convictions for crimes involving violence or weapons accounted for just 
one in twenty-five SQF arrests, or 0.2% of all stops, contradicting the 
claims of the New Policing that it is targeted at violence or removing 
weapons from the streets. 322 Sentences to jail or prison were rare with 
most of the 13.1% being sentenced to local jails. Again, there is little 
evidence in the processing of the stop-generated arrest cases to suggest 
that stops are having a measurable effect on crime.323
Even within these de minimus sanctions for crime, we observe a range 
of statistically significant effects suggesting racial disparities in processing 
and punishment. In twelve of fifteen analyses in Table 13 testing for 
difference in race or ethnicity, we observe significant effects that suggest 
harsher treatment of black, black Hispanic, and white Hispanic suspects. 
For example, black suspects are 8% more likely to be arrested if stopped, 
but less likely to be arraigned. This suggests that officers may use stops 
carelessly or even punitively to levy transaction costs with no basis for 
legal sanction. 
At the same time, for the cases that do proceed, black suspects are 
more likely to be adjudicated guilty and receive a criminal stigma. But the 
charges are less serious: the regression for conviction offense shows a 
greater likelihood to be adjudicated guilty for a less serious charge. 
Specifically, compared to white suspects, black suspects are more likely to 
plead to lower charges. Yet they also are more likely to be sentenced to 
jail or prison. Again, the transaction burdens of this form of misdemeanor 
justice fall more heavily onto black than white defendants. There are 
complex factors that may result in a jail or prison sentence, such as prior 
record and the number of charges in the case. But controlling for charge in 
these regressions, we observe a significantly greater risk of incarceration 
for black defendants. 
This duality for black suspects—arrests that lead to no charges or non-
serious charges, coupled with a greater risk of a criminal sanction and
321. SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 39, at 14, 19. 
322. See POLICE STRATEGY NO. 1, supra note 219, at 3–4.
323. Similar analyses using experimental designs to test for crime reduction effects 
of stops show a very small reduction in crime associated with increases in stops. See John 
MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, The Effects of Local Police Surges on 
Crime and Arrests in New York City, 11 PLOS ONE e0157223, 10–11 (2016).  This 
research showed that stops that are based on rationales that more closely approximate 
probable cause, instead of the reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops, do 
have statistically significant crime reduction effects.  Id.
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incarceration—seem to be present in tandem in this part of the New 
Policing. We observe much the same for black Hispanic suspects, 
although their incarceration risks at the end of the process are not 
significantly greater than white suspects. The results are similar for white 
Hispanic suspects, with the exception of arrests conditional on stops.
We see this as a grinding process of accumulating arrest records that 
may increase in number over time to produce at some tipping point a spell 
of incarceration. The consequences are severe, though. Even if there is low 
risk of jail time, the effect of imposing a criminal conviction becomes 
indelible. A criminal conviction is a permanent mark, one that is not easily 
removed through sealing or expunging of records.324 Once a person has a 
criminal conviction his or her prints will be maintained by the state linked 
to a stable New York State Identification (NYSID) and all later arrest 
events will be linked to this NYSID. The arrest charges, disposition, 
sentence imposed, and warrants issued because of failure to appear will be 
listed on the rap sheet. 
D. RACE, CRIME AND THE NEW POLICING IN NEW YORK
The New Policing took root in New York over two decades ago. 
Throughout this time, its tactics have been concentrated in the city’s 
poorest and most racially segregated neighborhoods. 325 These also are 
places where serious crime rates are higher, to be sure.326 Yet even after 
controlling for crime rates, our analyses show that these places receive 
more aggressive and racially skewed enforcement compared to other 
neighborhoods and the business districts of the city. The focus of 
enforcement on low-level misdemeanors and violations or public order 
offenses—separately from the pursuit of serious crime—is an essential 
feature of these tactics. 
Whether there are benefits that return to people living in these areas 
from the New Policing is a contentious debate. 327 Yet any benefits are 
quite small, and the statistical effects have no practical significance in 
terms of crimes actually averted.328 The evidence from court processing of 
324. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 648–49; see also Jacobs & Crepet, supra 
note 310, at 178–79. These marks are especially weighty when seeking employment in 
the private sector, or when seeking a variety of housing options.
325. Fagan et al., Broken Windows Revisited, supra note 33, at 310.
326. Id.
327 . Compare David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City’s Crime Decline: 
Methodological Issues, 31 JUST. Q. 154, 182–83 (2014) (showing no empirical evidence 
that misdemeanor arrests reduced levels of homicide, robbery, or aggravated assaults) 
with Corman & Mocan, supra note 25, at 261–62 (finding that an increase in arrests 
correspond with a decrease in certain crimes).
328. MacDonald, Fagan & Geller, supra note 323, at 9; see also Greenberg, supra 
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arrests produced by the New Policing clarifies the separation of the New 
Policing from public safety. Stops rarely produce arrests or summonses,329
and even less frequently result in seizures of weapons or contraband.330
Summonses are as often dismissed as they are sustained, if not more often. 
Arrests, even when the charges are serious, rarely result in substantive 
punishment, a signal that these are not cases that can be easily linked to 
serious crime. Black and Latino New Yorkers are subject to these types of 
arrests whether moving through their own neighborhoods or moving about 
other neighborhoods or districts in the city.
Another way to view these cases is through the prism of the processing 
costs that defendants incur. Summonses must be answered. Sometimes 
they result in monetary costs, an example of the burdens of legal financial 
obligations.331 However, they often are dismissed, yet the transaction costs 
to the defendant, usually black or Latino, are exacted through court 
appearances. Misdemeanor arrests are frequently declined for prosecution 
or dismissed in court, yet the transaction cost is again exacted. These cases 
require repeated court appearances over several months before they reach 
a conclusion. Monetary costs follow, whether in the form of processing 
fees for cases or for lost time and wages from the disruption of repeat 
court appearances. If convicted, usually for the least serious grades of 
misdemeanors, the stigma of a criminal conviction attaches, creating 
social and economic burdens and deficits. 
Stops and arrests also create the risk of heightened surveillance and 
harsher treatment in the courts for any subsequent appearance,332 and also 
spill over to bias in the form of exclusions from serving on juries,333 or 
note 327, at 181; Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on 
Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003–2010, 31 JUST. Q. 96, 
113–18 (2012). 
329. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
330. Id. at 558–59; see also Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or 
Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New York City's Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 
10 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365, 387 (2016) (showing low seizure rates and racial skew in 
how investigative stops are conducted in the search for weapons).
331. For an example of the burdens of pretrial bail, see Arpit Gupta, Christopher 
Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge 
Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471.
332 . Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine 
Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/T9JX-UJG3 (showing a racial skew 
in how the accumulation of arrest records, regardless of convictions, is reproduced 
through predictive policing tactics that target those with prior arrests as future risks). 
333 . Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest 
Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 412–14 (2016) (showing how 
prosecutors use prior arrests of prospective jurors as race-neutral explanations to justify 
peremptory strikes of blacks during voir dire).
110 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [VOL. 106:1
college enrollment, attendance and achievement. 334 Even simple 
economic transactions, such as privately selling an iPhone, are adversely 
affected by the stigma of neighborhood poverty and segregation. 335 In 
other words, stops and arrests will beget stops and arrests and “spillover 
discrimination,” simply by stigmatizing a neighborhood or smaller area as 
a “high crime area.” For example, Supreme Court doctrine allows an 
officer to conduct investigative stops based on informant tips without 
making their own “personal observation[s]”, 336 of what you were 
wearing,337 or how you behaved in view of the officer,338 so long as the 
officer can state a pretextual reason after the stop, consistent 
with Terry.339 Officers have unfettered discretion to make an investigative 
stop for any reason, including race or ethnicity, when an individual or 
vehicle is near a national border and the officer has taken into account the 
“characteristics of the [border] area.” 340 Officers in some places can 
conduct non-contact observations to extract the same information that they 
might obtain from an involuntary temporary street detention.341 Illinois v. 
Wardlow goes so far as to justify a stop based on behavior within a “high 
crime area,” although there is no clarity on the indicia of a high crime 
area.342 Utah v. Strieff now permits the prosecution of criminal offenders 
based on evidence obtained from an unlawful investigative (street) stop.343
334. Alex O. Widdowson, Sonja E. Siennick & Carter Hay, The Implications of 
Arrest for College Enrollment: An Analysis of Long-Term Effects and Mediating 
Mechanisms, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 621, 633–34 (2016) (showing that arrested youth were 
9% less likely than non-arrested youth to enroll in a four-year college within a decade 
after high school graduation).
335 Max Besbris, Jacob William Faber, Peter Rich & Patrick Sharkey, Effect of 
Neighborhood Stigma on Economic Transactions, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1, 3–4 (2017) 
(reporting evidence from a multi-city experiment showing that the returns from economic 
transactions are suppressed for persons living in poor, segregated and otherwise socio-
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods).
336. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). 
337. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989).
338. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000).
339. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). The justification has to 
include specific reasons that led to enough suspicion that the suspect was breaking the 
law. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
340. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975).
341. JEFFREY FAGAN, ANTHONY A. BRAGA, ROD K. BRUNSON & APRIL PATTAVINA,
AN ANALYSIS OF RACE AND ETHNICITY PATTERNS IN BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIELD INTERROGATION, OBSERVATION, FRISK, AND/OR SEARCH REPORTS 1–3 (2015) 
(citing Boston Police Department Rules and Procedures, Rule 323 § 1 (May 25, 2005)); 
see generally Jeffrey Fagan, Anthony A. Braga, Rod K. Brunson & April Pattavina, Stops 
and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance and Race in the New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 539 (2016).
342. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien 
Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable 
Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1587, 1589 (2008).  But see Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016) 
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At the core of this doctrine is a deep deference and respect for police 
expertise to exercise their professional judgment. 344 And because the 
police are permitted to rely on the cumulative information available to 
them that “might well elude an untrained person,”345 the uncritical mass of 
stop data based on judgments of actuarial or collective suspicion creates 
an echo chamber of information that sustains if not multiplies police 
interventions that deepen its discriminatory effects.
So, as misdemeanor arrests and violations pile up in a neighborhood, 
that neighborhood becomes a high crime area and a target for yet more 
intensive enforcement in the style of the New Policing. With those stops 
and arrests come burdens. The burdens accumulate socially, economically, 
and psychologically.346 Even if your case is dismissed in court, as often 
happens, you will still have an arrest record that brings on the “civil death” 
of discrimination by landlords, employers, and anyone choosing to 
conduct a background check for any reason.347 Failure to return to appear 
in court, no matter how trivial the charge, or failing to appear after posting 
bail will lead to a warrant that will make you arrestable on sight.348
Under these conditions, black and Latino New Yorkers learn that 
routine movements can and do lead to legal entanglement and burdens.349
Those movements have almost no costs or consequences in other 
neighborhoods. But they do have legal consequences, especially from the 
misdemeanor arrest prong, for black and Latino New Yorkers in those 
(holding that flight by black males in Boston may be “totally unrelated to consciousness 
of guilt” owing to the disproportionate and repeated targeting by police for investigative 
encounters. “Such an individual, when approached by the police, might just as easily be 
motivated by the desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by 
the desire to hide criminal activity.”). 
343. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (holding that evidence of a valid 
outstanding arrest warrant obtained in an unlawful investigative stop was not flagrant 
police misconduct).
344. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979) (observing that a “trained, 
experienced police officer . . . is able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct 
which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer”); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 566 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“[C]ourts need not ignore the considerable expertise that law enforcement 
officials have gained from their special training and experience.”). 
345. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 417, 418 (1981)).
346. Geller et al., supra note 6, at 2324–25. 
347. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of 
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1805–06 (2012); see also JAMES B. JACOBS,
THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 33–51 (2015).
348. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 105. 
349. Tyler, Fagan & Geller, supra note 6, at 775–76; see also Joseph Goldstein, 
‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Ebbs, But Still Hangs over Brooklyn Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/MZ97-VS2E (reporting on views of neighborhood residents on the 
frequent negative interactions with police in the absence of any criminal activity).
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neighborhoods, which can translate into social and economic burdens in 
housing, employment, and other social domains. The psychological toll is 
also salient, compromising emotional capital that is often needed to 
negotiate work and other everyday interactions.
Those seeking to leave their poor and segregated neighborhoods 
through the pathways of employment and housing face these obstacles.350
Instead of gaining the means to move ahead, they are instead perhaps 
mired deeper in the poverty traps of their neighborhoods. The city and its 
police continue to engage in an aggressive form of Broken Windows 
policing that may lock people in place and deepen the disadvantages that 
keep them and their neighbors there. We explore these dynamics in more 
detail in the next Part. 
IV. THE NEW POLICING AND THE REPRODUCTION OF SEGREGATION
It was only a few short weeks between the July 2014 chokehold 
homicide of Eric Garner by New York City police officers 351 and the 
August 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown after a confrontation with 
Officer Darren Wilson of the Ferguson Police Department.352 Both deaths 
were sparked by minor legal violations—non-criminal social disorder 
offenses—that have become a staple of contemporary policing.353 Black 
men died in each case at the hands of white police officers. One death—
Michael Brown’s—took place in a small suburb with a population of just 
over 20,000. The other took place in the largest city in the country with a 
population 400 times greater than the first. Neither resulted in a grand jury 
indictment of any of the officers involved. Both killings renewed attention 
among journalists, researchers, and the public to the disproportionate rate 
of police killings of black men in the United States.354
350. Rosenberg, supra note 245.
351. Eric Garner died during his arrest for selling loose cigarettes, a violation of New 
York City Code § 17-704, Regulation of Tobacco Products, and New York State Pub. 
Health Law 13-F § 1399-gg (1), Out-of-Package Sales of Tobacco Products. See Al 
Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric 
Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/JR66-JWJL. New York 
City had increased its laws and enforcement of loose cigarette sales just six months 
before Garner’s death. Garner’s offense was a violation punishable by a fine of up to 
$2,000 for selling unlicensed cigarettes. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF FIN., NEW LAWS AND 
PENALTIES FOR CIGARETTE AND OTHER TOBACCO PRODUCT VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK 
CITY 6 (2014), https://perma.cc/7H9S-VSXT.
352. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY 
FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 5–8 (2015). 
353. See Livingston, supra note 19, at 578–84; Kelling & Bratton, supra note 10.
354. Catherine Barber et al., Homicides by Police: Comparing Counts from the 
National Violent Death Reporting System, Vital Statistics and Supplementary Homicide 
Reports, 16 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 922, 922 (2016); Willie F. Tolliver et al., Police Killings 
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Besides these two particular events, the respective policing regimes 
providing the context for these killings remain disconnected in the 
political, legal, and popular imagination. We argue here that these two 
policing models are two faces of a new culture of policing that is as
common in smaller cities as it is in the larger ones. The respective policing 
styles share the same ideological and institutional features: managerialism, 
social and spatial control of the poor, revenue generation, and the distorted 
influence of metrics and numbers on substantive policing. Both are 
skewed racially, as reported in civil rights investigations and in 
litigation.355
Much of the discourse on policing over the past few years, when 
police shootings and citizen deaths took center stage in law and policy, has 
focused on catastrophic events such as the Garner and Brown deaths. 
These events do merit close attention, and there is considerable 
scholarship now devoted to reducing the harms inherent in contemporary 
policing. 356 But the spotlight on salient fatalities in police-citizen 
encounters may mask underlying trends in policing methods that tie 
together places such as New York and Ferguson. Aggressive policing of 
local ordinances and misdemeanor crimes has become the staple of 
policing over the past two decades, despite sustained decline in violent 
crime rates in most U.S. cities.357
In light of the evidence thus far presented, we take a deeper look at the 
consequences and implications of this model of policing for urban social 
ecology: the maintenance of racial boundaries, both spatial and economic, 
and the economic disenfranchisement of citizens under these models of 
socio-legal control.
A. CONNECTING TISSUE
What connects law enforcement across cities large and small is the 
underlying logic of the New Policing: the emphasis on minor social 
disorder as a leading indicator both of crime rates and criminality among 
of Unarmed Black People: Centering Race and Racism in Human Behavior and the 
Social Environment Content, 26 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 279, 281–82 (2016); see, 
e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar & Steven Rich, Final Tally: Police Shot and Killed 986 
People in 2015, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/XR7D-MFUU.
355. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 62–63.
356 . See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s 
“Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281 (2016); 
Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211 
(2017).
357. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 640; Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1348; 
PREETI CHAUHAN, ADAM G. FERA, MEGAN B. WELSH, ERVIN BALAZON & EVAN 
MISSHULA, TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN NEW YORK 8–11 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/4WFM-BAGX.
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individuals.358 The depth of belief in this policing model is evident in both 
popular and academic scholarship for more than three decades.359 The new 
era in policing instantiating these views is marked by changing definitions 
of the criminal, the expansion of law to accommodate new forms of social 
regulation, a burgeoning criminal procedure rendering moot substantive 
criminal law, new forms of punishment and control, a broadening social 
context in which law and regulation are enforced with the potential for 
criminal sanctions, and—most relevant for this Article—a renewed focus 
on social control of persons in lower social strata.360 All of this adds up to 
what Marcus Dubber identifies as the “new police science.”361
A second connecting thread that we observed both in Ferguson and in 
New York is the menu of punishments and methods of social control 
following from this policing model. Fines and fees or other legal financial 
obligations are imposed on defendants. Pretrial detention for periods 
ranging from a few hours to a few weeks may result if bond is not posted. 
Even traffic violations, not punishable by jail time, can result in custody 
arrest.362 Reporting obligations to probation officers, random drug testing, 
and other “treatment” conditions may be imposed, each of which carries 
escalating penalties if conditions are unmet. We are not alone in showing 
how this system of administrative rules serve as a form of punishment, 
with costs piling up even for those who are not found guilty of any 
criminal offense.363
358. Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Mapping the New Criminal Justice 
Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 1, 6 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra 
Natapoff eds., 2017) (“These ‘order-maintenance’ and ‘zero tolerance’ policies amounted 
to an official decision to treat young men of color in certain neighborhoods as 
presumptive criminals . . . .”).
359. See, e.g., BRATTON WITH KNOBLER, supra note 2; KELLING & COLES, supra 
note 2; SKOGAN, supra note 16; Corman & Mocan, supra note 25; Heymann, supra note 
1; Kelling & Bratton, supra note 10; Livingston, supra note 19; Kelling & Wilson, supra 
note 15; Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order 
Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, 17 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 237
(1969); Heather MacDonald, ‘Broken Windows’ Policing Does Work, NAT’L REV. (June 
8, 2015), https://perma.cc/6VQ9-UYNH. 
360. Dolovich & Natapoff, supra note 358, at 14–15; see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ,
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 159 (2011). 
361 . THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 1, 107 (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 
2006) [hereinafter NEW POLICE SCIENCE].
362. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324–26, 354–55 (2001) 
(affirming police authority to make warrantless arrests for petty offenses punishable only 
by fine). Gail Atwater was arrested for traffic violations including failure to wear a 
seatbelt and failure to carry a driver’s license and vehicle registration. Id. at 524. For 
more details on the consequences of Atwater’s arrest, see Bowers, supra note 7, at 989.
363. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 9, at 52–53; Logan & Wright, supra note 9, at 
1211–12. 
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A third connecting thread is the expanding net of legal, social, and 
economic consequences of misdemeanor arrests and convictions: a 
criminal record; an immigration hold and detention leading perhaps to 
deportation; eviction from public housing or failure to meet rent 
obligations; suspension of driving privileges; disruptions in employment 
or schooling; and child custody disruption. 364 For those unable to post 
bond, a pretrial spell in jail can bias later proceedings toward harsher 
dispositions and sentences.365 Failure to be present at any of a sequence of 
court dates can lead to a warrant and criminal arrest. In the wider 
community, harsh enforcement of minor disorder violations takes a 
psychological toll. Persistent “crackdowns” on the day-to-day activities of 
neighborhood residents in public spaces insert police into the 
developmental landscape of children living in those areas, leading to 
tensions and cynicism between citizens and police, even among 
neighborhood children.366
While the policing regimes in Ferguson and New York can be 
connected tactically, there also are connections in the ideology that 
animates these practices. One could argue that these policing regimes 
work to the benefit of local residents. Reducing fear of crime by removing 
signals of crime is a net benefit, regardless of actual changes in crime 
risks. 367 If the police focus on physical disorder, such as graffiti, 
improving those conditions could also be a net benefit by attracting and 
normalizing economic activity that can benefit the social and economic 
fortunes of local residents.368
If the theory linking social and physical disorder to crime is sound, 
then there should also be crime control benefits to the people and places 
where these tactics are concentrated.369 But this is a contested claim, and 
so far, there is little evidence to show that this model of policing produces 
364. Howell, supra note 6, at 300–06; see also Jain, supra note 305, at 820–44. 
365. Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect 
Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 KAN. L. REV. 879, 880, 895 (2008); Marian R. 
Williams, The Effect of Pretrial Detention on Imprisonment Decisions, 28 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 299, 313 (2003).
366 . Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and 
Adolescents, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 217, 229–31 (2005); see also PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK 
IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL 
EQUALITY 150, 157 (2013) (showing that the presence of police is part of a spectrum of 
persistent disadvantages facing residents in black poor minority neighborhoods).
367. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 368. 
368. Lorlene M. Hoyt, Do Business Improvement District Organizations Make a 
Difference? Crime in and Around Commercial Areas in Philadelphia, 25 J. PLANNING 
EDUC. & RES. 185, 190–91 (2005); see also SHARKEY, supra note 366, at 75. 
369. Kelling & Bratton, supra note 10.
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more than minor crime control benefits. 370 Certainly, removing both 
physical and social disorder might lead to improvements in neighborhood 
amenities, but it could also spark rounds of gentrification that result in 
conflict between new and incumbent residents, or otherwise disadvantage 
or displace local residents. 371 The presence of police intervening in the 
everyday routines of social interactions among local neighborhood 
residents may engender ill feelings toward police, legal cynicism, and a 
withdrawal from joining with the co-production of security.372
These features of the New Policing seem well suited for urban areas, 
where crime rates tend to be higher,373 police forces larger, and policing 
resources deeper. Our interest in this Article is to connect the regimes in 
Ferguson with those in large cities such as New York. Ferguson is typical 
of small cities; these are places with population less than 50,000, low rates 
of violent crime, mostly single-family homes and low-rise block 
apartments, and low population density. Yet there are sub-locales in large 
cities that share those small-city features. The police precincts in the 
eastern part of New York City share similar structural characteristics with 
Ferguson: low rates of violent crime, low population density, a 
preponderance of single-family or low-rise housing, few public 
transportation options with correspondingly high rates of automobile 
ownership and usage. While the theory of social disorder underlying the 
New Policing may generalize to large and small cities, it has little apparent 
relevance to places with few indicia of social disorder or crime. Yet the 
strength of the ideology of policing disorder, or Broken Windows 
policing, has animated its spread across the country regardless of social, 
physical, or crime conditions, and with little attention to the thin evidence 
of its crime control benefits.374 It is no surprise then that these policing 
370. Sophie Body-Gendrot, Public Disorders: Theory and Practice, 10 ANN. REV. L
& SOC. SCI. 243, 243–44 (2014) (arguing for a social constructionist view of disorder in 
which disorder can be viewed either as a source of democratic vitality or social 
pathology). For a review of the contradictory empirical evidence, see supra Part I. See 
also TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 22; Howell, supra note 6, at 276 & n.20; MacDonald, 
Fagan & Geller, supra note 323, at 10–11; Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 28, at 
638.
371. SHARKEY, supra note 366, at 152; see also Amy Schwartz et al., Has Falling 
Crime Driven New York City's Real Estate Boom?, 14 J. HOUSING RES. 101, 122–24 
(2003).
372. Tyler & Fagan, supra note 254, at 264; Tyler, Fagan, & Geller, supra note 6, at 
757–58.
373. See RUTH D. PETERSON & LAUREN J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS:
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 15 (2010); Tomislav V. 
Kovandzic, Lynne M. Vieraitis & Mark R. Yeisley, The Structural Covariates of Urban 
Homicide: Reassessing the Impact of Income Inequality and Poverty in the Post Reagan 
Era, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 569, 572–74 (1998).
374. The Broken Windows theory was first advanced by Professor Zimbardo in his 
experiment in Palo Alto, California, and a New York City neighborhood in the Bronx. 
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tactics and logics have penetrated policing widely both in the United 
States and elsewhere.375
B. POLICING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BOUNDARIES
If not a prophylactic against a criminal invasion brought on by social 
disorder, misdemeanor arrests may be serving other purposes. The 
Ferguson Report, and litigation elsewhere challenging certain LFOs, 376
suggests that there are profit interests in the system of fines and fees in 
Ferguson. The private corrections litigation in Georgia and Alabama 
suggest that Ferguson is not an isolated case in the governmental pursuit 
of revenue from criminal justice actions.377
In Ferguson, it appears that black residents and black visitors are the 
prime targets of that enforcement. 378 This speaks to motives other than 
pure profit. There is no reason that whites living in Ferguson or passing 
through could not be targeted at comparable rates for enforcement of 
violations, ordinances, and minor misdemeanors. Targeting those offenses 
in a race-neutral way might increase the revenue flowing to the city: if 
white residents or visitors are better off economically, their ability to pay 
fines and fees would either replace or supplant those who cannot afford 
the taxing legal actions that lead to warrants and further personal monetary 
drains. The increase in revenue from diversifying the racial distribution of 
those targeted for legal-monetary sanctions might in fact benefit the FPD 
See Zimbardo, supra note 359, at 264, 287–93. Palo Alto, home to Stanford University 
and its surrounding community, was a small city in 1969. As described by Zimbardo, the 
experiment was done using a single car abandoned on a typical low-density street with a 
relatively low crime rate. The presence of a single disorderly vehicle in an otherwise 
orderly area did not inspire criminals to invade the area, nor did it launch a crime wave in 
Palo Alto. It was not until one of the experimenters broke a window in the abandoned car 
that it received any criminal attention. Id. at 290. The Bronx site was a high crime urban 
area that already had been blighted by extensive decay, including crime, abandoned and 
burnt out housing, and active drug markets. Rodrick Wallace, A Synergism of Plagues: 
“Planned Shrinkage,” Contagious Housing Destruction, and AIDS in the Bronx, 47 
ENVTL. RES. 1, 1–2 (1988); see also JONATHAN MAHLER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE 
BRONX IS BURNING: 1977, BASEBALL, POLITICS, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF A 
CITY 29–30 (2006). An abandoned car in the Bronx was just another target for vandals 
looking to scavenge materials for resale in an illicit market. Zimbardo, supra note 359, at 
287. There was no basis in either theory—given the lack of noise-free signals of 
disorder—nor in the case study design to make any causal inference that the vandalism of 
the car could be attributed to its presence in an already highly disordered neighborhood. 
Yet that is precisely the theory of “broken windows” that incorporated the Zimbardo 
results. 
375. NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 361, at 24; Forrest Stuart & Steve Herbert, 
The Police and Inequality: Tales from Two Cities, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL 
POLICING 193, 198 (Ben Bradford et al. eds., 2016). 
376. See supra notes 115–116.
377. Id.
378. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 63–69.
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as well as the city generally. So why would the FPD not enforce the law 
more often and as aggressively with whites as it did with blacks?
One explanation is the defense of property. Raising the costs for black 
residents or visitors to move freely through either mixed or predominantly 
white social spaces would ward off encroachments that might diminish 
property value, or protect against property loss. Those motives, together 
with personal fears of, were drivers of the move toward segregation in 
early twentieth century St. Louis.379
A second and perhaps related explanation is the maintenance of 
physical space and boundaries separating black people in Ferguson from 
others. In other words, promoting segregation. The revenue interest of the 
Ferguson style of New Policing complements the interest in maintaining 
racial separation. Maximizing revenue by distributing enforcement 
proportionately by race or by allocating enforcement zones more 
uniformly might sacrifice the racial separation interest that the current 
policing model may serve.380 This is more than simply a statistical form of 
discrimination: the profit and social control benefits of policing Ferguson-
style suggests a preference or structural bias in Ferguson policing.
The pursuit of racial separation in Ferguson through policing is neither 
new nor surprising. Segregation runs through the history of Ferguson and 
the surrounding municipalities. 381 Ferguson is a small area where black 
and white homeowners live in close quarters, frequently crossing paths in 
their everyday movements and routines. Collective action by whites 
produced segregation in the form of legal instruments and social norms.382
But the instruments available decades ago to manage racial separation 
within law and policy are no longer available. Formal legal barriers that 
enforced segregation, such as restrictive covenants, were banned in 1948 
in Shelley v. Kraemer 383 and again later with the passage of the Fair 
Housing Act in 1968.384
379. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 25–28.
380. See, e.g., Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? 
Descriptive Government and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POL. 1090, 1092–93
(2017) (showing that the use of fines and fees for local revenue disproportionately affects 
black voters and suppresses black representation)
381. Id. at 5–7.
382. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 151, at 36–57; see also David M. Cutler, 
Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 
J. POL. ECON. 455, 487 (1999) (citing the demise of legal barriers enforcing segregation 
after 1990).
383. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948) (finding that restrictive covenants 
barring blacks from home ownership was a “state action” that violated the rights of 
individuals under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
384 . Carol Rose & Richard R.W. Brooks, Racial Covenants and Housing
Segregation, Today and Yesterday, in RACE AND REAL ESTATE 161, 161, 169 (Adrienne 
Brown & Valerie Smith eds., 2015); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 147, at 34 n.33.
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If collective action by whites produced twentieth century segregation 
in Ferguson and elsewhere, there is no reason why concerted political 
actions by whites—with the consent and participation of black officials in 
Ferguson and its neighbors385—would not sustain a policing regime that 
enforces social and economic boundaries. Administrative and agency 
actions in this instance created a policing model that maintained separation 
socially, if not spatially, without resorting to the banned segregation 
instruments of the past. 
The City of Ferguson, as did several of its neighbors, appears to have 
leveraged the regime of fines and fees, tolerated by state law and enforced 
by its small local police forces, to maintain racial boundaries defined by 
law and local economics—boundaries that reinforced the spatial 
segregation typical of many of these small cities. By coupling the regimes 
of LFOs with a brand of the New Policing that enforced minor violations 
and misdemeanors to generate revenue and criminal liabilities for those 
who failed to pay, Ferguson created alternative mechanisms to enforce 
segregation by building a de facto system of economic disenfranchisement 
under the color of law. Policing helps to lock people in place both spatially 
and economically. Systematic coupling of police actions against minority 
motorists and the fiscal and legal consequences of those actions for blacks 
maintains a form of economic and social separation that could no longer 
be maintained by the instruments of the past, including housing codes and 
other discriminatory policies.
Perhaps in cities such as New York, where there is less dependence on 
revenue from fines and fees, the economic prong of the New Policing is a 
secondary and non-essential factor contributing to this separation 
dynamic. The relative sizes of municipal budgets suggest that the 
rationales for the New Policing and the regime of LFOs differ in cities 
compared to smaller areas. Smaller places are more likely to use traffic 
tickets to generate revenue to offset shortfalls in municipal budgets and 
declines in municipal revenue.386
Yet what connects the policing model in a place like Ferguson with 
policing under Broken Windows and order maintenance in the larger cities 
is interest in managing minority populations. 387 Policing in Ferguson 
imposed both criminal and economic sanctions on its residents, creating 
strong disincentives to move and associate. Concentrated enforcement of 
the New Policing tactics imposes both of these sanctions as well in larger 
385. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 3, 21–25.
386. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rear View Mirror: Local 
Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J. L. & ECON. 71, 86–87 (2009) 
(using panel data from North Carolina counties to show that police issue significantly 
more tickets in the year following a decline in local government revenue).
387. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 691–92. 
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cities like New York, where routine movements can also provoke the 
police gaze and intrusion. 388 In Ferguson, pretexts for police actions 
exacted an economic cost through the fine regime for everyday 
movements, the corollary in New York and other big cities is the social 
and legal tax for such movements. 
C. REPRODUCING SEGREGATION
In cities, as in suburbs and exurbs, movements of citizens are affected 
by police tactics. When police routinely and promiscuously intervene in 
the everyday lives of citizens, they impose interaction costs that inevitably 
deter residents from moving freely. And when these police actions 
produce legal and economic consequences for those already in 
disadvantaged social positions, those consequences effectively lock them 
in already disadvantaged places by constraining choices of neighborhood 
selection.389 Even when a neighborhood changes for the better, it retains 
its status relative to other neighborhoods that are changing 
simultaneously.390 Because police deployments and actions are racialized 
and focused in poor and segregated places, police in effect reproduce 
inequality, racial stratification, and segregation through criminal legal 
enforcement actions that can constrain mobility. 391 Two types of police 
enforcement instruments can proscribe movements: the costs of legal 
interventions and the dignity costs of police intrusions. 
1. Residual Legal Costs
First, as in Ferguson, intensive enforcement of non-criminal violations 
and minor misdemeanors create court actions with potentially substantial 
economic and legal consequences for indigent persons. Review papers 
using meta-analysis techniques find that race enters into police decisions 
to arrest, rather than other discretionary dispositions in misdemeanor 
enforcement. 392 Police targeting decisions—how they are deployed and 
what they do once in place—define which crimes, people, and especially 
which places matter. Because places are conflated in most cities with 
388 . See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: 
Evaluating Stop-and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397 
(theorizing mechanisms through which a program of stops that blankets minority 
communities can create and reinforce social and racial stratification).
389. Robert J. Sampson & Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Selection and the Social 
Reproduction of Concentrated Racial Inequality, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 20–21 tbl.4 (2008) 
(showing intergenerational reproduction of racial inequality through constrained mobility 
pathways that vary by race and ethnicity).
390. Sampson & Morenoff, supra note 76, at 199.
391. Huq, supra note 388, at 2430–40.
392. Kochel, Wilson & Mastrofski, supra note 129, at 479, 498. 
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racial concentration, 393 enforcement by social area and social group 
applies legal sanctions selectively to ensure transaction costs from 
repetitive court appearances to clear minor legal matters such as 
summonses, or stigma costs of conviction.394
Once subject to arrest, defendants face court processes that now 
resemble administrative and bureaucratic regimes of regulation and 
control, and that stretch out over months. 395 This new model of 
adjudication has replaced the determination of guilt and punishment for 
these offenses, defaulting to actuarial determinations of dispositions, or a 
going rate. 396 Defendants often have to navigate this system with ill-
prepared and under-resourced defense counsel. 397 The regimes of LFOs 
and the bureaucratic entanglements of processing these arrests create 
burdens and costs for the accused, guilt aside. We see this both in 
Ferguson and New York, and the diffusion of this policing model suggests 
that this is the reality in both urban and municipal courts elsewhere.
The adjudication process, whether resulting in a sanction or dismissal, 
also exacts costs and reinforces the risks of managerialism for its targets. 
As we saw in New York, and as others have pointed out, interactions with 
police under the New Policing—if they do proceed beyond stops to court 
involvement—lead nowhere. Adjudication of alleged crimes has defaulted 
to a maze of court appearances that often lead to dismissal or the most 
minor forms of punishment. But it is the repeated mandates to appear in 
court, and to pay fines and fees along the way, that creates the hazards of 
deeper legal entanglements through warrants and extended reporting 
requirements to agents who carry out the social control mandates of the 
court. 
393. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 151; Shertzer & Walsh, supra note
151.
394. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Courts in Slow Motion, Aided by Defense, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/L96C-6SXS (showing that repeated delays in 
resolving misdemeanor cases and summons burdens defendants with numerous court 
appearances stretching over months while cases remain pending).
395. Id.
396. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 623–25.
397. Glaberson, supra note 394; see, e.g., Complaint at 6–12, Yarls v. Bunton, No. 
Civ. 16-31-JJB-RLB, 2017 WL 424874 (M.D. La. 2017) (alleging that criminal 
defendants in Orleans Parish are denied defense counsel due to budgetary shortfalls and 
excessive caseloads); Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment 
Right to Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 360–63
(2010); Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 749–50 (2016) 
(arguing for parity in the resources that prosecutors allocate and the methods they use to 
investigate crimes by police with investigation and prosecution of crimes by citizens); 
Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public 
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 268 (2004) (arguing for parity in resources 
allocated to prosecutors and to defense counsel).
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As a result of the new managerial posture of the misdemeanor courts, 
arrest now launches its own form of punishment once a case is calendared. 
As Malcolm Feeley once famously observed, the process indeed remains 
the punishment.398 But the process itself has changed from the complex 
bureaucratic disarray described by Feeley to an administrative regime 
infused with scheduled fees, repetitive docket appearances, lengthening 
arrest records, and a host of ancillary legal consequences. 399 The 
accumulation of burdens from these stigma and complications from both 
arrest and non-arrest police actions complicates social mobility by 
disadvantaging economic enfranchisement, in effect locking already poor 
people in poor places.400
This is one part of the dynamic of the reproduction of segregation. The 
overlap of segregation and consequential policing is apparent from maps 
of misdemeanor arrests and maps of segregation. Comparing Figures 5–8
shows that misdemeanor arrests, street stops, poverty, and segregation are 
essential characteristics of impoverished neighborhoods of New York. 
When people already in conditions of segregation risk further pointless 
misdemeanor arrests for minor crimes, the legal costs of everyday 
movements reinforce segregation by simply deterring movements within, 
much less across, those neighborhood boundaries. 
2. Social Transactional Costs
The second face of policing that deters movement is active 
surveillance and intrusion through the programmatic application of Terry
stops or investigative stops. 401 The saturation of certain neighborhoods 
with stops suggested extremely tight surveillance and disruption of 
everyday movements primarily of young black males. 402 Several cities 
experienced this type of blanketing of entire neighborhoods with intrusive 
398. FEELEY, supra note 304, at 12–13. Feeley distances this process from the 
tempting analogy of the “assembly line,” citing complexity in the everyday decisions of 
prosecutors and defense counsel in negotiating pleas. Id.
399. JACOBS, supra note 347, at 303–05 (suggesting similarities between a criminal 
record and a job resume that signals to prospective employers, landlords, or even marital 
partners that one’s criminal capital may exceed that person’s social capital); see also
Bowers, supra note 317, at 1699; Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban 
Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1060 (2013).
400. See Sampson & Morenoff, supra note 76, at 200 (describing the absence of 
social and economic mobility over time for poor people living in persistently poor 
places).
401. Fagan, Braga, Brunson & Pattavina, supra note 341, at 553–66; Meares, supra
note 4, at 164–65.
402. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 3–4, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540, 646, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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police activity,403 including and especially New York City.404 In the Floyd
trial on constitutional violations in the conduct of stop and frisk activity, 
one of the litigated facts was that police stops were concentrated in 
neighborhoods with high percentages of black and Latino residents, net of 
the influence of local crime rates.405 The evidence also showed a pattern
of stops of individuals who were out of place: people who had crossed 
racial boundaries and entered places where other races or ethnicities were 
the dominant presence.406 In other words, patterns both of misdemeanor 
arrests and street stops described place-specific enforcement of law within 
racially defined boundaries. 
How police behave in these contacts shows just what the costs of free 
movements are, both within and across neighborhoods. Proactive or 
aggressive policing—central features of the New Policing—can facilitate 
recurring and sometimes disturbing incursions on the dignity of citizens in 
their everyday social interactions with police. 407 In Terry, the Court 
recognized the risks of programmatic street stops incurring personal 
dignitarian harms:
[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that [a stop and frisk] 
performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands 
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 
‘petty indignity.’ It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity 
of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.408
403. See, e.g., AYRES & BOROWSKY, supra note 46, at 5–7; Rod K. Brunson & 
Ronald Weitzer, Negotiating Unwelcome Police Encounters: The Intergenerational 
Transmission of Conduct Norms, 40 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 425, 431 (2011); 
Brunson & Weitzer, supra note 7, at 859–60; Fagan et al., Broken Windows Revisited,
supra note 33, at 312–14; Craig B. Futterman, Chaclyn Hunt & Jamie Kalven, “They 
Have All the Power”: Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South Side 1–3 (Chicago 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 573, 2016); MacDonald, Fagan & 
Geller, supra note 323, at 1–2; Tyler, Fagan & Geller, supra note 6, at 765–67. 
404. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 45, at 853, 855–56, 871.
405. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding 
that officers conducted a pattern of “indirect racial profiling” by concentrating stops in 
minority neighborhoods that routinely violated Fourth Amendment standards for 
investigative stops and frisks); see also Fagan et al., Broken Windows Revisited, supra 
note 33, at 323–25; John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the Stop-and-Frisk 
Verdict, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 13, 2013), https://perma.cc/RJT6-233D.
406. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 42 tbl.7, 44 tbl.8, Floyd v. City of New York, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034). 
407. See Howell, supra 6, 292–315, 325–26 (showing evidence that aggressive 
policing of misdemeanor and other minor non-fingerprintable offenses has adverse 
consequences that include economic costs to citizens, dignity incursions that produce 
legal cynicism, and disincentives to cooperate with police); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect 
and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 82 (2003).
408. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968).
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After Terry, the court did not return to the dignity risks of every day 
stops, until it did in Atwater v. Lago Vista, a case that highlighted a
different dimension of the New Policing: the exercise of arrest discretion 
for the most minor of traffic violations. 409 If the arrest of Gail Atwater for 
failing to buckle her seatbelt was, as the Supreme Court noted, a “pointless 
indignity,”410 imagine the scope of such indignities in the fruitless stops 
and street detentions of over four million citizens in New York since 2003, 
most of whom were found to have committed no crime, nor infraction of a 
civil ordinance.411
Recent studies analyzing the content of interactions between citizens 
and police in the course of Terry stops show the emotional and often 
physical freight of being stopped. Firsthand accounts of police encounters 
were reported by Professors Rod Brunson and Ronald Weitzer in a recent
article,412 by Michael Powell in a series of interviews in New York with 
college students,413 and also by college students in focus groups conducted 
again in New York City. 414 Each study offers strong similarities in the 
narratives describing inconsistent and arbitrary stop rationales that 
bordered on the pretextual. The accounts of everyday indignities are stark 
and take several forms: unwarranted stops, stops alleging criminal 
wrongdoing, unwarranted searches of personal effects and body searches, 
physical aggression and property destruction, temporary detentions in 
police precincts, racial and homophobic invective, and threats of legal 
action and further violence.
Ethnographic studies show similar reactions by police. Brunson and 
Weitzer showed that police were particularly harsh in conducting stops of 
black youths who were out of place.415 Police reserved special hostility for 
youths in mixed race groups. 416 Brunson and Weitzer also showed that 
409 . Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S 318, 372 (2000) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]s the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a 
relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing 
an individual.”). Interestingly, the respondent in this case was a white middle-class 
woman. 
410. Bowers, supra note 7, at 989.
411. See supra Part III; Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; OAG REPORT, supra note 
127, at 111–17; Bowers, supra note 317, at 1696 n.189; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, 
at 669; The Stop, Question and Frisk Report Database, supra note 252.
412. Brunson & Weitzer, supra note 7.
413. Michael Powell, Police Polish Image, but Concerns Persist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 
2009), https://perma.cc/P8ZZ-KMUN.
414. Jeffrey Plaut, Dawn Hoffman & Scott Lowenstein, Global Strategy Group, 
Understanding Stop & Frisk: Report of Findings from Focus Groups with African 
American and Latino New Yorkers (2011) (on file with authors). 
415. Brunson & Weitzer, supra note 7, at 865–68; see also RIOS, supra note 3, at 
154–56.
416. Brunson & Weitzer, supra note 7, at 868.
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police aggressively enforced racial separation with white youths, 
comparable to similar enforcement with their black counterparts. Whites 
traveling with—or simply being in the company of—young black males 
were subjected to the same harsh treatment as groups of black males. 
Spatial segregation was enforced for white youths when traveling in 
racially mixed or majority-black neighborhoods. Racial separation also 
was enforced with white youths who crossed cultural boundaries by 
appearing in public while dressed in hip-hop apparel. Whatever racial 
privilege whites may enjoy in freedom from police suspicion or action in 
their typical routines, it may be pierced when they violate racial covenants 
and codes of social organization that police enforce, whether 
subconsciously or as a matter of shared cultural norms and preferences. 
Not only did the risks differ, but the course of these mixed-race 
encounters was distinctly different in tone and in basic respect for the 
dignity of the respondents. The descriptions by white respondents along 
these lines are vivid. For example, a white youth named Toby reported a 
similar experience when they journeyed into a majority-black 
neighborhood and were stopped by the police: 
[We] was on a corner during school hours and a cop talked 
to us about what we were doing, and then took us back to 
school. We got in trouble for it at school, it sucked. . . . The 
cop that stopped us was being a dick at first. He kept asking 
us if we were going on a booty call together. You know, 
like we were gay. Then kept making jokes about booty 
calls and then ask[ed] if we left school because of the 
“brothers.” Then he asked if we were scared of the 
“brothers” and if that is why we left school or if the 
“brothers” booty call[ed] us and that is why we left. The 
cop finally quit giving us shit, took us back to school, and 
we got three days of in-school suspension.417
Toby evidently crossed two social boundaries, inviting a harsh police 
response: he was spatially out of place as a white youth in a black 
neighborhood, and he was traveling in a racially mixed group. Yet he was 
also quite sure that, although the officer’s comments were offensive, they 
felt that they “kinda got off easy.”418 But that was not always the case. 
Kyle told this story:
[The police] asked me what I was doing in a Black 
neighborhood, ’cause I’m a White boy. They said, ‘You 
417. Id. (alteration in original).
418. Id.
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ain’t sellin’ drugs are you?’ and he tried to plant drugs on 
me. I didn’t have weed on me ’cause I never sold it or 
smoked it but the [officer] put it in my pocket, put his hand 
in my pocket and pulled it out. I felt his thumb was folded 
under his hand, there’s a lump. And then when he touched 
me I felt a bag under his thumb, he pulled it out and then 
said, “Aha, what’s this?”419
Cultural integration was treated as harshly as was crossing spatial 
boundaries. White youths who dressed in “hip hop” clothing such as saggy 
pants or wide-brimmed baseball caps, or who had “grills,” or wore new 
“Jordans” (tennis shoes), were all viewed suspiciously or treated harshly, 
in the accounts of the St. Louis youths.
The attribution of suspicion in these instances, and the pathway from 
suspicion to harsh treatment in the course of everyday policing, evokes 
Jerome Skolnick’s timeless archetype of the “symbolic assailant”—an 
individual whose mere attire, demeanor, or language is construed by 
police as a cue that the person is a potential threat or involved in illegal 
activity.420 But in the New Policing, in an era of declining crime rates, it 
also marks these individuals as targets for mechanisms of social control 
that reinforce social and economic boundaries. The symbolic assailant is 
deeply embedded in the social context of race and neighborhood, mixed in 
with attributions of disorder and criminality.421 It is common to cities as 
far apart as St. Louis, Ferguson, and New York, as well as Chicago and 
Kansas City. What perhaps links the New Policing with the reproduction 
of segregation is the banality of its enforcement, its indifference to 
dignitarian concerns, and the acts of criminalization and gratuitous 
violence that seem to follow from policing that is endemic to poor people 
in poor places.
3. Beyond Inequality: Social, Health, & Economic Legacies of the New 
Policing
Residential segregation has been an enduring feature of American 
urban life for persons of African descent for decades.422 Segregation of 
blacks is so severe that sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton 
419. Id. (alteration in original).
420. SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 29, at 45–48.
421. Alpert, MacDonald & Dunham, supra note 182, at 422–23.
422. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 151, at 2 (“No group in the history of the 
United States has ever experienced the sustained high level of residential segregation that 
has been imposed on blacks in large American cities . . . .”).
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refer to the condition as “hypersegregation.”423 In cities across the United 
States, people tend to cluster in social and economic spaces with people 
who share their educational, socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic 
backgrounds.424 Even as U.S. cities have become more racially diverse in 
the past two decades with rising Latino immigration, racially distinct 
neighborhoods persist and remain a central defining feature of the urban 
landscape of many cities. In other words, racial segregation today has a 
multigroup structure that spans artifactual neighborhood boundaries to 
reflect segregation patterns across communities within a wider 
metropolitan area.425 This spatial configuration, which Chad Farrell terms 
“segregation amid diversity,” characterizes the segregation patterns we 
observed both in New York and Ferguson.426
Segregation by itself may or may not have adverse effects on social 
advantage, but it is related to upward mobility and income inequality.427
Historically, the blocking effects of racial segregation on social mobility 
are most pronounced in the middle of the social stratification ladder, 
where white-collar socioeconomic strata are statistically adjacent to blue-
strata. 428 The conflation of racial segregation and economic mobility 
means that, typically, a black adolescent or young adult male in U.S. cities 
lives in very different economic and social circumstances than his white 
counterpart: different types of schools, different social networks, different 
levels of access to social capital leading to crime, and different exposure 
to the police and to violence.429 The blocking effects of segregation mean 
423 . Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 
DEMOGRAPHY 373, 373 (1989).
424. Bryan S. Graham, Identifying and Estimating Neighborhood Effects 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22575, 2016) (reporting his calculations 
of neighborhood characteristics using the Neighborhood Change Database,.  Graham 
estimates that: 
In 2000 the average Black individual lived in a city where over 50 percent of 
her immediate neighbors were Black, although just 20 percent of residents city-
wide were. She was two and one half times as likely to have a Black neighbor
relative to a counterfactual world without residential segregation by race.  
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
425. Chad R. Farrell, Bifurcation, Fragmentation or Integration? The Racial and 
Geographical Structure of US Metropolitan Segregation 1990–2000, 45 J. URB. STUD.
467, 468–69, 472 (2008) (describing a “patchwork of different groups occupying spatial 
niches within large, diverse metropolitan areas” spanning boundaries of small 
municipalities within “an array of incorporated municipalities and their unincorporated 
equivalents”).
426. Id. at 468.
427. Duncan & Duncan, supra note 155, at 500; see also Farrell, supra note 425, at 
469 (“Residential segregation can also block pathways to socioeconomic mobility.”). 
428. Duncan & Duncan, supra note 155, at 502. 
429. SHARKEY, supra note 366, at 30–33.
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that people in these areas are far less likely to better their economic 
circumstances than whites. 
We observed in two quite different locales that the cumulative and 
aggregate effects of New Policing placed economic burdens and social 
stigma on blacks and, to a slightly lesser extent, Latinos living in 
conditions of spatial and racial segregation. When families are given the 
chance to escape poor and racially segregated neighborhoods, economic 
disadvantage can be overcome if they can move to neighborhoods with 
higher income levels and less segregation than the neighborhoods they had 
left. 430 But those chances are out of reach for many families, whose 
escapes are blocked by segregation and criminal justice involvement. 
People living in neighborhoods with high levels of racial fragmentation 
and income inequality have less access to public goods, and lower levels 
of civic engagement that might alleviate those conditions. 431 In other 
words, black residents of highly segregated and economically unequal 
neighborhoods have limited access to the types of everyday material 
services (such as, libraries, supermarkets, parks, and cultural institutions) 
that characterize economically better-off places. 432 Segregation, in other 
words, determines access to such essentials as educational and 
employment opportunities for African-Americans, truncating their 
socioeconomic mobility and reinforcing racial inequalities.433
People in segregated neighborhoods also form weaker bonds with their 
neighbors, attenuating the formation of social capital—trust and ties 
between neighbors—that can, in conditions of high social capital, translate 
430. Micere Keels, Greg J. Duncan, Stefanie Deluca, Ruby Mendenhall & James 
Rosenbaum, Fifteen Years Later: Can Residential Mobility Programs Provide a Long-
Term Escape from Neighborhood Segregation, Crime and, Poverty?, 42 DEMOGRAPHY
51, 71 (2005) (“Helping low-income minority families relocate to communities that are 
racially integrated, [and] economically prosperous . . . appears to be beneficial in both the 
short and long run.”); see also Jake Intrator, Jonathan Tannen & Douglas S. Massey, 
Segregation by Race and Income in the United States, 1970–2010, 60 SOC. SCI. RES. 45, 
54–57 (2016).
431. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir & William Easterly, Public Goods and 
Ethnic Divisions, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1243, 1274 (1999) (showing evidence that ethnic 
fragmentation with neighborhood segregation can lead to a low supply of public goods, 
including public education); see also Andrea Tesei, Racial Fragmentation, Income 
Inequality and Social Capital Formation: New Evidence from the U.S. 2 (2011) 
(unpublished paper), https://perma.cc/XJ6Q-W9RX.
432. JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR 
BLACKS, HISPANICS AND ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1, 5, 9 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/XM3W-KH27 (showing that black and Hispanic households live in 
neighborhoods with more than one and a half times the poverty rate of neighborhoods 
where the average non-Hispanic, white lives).
433 . David R. Williams & Chiquita Collins, Racial Residential Segregation: A 
Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 404, 407 
(2001).
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into better economic fortunes and social mobility. 434 These associations 
and interactions among neighborhood residents define the socioeconomic 
environments of their members; when locked into isolated and segregated 
places, these environments can create and perpetuate inequality between 
these associational networks and similar networks in less isolated areas.435
The blocking effects of segregation on mobility serve to consign those 
living in segregated neighborhoods to long-term exposure to a set of social 
and psychological toxins that reinforce the individual and collective 
disadvantages of these poverty traps.436 First, and perhaps most important, 
is the subsequent exposure to crime and victimization. Across studies, 
there is a robust and persistent link between racial residential segregation 
and neighborhood rates of violent crime. Professors Logan and Messner 
show these effects for suburban communities surrounding metropolitan 
areas, while Professors Peterson and Krivo focus on inner-city 
neighborhoods, again in large cities. 437 Professor Douglas Massey further 
specifies the connection between income deprivation, concentrated 
poverty (via segregation), and a “high risk of physical injury, violent 
death, and criminal victimization.” 438 Professors Edward Shihadeh and 
Nicole Flynn showed the same, but used a definition of segregation based 
on spatial isolation—the social and physical distances of black residents 
from whites—to show the link between high degrees of “segregation” and 
violent crime.439 Segregation also seems to multiply its effects over time 
434. For a detailed exposition of social capital theory and function, see James S. 
Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. S95, S100–
S105 (1988).
435. Steven N. Durlauf, Associational Redistribution: A Defense, 24 POL. & SOC’Y
391, 392–94 (1996) (showing that these associations and network interactions are 
observed at the neighborhood level, where social capital represents a collective resource 
for the neighborhood that shapes the economic fortunes of its residents). 
436 . Sampson & Morenoff, supra note 76, at 199 (“[N]eighborhoods remain 
remarkably stable in their relative economic standing . . . which means that the overall 
pattern of neighborhood inequality did not change much over time [and that] further 
change is invariably in the direction of greater racial homogeneity and more poverty.”).
437 . John R. Logan & Steven F. Messner, Racial Residential Segregation and 
Suburban Violent Crime, 68 SOC. SCI. Q. 510, 510 (1987) (arguing for the consideration 
of “racial residential segregation as an independent variable with important consequences 
for metropolitan communities”); Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Racial Segregation 
and Black Urban Homicide, 71 SOC. FORCES 1001, 1001, 1006 (1993) (showing evidence 
form 125 central cities that “social isolation . . . is the mechanism by which segregation 
leads to higher levels of homicide among African Americans”).  
438. Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime
in Urban America, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 1203, 1210 (1995) (describing the mechanisms 
by which segregation creates conditions leading to elevated risks of violent crime 
victimization).
439. Edward S. Shihadeh & Nicole Flynn, Segregation and Crime: The Effect of 
Black Social Isolation on the Rates of Black Urban Violence, 74 SOC. FORCES 1325, 1341 
(1996) (showing that, in addition to residential segregation, unevenness in the spatial 
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as populations change in neighborhoods. Research in Chicago 
neighborhoods from 1970–1990 shows that increases in neighborhood 
homicide and concentrated social deprivation over a twenty-year period 
were associated with increases in black population, but decreases in white 
population.440 Recent research shows similar evidence of elevated rates of 
violence in both Latino and black neighborhoods across central cities in 
the United States.441
Several studies report that racial segregation exacerbates the 
prevalence and severity of health disparities,442 and is a fundamental cause 
of racial disparities in health.443 For example, researchers have reported 
that black infants in hypersegregated metropolitan areas were more likely 
to be preterm births. 444 Overall, access to health care is limited in 
segregated neighborhoods, including higher rates of hospital closings.445
One explanation is the concentration of uninsured people in the catchment 
areas of those hospitals, creating a fiscal strain that often leads to 
distribution of blacks and whites leads to physical and social isolation and in turn, higher 
rates of both black homicide victimization and black robbery victimization).
440. Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Robert J. Sampson, Violent Crime and the Spatial 
Dynamics of Neighborhood Transition: Chicago, 1970–1990, 76 SOC. FORCES 31, 56 
(1996) (showing sharp racial group differences in the growth of homicide in black and 
white neighborhoods as segregation and poverty changed over time).
441. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Segregated Spatial Locations, Race-Ethnic 
Composition, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 93, 102 (2009) (showing that the spatial distribution of disadvantage and segregation 
accounts for higher levels of violence in both black and Latino neighborhoods compared 
to white neighborhoods).
442 . See, e.g., Tse-Chuan Yang, Yunhan Zhao & Qian Song, Residential 
Segregation and Racial Disparities in Self-Rated Health: How Do Dimensions of 
Residential Segregation Matter?,  61 SOC. SCI. RES. 29 (2017) (discussing evidence that 
specific dimensions of residential segregation are implicated in health disparities).
443. See, e.g., Williams & Collins, supra note 433, at 404.
444 . Theresa L. Osypuk & Dolores Acevedo-Garcia, Are Racial Disparities in 
Preterm Birth Larger in Hypersegregated Areas?, 167 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1295, 1300 
(2008) (“[T]he probability of preterm birth for Blacks was higher, and . . . the racial 
disparity in preterm birth was larger, for infants born in metropolitan areas characterized 
by hypersegregation. . . .”); Emily Walton, Residential Segregation and Birth Weight 
among Racial and Ethnic Minorities in the United States, 50 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 
427, 436–37 (2009) (showing that the incidence of low birth weight increases with the 
percentage of Latino and African-American population in U.S. cities); see also Anna 
Forte, Segregation and Health, OAK PARK REG’L HOUSING CTR. (June 22, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/UM6Z-AZEQ.
445 . Sara McLafferty, Neighborhood Characteristics and Hospital Closures: A 
Comparison of the Public, Private and Voluntary Hospital Systems, 16 SOC. SCI. MED.
1667, 1671 tbl.5 (1982) (showing that closings of each of three different types of 
hospitals were more likely in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of black 
residents); David G. Whiteis, Hospital And Community Characteristics In Closures of 
Urban Hospitals, 1980–87, 107 PUB. HEALTH REP. 409, 414–15 (1992) (showing that 
hospital closings from 1980–1987 were predicted by the percent of black population in 
the community).
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closings.446 In addition, federal funding cuts in that era in unemployment 
insurance, income support, food stamps, and child nutrition programs 
disproportionately affected poor people in predominantly minority 
neighborhoods, increasing their demand for health care that was 
increasingly scarce and inaccessible to them. 447 One study showed that 
pharmacies in predominantly minority New York City neighborhoods 
were less likely than pharmacies located elsewhere in the city to stock 
adequate amounts and types of medication.448
The cumulative effects of segregation on health, violence, and 
socioeconomic isolation from educational and economic opportunities 
suggest a process of stress proliferation that translates into “large and 
systematic inequalities in physical health, longevity, and emotional well-
being.” 449 Stress experiences at the individual level, such as 
discriminatory treatment or poor access to health care or education, 
aggregate over time and are magnified into health impacts of structural or 
contextual factors such as concentrated poverty, racial segregation, lower 
educational attainment, environmental hazards, and neighborhood 
disorder. 450 The effects of neighborhood disorder, where policing is 
concentrated, on stressors that ultimately affect health can also be seen in 
psychological stress responses, such as fearful anxiety or depression.451
These same stressors also produce physiological signs of autonomic 
arousal including nausea, troubled breathing, chest pains, upset stomach, 
and muscle weakness. 452 Although research on stressors has not looked 
(yet) at police treatment, some studies have shown the psychological 
impacts on mental health of harsh interactions with police in the context of 
New Policing.453
Other work shows how racial segregation and inequality impacts the 
economic lives of black persons in their access to capital and their ability 
446. McLafferty, supra note 445, at 1671.
447. Whiteis, supra note 445, at 414–15.
448. R. Sean Morrison et al., “We Don’t Carry That”—Failure of Pharmacies in 
Predominantly Nonwhite Neighborhoods to Stock Opioid Analgesics, 342 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1023, 1025 (2000) (showing that pharmacies in predominantly nonwhite 
neighborhoods in New York City were less likely to stock opioids than pharmacies in 
predominantly white neighborhoods).
449. Peggy A. Thoits, Stress and Health: Major Findings and Policy Implications, 
51(S) J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. S41, S46 (2010) (summarizing research linking 
segregation to physical and mental health stressors that are concentrated among 
disadvantaged group members).
450. Id.
451. Terence D. Hill, Catherine E. Ross & Ronald J. Angel, Neighborhood Disorder, 
Psychophysiological Distress, and Heath, 46 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 170, 176–79
(2005).
452. Id. at 181.
453. See, e.g., Geller et al., supra note 6.
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to multiply it.  For example, attributions of class and crime combine to 
devalue the economic status of blacks in civil tort claims in the eyes of 
white jurors.454 These patterns lead to biases that in turn tend to reduce 
the monetary value attributed to the income and property of black people, 
or lead jurors to see black people’s money as having come from morally 
suspect sources, and hence devalue their loss.455 Professor Regina Austin 
describes a case arising from a traffic accident where several jurors
reported that “they did not want to award anything to [the plaintiff] 
because she was a fat black woman on welfare who would simply blow 
the money on liquor, cigarettes, jai alai, bingo or the dog track.”456 Austin 
concludes that the “[p]laintiff was . . . beholden to them and their class for 
any money she had, whatever form it took, and the jurors in turn felt 
justified in keeping a tight rein on the purse strings.”457
Such attitudes go beyond the criminal stigma to reflect a plaintiff’s 
presumed position in the labor market and the low market value of her 
labor. It is a form of collective suspicion, but generalized from criminal 
behavior to attributes associated with racial stratification and 
concentration.  In other words, jurors’ biased view of a black plaintiff’s 
worth becomes a reproducer of her already diminished (and suspect) social 
and economic standing. Professor Austin concludes that the money being 
awarded was not simply an economic determination, but a calculation that 
also reflected social and cultural modifiers that owed to a black 
defendant’s place toward the bottom rungs of social stratification.  It is not 
too hard, in this light, to connect the deeply instantiated system of racially 
latent taxation in Ferguson with the devaluation of the labor and lives 
needed to generate the revenue that is transferred to the city to pay for its 
largely white police force.  It is not only the money that is devalued, it is 
454. Ronen Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Valuing Black Lives: Constitutional 
Challenges to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages 5 (Univ. of 
Tex. Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 674, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/SJZ3-KM79 (critiquing the use of race-based wage, life expectancy and 
work-life expectancy tables in calculating tort awards that damage racial minority 
communities as well as individuals).
455. Id. at 4, n.3, 12 n.29; see also Regina Austin, “Black People’s Money”: The 
Impact of Law, Economics, and Culture in the Context of Race on Damage Recoveries 2
(Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 16-24, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/W3VE-52XR (theorizing that black people’s money is worth less than 
whites’ because their “cash is considered petty [in small amounts] and in large amounts it 
is considered evidence of crime”).  Jurors also said that they, as taxpayers, “would be 
paying one way or another, by awarding money in [a] case or through welfare.” Wright v. 
CTL Distribution, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
456. Austin, supra note 455, at 3 (quoting Wright v. CTL Distribution, Inc., 650 So. 
2d 641, 642 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995)) (alteration in original).
457. Id. at 5.
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the effort to produce it and the moral diminution of the uses of that 
money.458
Limited access to capital also attenuates the ability of black and other 
minority business borrowers to invest and multiply their capital. Professor 
Darius Palia showed that black borrowers are 30% more likely to have 
their business loan applications rejected compared to white borrowers, 
after controlling for a rich set of alternative factors including the borrower, 
the firm and the characteristics of the lender.459 Palia found no differences 
between Asian and white borrowers.460
Not only were loan applications differentially accepted, but the 
average amount loaned to black borrowers was far lower ($331,000) than 
loans to white borrowers ($1.17 million). 461 As a counterfactual, Palia 
also considered the expected default loss, but found no evidence that black 
borrowers posed a larger risk for lenders.462 This analysis is quite strong, 
owing to the use of three different methods to account for any alternative 
factors that might predict lending differences. 463   The lower access to 
capital for black borrowers again suggests attributions of financial risk that 
mirrors the risks of criminal activity that animates police decision making. 
Whether by blocking access to capital or access to employment, the effects 
of racial segregation that block the social mobility of black and other 
minorities again reproduce and deepen segregation.
If the New Policing is reinforcing and deepening segregation, these 
empirical studies suggest that it also is contributing to health disparities, 
higher risks of mortality and crime victimization, and attenuated access to 
educational, employment, and economic opportunities. These deficits 
compound the direct economic burdens imposed by the New Policing and 
the regimes of legal financial obligations that can deepen segregation. 
Together with poor housing conditions and limited access to basic 
neighborhood amenities, segregation appears to have a churning effect on 
the processes and structures that contribute to sustained economic 
disadvantage, or the perpetuation of poverty traps through downward 
socioeconomic mobility.464 Mobility is a casualty of these processes, and 
458. As Professor Austin notes, for whites, the money that would be awarded in a 
tort action to a black person “would obviously be put to a better, higher use in the hands 
of a nonblack person. Moreover, the money is tainted by the association between blacks 
and crime and dishonesty and, as with a fetish subject to a taboo, is sanitized or restored 
to full value when it passes into the hands of others. Id. at 38.
459 . Darius Palia, Differential Access to Capital from Financial Institutions by 
Minority Entrepreneurs, 13 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 756, 777–78 (2016).
460. Id.
461. Id. at 779.
462. Id.
463. See id.
464. SHARKEY, supra note 366, at 114–15.
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so the inheritance of the ghetto, with its skewed exposure to policing, 
burdens successive generations. In other words, New Policing contributes 
to being “stuck in place,” or the cross-generational legacy of urban 
disadvantage.465
CONCLUSION
The New Policing today is ascendant in crime control theory and 
policy. Breaking with a past tradition of “reactive policing,” agencies now 
emphasize advanced statistical metrics, new forms of organizational 
accountability, and aggressive tactical enforcement of minor crimes as the 
core of the new models. The tactics of the New Policing have become 
institutionalized in police–citizen interactions in the everyday lives of
residents of poorer, often minority, and higher crime areas of the nation’s 
cities. 
We link the rise of the New Policing in urban areas to new trends in 
policing in smaller cities and municipalities. We observe surprising and 
troubling similarities in the conduct of the New Policing in two vastly 
different areas, the suburb of Ferguson and the metropolis of New York 
City. We show that both in large cities and small municipalities, there is a 
racial skew in the distribution of the burdens of the New Policing.
Aggressive enforcement of low-level offenses—whether “public order” 
crimes such as open containers or traffic violations for vehicle defects—is 
the starting point for legal proceedings that over time evolve into 
punishments that lead to financial burdens and criminal stigma with 
lasting consequences. These financial burdens can metastasize from 
simple fines to warrants to arrests and further penalties. In turn, exposure 
to criminal punishment imposes social and economic burdens with both 
near- and long-term effects on employment, housing, and other social 
assets. 
Beyond criminal sanctions, the New Policing systematically reinforces 
and reproduces racial separation and segregation, attenuating socio-
economic mobility while deepening inequality. In turn, inequality and 
segregation are linked to externalized harms in physical and mental health, 
mortality and the formation of social capital, compounding the 
disadvantaging effects of the New Policing. Future research and 
policymaking in this area should be aimed at understanding and breaking 
the cycles of intergenerational poverty of which the New Policing is an 
important contributor.
465. Id. at 117.
